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1. Introduction – The Rise of Finance and Contemporary Society 
Since the 1980s at least, the world witnessed the ‘rise of finance’. At the 
core of our contemporary “world risk society” (Beck 1999) is a system of 
finance, a network of institutions and actors organizing gigantic flows of 
credit and money, of information and risk. Finance is “the infrastructure of 
the infrastructure, the most integrated ‘playing field’ in the world order” 
(Cerny 1993: 10). The creation of multiple forms of money and access to 
credit are the mechanisms by which the international financial world struc-
tures the global economy (Carruthers and Kim 2011; Strange 1988; Castells 
1996). Contemporary global financial markets have to be viewed as both a 
catalyst and a result of globalization. Financial markets and related econom-
ic ideas and interests which structure and reproduce them connect national 
economies to each other and create mutual dependencies at a global level 
(Lash and Urry 1994; Beck 1999). The proliferation of ‘virtual money’, 
driven by informational, tele-communicational and digital progress, has 
produced a global field, increasingly unregulated by national or internation-
al regimes but structured by market actors themselves. 
 Of course ‘finance’ – the management of money and credit by various 
economic actors – and financial activities as such are not just phenomena of 
our times. Finance has both a long history and a long past. Financial invest-
ment and transactions, saving and the accumulation of wealth have been 
present throughout human history (Weber [1927]1961; Braudel [1979]1983; 
Finley 1973). The roots of modern finance in its capitalistic form can be 
traced back to 16th century Netherlands (Neal 1990; Tracy 1985) or 18th 
century England (Dickson 1967; Carruthers 1996; Michie 1999, 2006) and 
are closely linked to the raising of funds by the modern nation state. How-
ever, most of the practices and institutions of modern finance were invented 
much earlier in the 14th century city-states of Northern Italy – Genoa, Ven-
ice and Florence in particular (Arrighi [1994]2009; Braudel [1979]1983; see 
also Munro 2003). For a long time in history, financial activities were re-
stricted to a ‘power elite’ – landed nobility and clergy in ancient times, aris-
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tocracy, the church and merchant elites in the Middle Ages. However, in 
specific times of economic prosperity even the middle and lower classes 
engaged in financial investment activities. For instance, this holds true for 
financial instruments such as the Genoese loca (Byrne 1930) or municipal 
annuities in 16th century Antwerp (Van der Wee 1977).1  
 ‘Ordinary’ people became involved within finance on a larger scale for 
the first time in the 18th century (Neal 1990; Laurence et al. 2009; Glaisyer 
2006; Preda 2009). In the course of the 19th century and in the beginnings 
of the 20th century, financial investment became a widespread and popular 
practice in the United States and Western Europe (Ott 2011; O’Sullivan 
2007; Preda 2001). Nowadays however, the seemingly unprecedented ex-
pansion of finance appears to outrun its historical origins. In academic ac-
counts, these developments are interpreted as both outcome and condition of 
an elementary change in economic culture and social organization. Since the 
1990s, the term ‘financialization’ has been used by various authors to de-
scribe the shift from industrial capitalism to ‘finance capitalism’. Nowadays, 
it seems “difficult to escape the impression that we live in a world of fi-
nance” (Krippner 2005: 173).Today, we live in financialized times which 
are marked by the increasing control over wealth, power and size of the fi-
nancial industry and the diffusion of financial activities and logics through-
out society as a whole.  
 As we will see throughout this book, the genuinely sociological issues of 
social order and social change can be studied along the dynamics of private 
wealth in such an era of financialization. Although processes of 
financialization represent a ‘commonality’ of contemporary capitalist socie-
ties, we find national-specific varieties of household finance. Despite the 
last decades witnessed a trend towards mass-participatory finance, we find 
remarkable differences in investment practices and asset ownership between 
groups in the social strata. 
                                                       
1 Credit and debt, however, were also available to the poor (Graeber 2011; Gelpi and 
Julien-Labruyere 2000). From the 15th century, institutions sprang up imbued with the 
Franciscan desire to counter usury through granting of loans backed by pledged goods: the 
monti di pietà. 
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 Although the sociology of finance has flourished over the last decade, 
research has mainly focused on the professional world of finance or private 
and public debt. We bring private wealth back in. Backed by the ‘sociology 
of wealth’ and recent research which documents that ‘wealth matters’, we 
argue that the rise of finance and private wealth are closely interrelated. One 
the one hand, the rise of finance and basic processes of marketization and 
privatization cause pressures on people and give rise to ‘new’ insecurities, 
one the other hand, the rise of finance involves new opportunities and op-
tions for many people. We can observe what is called a “duality of struc-
ture” (Giddens 1984) with finance shaping and being shaped by practices of 
investment and the accumulation of wealth. 
 Against the backdrop of the rise of finance and interrelated social dynam-
ics, we discuss the development of private wealth over the last four decades. 
We choose to start our analysis in the 1970s for two reasons. First, for a 
larger number of countries, detailed and comparable data on private wealth 
are only available since the 1960s and 1970s. Second, most of the literature 
on financialization identifies the origins of the rise of finance in the 1970s 
(Krippner 2011; Dobbin and Jung 2010; Fligstein 1990; Crouch 2011). We 
take a look at the historical trajectories of level, composition and distribu-
tion of private wealth in a cross-national perspective and explore to what 
extent there are variations across social structure. The following five inter-
twined questions are guiding our research: 
 
• How have levels of private wealth developed over the last decades? 
• How has the composition of private wealth developed over the last 
decades? 
• How has the distribution of private wealth developed in the long 
run? 
• What drives dynamics of private wealth and what makes them vary 
across countries? 
• How does the social structure of private wealth and investment look 
like? Which social groups rely on which forms of assets? 
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To that, we analyze a range of different types of data. We draw on official 
aggregate data as well as on existing up-to-date household-level survey data. 
 
Outline of the study 
Since this book deals with the development of private wealth throughout the 
last decades from a cross-national perspective, perhaps you might ask: 
Didn’t Thomas Piketty told us this story yet? We would like to say that 
Piketty’s popular work tells only a part of the story and tells it from an 
economist’s point of view. We will provide a sociologically-grounded story 
of the development of private wealth in an era of financialization. What is 
lacking so far is a thorough analysis which explicitly discusses the evolu-
tion, composition and distribution of wealth against the backdrop of trans-
formative processes of financialization taking place in capitalist societies 
since several decades now. We will focus solely on private (household) 
wealth and not on national wealth like Piketty. And, unlike Piketty and his 
partner Gabriel Zucman (2014), we are mainly interested in explaining the 
development of the composition of wealth across time and cross-nationally 
and not chiefly concentrate on the movements of the net wealth-to-income 
ratio. Last but not least, we dig deeper. This means that we extend the num-
ber of countries under analysis for which longitudinal data is available, plus 
we take a look at survey data to explore the micro-level of wealth dynamics. 
In analyzing aggregate data, we discuss historical trends in the dynamics of 
private wealth – its patterns, components and its distributions over time – 
and the reasons for cross-national differences and similarities. In analyzing 
survey data, we take a look at the determinants of the ownership of different 
types of assets at the household level and to what extent there are cross-
national variations.  
 After we give a short overview of classic and more recent sociological 
research on private wealth, we start with discussing financial inclusion in 
historical perspective. We can trace investment practices from ancient and 
pre-modern societies when land, lending and trade represented the economic 
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foundation, to the creation of basic financial, collective or charitable in-
vestment forms, to the emergence of a range of specialized and sophisticat-
ed vehicles, products and funds. We can trace investment as an economic 
activity restricted to a ‘power elite’ to mass-participatory finance in con-
temporary capitalist society. 
 In order to describe the prominent role of finance in our world and the 
current mass-participation within global financial markets, researchers from 
a variety of disciplines make use of the concept of ‘financialization’. So, in 
a second part, we briefly outline financialization as a concept in the social 
sciences. 
 Against this backdrop, we explore the trajectories, patterns and distribu-
tions of private wealth throughout the last decades in cross-national perspec-
tive. As we will show, we cannot analyze the dynamics of private wealth in 
isolation from broader social transformations and other parts of society, nor 
can we look at them in isolation from their socio-structural, institutional and 
cultural environment. Whereas prior research has looked at the development 
of aggregate private wealth and the evolution of wealth inequality, less at-
tention has been paid to the development of the composition of private 
wealth. This surprises since the longitudinal analysis of private debt has 
flourished in the aftermath of the US Subprime Crisis and the European 
sovereign debt crisis. 
 The findings raise the question if and how one can explain the dynamics 
of private wealth since the 1970s. Thus, we examine what impacts private 
wealth accumulation. On the basis of previous research, we argue that wel-
fare state arrangements and the organization of corporate finance are mainly 
responsible for private wealth accumulation throughout the last decades, 
using panel models of 13 OECD countries from 1970 to 2012. 
 From the perspective of the ‘embeddedness’ of economic action 
(Granovetter 1985; Dobbin 2004; Beckert 2003), economic practices not 
only vary across historical contexts, institutional regimes and societies, but 
between social groups within a distinct context as well. Thus, in a final part, 
we investigate the social structure of financial investment. After a brief out-
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line of existing approaches for explaining investment decisions from eco-
nomics, we draw on three sociological concepts to explain financial practic-
es and the choice of investing in specific financial products (investment 
funds, life insurance and pension funds and stocks). We draw on the con-
cepts of ‘investment habitus’ (Bourdieu [1979]1984), ‘special assets’ 
(Zelizer 1989) and ‘conspicuous investment’ (Veblen 1899) in order to ex-
plain different financial practices across the social structure of society. Us-
ing household-level survey data, we conduct an analysis for four different 
countries (Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the United States). 
 Nearly every domain of social life has been touched by financialization – 
from inequality and social mobility to national politics and state power, 
from corporate business and labor markets to social movements and every-
day life. This development makes financial markets and logics an increas-
ingly powerful force that shapes the future of our society. In spite of re-
search accumulation, when it comes to private wealth, the relationship be-
tween financialization and the social dynamics of private wealth still repre-
sents a sociological lacuna. This becomes even more striking in face of the 
increasing significance of private wealth for macro-economic stability and 
price bubbles, old age provision and socio-economic security or future ine-
quality and ongoing public debates on the introduction of an inheritance-tax. 
In looking at mechanisms and consequences behind the developments, pat-
terns and distributions of private wealth in a ‘financialized world’, this study 
not only fills empirical gaps in sociological research, but contributes to a 
comprehensive uncovering of socioeconomic processes and structures 
which are essential for our understanding of contemporary and future socie-
ty. We aim at encouraging a more expansive sociological focus on private 
wealth and financial investment, on issues of social order and change in an 
era of financialization. 
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2. Background 
2.1. Private Wealth and Social Dynamics 
At least since Thomas Piketty’s controversial bestseller Capital in the 21st 
Century (2014) everyone has recognized that ‘wealth matters’. In the after-
math of Piketty’s work, private wealth has developed into a research issue 
par excellence for the social sciences.2 Inequality research increasingly 
turns to wealth as a powerful determinant of social stratification. However, 
much before the Piketty-hype both sociologists and economists have been 
interested in private wealth. Classical economists like Adam Smith, Karl 
Marx, Thorstein Veblen, Simon Kuznets or Raymond Goldsmith as well as 
sociological classics like Max Weber and Georg Simmel engaged in analyz-
ing the role of private wealth for social structure and economic develop-
ment. 
 Wealth has been a longstanding topic in sociology (Weber [1920]1950, 
[1922]1978; Simmel [1907]2004). For Max Weber, the ‘spirit of capitalism’ 
appeared first and foremost in the accumulation of wealth, a spirit fueled by 
protestant ethical norms. Weber also integrated wealth (property ownership) 
in his class concept in distinguishing between acquisition classes and prop-
erty classes (Weber [1922]1978). In his Philosophy of Money, Georg 
Simmel ([1907]2004: 218) conceptualized the possession of money as an 
embodied potentiality since a “fortune is encircled by innumerable possibili-
ties of use”. He uses the German word ‘Vermögen’ which means ‘to be able 
to do something’ to describe this. But although wealth took a central role in 
the classic works, later sociological accounts have neglected wealth for a 
long time. Wealth was either treated as a topic in elite studies (see Mills 
1956) or was only exceptionally integrated in sociological research on strati-
fication and families (see Henretta and Campbell 1978, 1980). Typically, 
income has been taken as the main indicator of economic well-being and 
was investigated extensively (see e.g. Parkin 1971; Grusky et al. 2008). 
However, a look at the income variable alone is not enough to understand 
                                                       
2 Throughout the text household wealth and private wealth are used interchangeably. 
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the true nature of economic inequality and social structures. Studies at the 
aggregate level and the household level show that income and wealth 
measures are only weakly correlated (Keister and Moller 2000; Wolff 2006; 
Skopek et al. 2012). Besides, and perhaps even more important, research has 
continuously found wealth distributions to be more equal than income dis-
tributions (Wolff 2006; Davies 2008; Piketty 2014). 
 
Towards a sociology of wealth 
For a sociologist wealth is too essential and fascinating to ignore. Wealth 
ownership significantly impacts social outcomes and vice versa – a thing 
already noted by Georg Simmel ([1907]2004) in his Philosophy of Money. 
In other words, wealth “provides for both short- and long-term financial se-
curity, bestows social prestige, contributes to political power, and can be 
used to produce more wealth” (Keister and Moller 2000: 64). Indeed, we 
can distill four ‘wealth-effects’ from the literature: (1) wealth as security, 
(2) wealth as inherited advantage, (3) wealth as income, (4) wealth as power 
and (5) wealth as capabilities. 
 
Wealth as security 
Wealth provides security in multiple forms (security-effect). Next to eco-
nomic security, wealth ownership guarantees and secures social position in 
the social structure and additionally creates “ontological security” (Giddens 
1991) in a world marked by transitions, crises and risks. 
 Wealth can function as a safety net in critical life phases like illness, un-
employment or old age – a role which is particularly important in less gen-
erous liberal and family-based welfare states (Skopek et al. 2014). This safe-
ty net character, however, increasingly becomes important in conservative 
and social-democratic welfare states, too. Traditionally, wealth accumula-
tion and investment are important strategies to handle status uncertainty, 
especially for the middle classes (Groh-Samberg et al. 2014). Against the 
background of welfare state re-building, however, property ownership gains 
increasing importance (Mau 2015; Schimank 2011). For securing one’s fu-
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ture standard of living, particularly when it comes to retirement, accumula-
tion of wealth becomes a necessity and basic condition for status mainte-
nance. Property promises to offer security and certainty in an uncertain 
world. In times of growing status insecurities across developed capitalist 
societies (Beck 2001; Sennett 2006), asset ownership provides status 
maintenance for present and future generations – in particular for the strug-
gling middle classes (Mau 2015; Nachtwey 2016). 
 This holds particularly true for a society in which intergenerational 
wealth transfers take a key role for financial well-being (Korom 2016). In-
deed, previous research shows that parental wealth has effects on children’s 
educational attainment (Conley 2001), and education is in turn related di-
rectly with wealth (Keister 2003). Parents’ wealth is strongly associated 
with their children’s wealth (Charles and Hurst 2003; Keister 2004), mainly 
via the acquisition of homeownership. Wealthy people also seem to be 
healthier (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 2013) and report higher levels of 
subjective well-being (Hochman and Skopek 2013).  
 
Wealth as inherited advantage 
Unlike for the intergenerational transfer of education or income, there is a 
direct mechanism for the transmission of wealth inequality (Kohli 2004; 
Beckert 2007). Wealth and its “superadditum” (Simmel [1907]2004) can be 
transferred across multiple generations (inherited advantage-effect). Wealth 
accumulation represents a typical case for the “Matthew-effect” (Merton 
1968) and social mechanisms of “cumulative advantage” (DiPrete and 
Eirich 2006).  
 A lot of recent research has investigated the ambivalent mechanism of 
inheritance which seemingly contradicts with the meritocratic principles of 
modern market society. Recent research not only emphasizes that inherited 
wealth is distributed uneven across the social structure of society (Korom 
2016; Szydlik 2004; Szydlik und Schupp 2004), but also that inheritance of 
family wealth has profound, long-lasting effects on social mobility across 
several generations (Clark 2014). For example, Clark and Cummins (2014) 
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use the distribution of rare surnames in England and find significant correla-
tion between the wealth of families that are five generations apart. In a simi-
lar study on Florentine surnames, Barone and Mocetti (2016) find evidence 
of substantial real wealth inheritance across generations that are six centu-
ries apart. 
 There are at least two main mechanisms through which wealth is accu-
mulated: (1) labor market income or self-earned wealth and (2) inheritance 
or intergenerationally transferred wealth (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 
2013; Skopek et al. 2014). However, prior research also points at education 
(Keister 2003), marriage (Zagorsky 2005), homeownership (Killewald and 
Bryan 2016), and self-employment (Quadrini 1999) as possible channels of 
wealth accumulation. 
 Today, there is a widespread debate on the extent to which inheritance as 
a source of wealth accumulation is growing in importance (Piketty and 
Zucman 2015). For instance, France Piketty (2011) shows that the annual 
flow of inheritance in France rose from less than 5 per cent of national in-
come in 1950 to 15 per cent in 2010. Schinke (2012) finds that the annual 
inheritance flow in Germany increased from 2 per cent to about 11 percent 
of national income between 1960 and 2010. 
 Usually, intergenerational inheritance is suggested as playing a key role 
for the perpetuation of wealth inequality and the preservation of the largest 
fortunes from generation to generation (Szydlik 2004; Spilerman 2000; 
Piketty and Zucman 2015; Nau and Tumin 2012). In a recent study, 
Adermon et al. (2016) show that inheritances and gifts can explain the 
greater part of the intergenerational correlation in wealth. However, in the 
course of economic recovery after both World Wars, middle class wealth 
spread – particularly through homeownership – and the role of inheritance 
has become more ambiguous. Empirical studies partly differ (1) in the rela-
tive importance they assign to inheritance as a source of wealth and (2) in 
whether it has equalizing or disequalizing effects on the distribution of 
wealth. Partly, this stems from the fact that data on inheritance are even rar-
er than data on wealth, making it difficult to ascertain the correct relation-
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ship between inheritance and wealth ownership (see Miller and McNamee 
1998). 
 Whereas Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein (2013) attribute equal importance 
to labor market income generated and intergenerational wealth transfers, 
recently, Korom (2016) finds evidence that wealth transfers contribute more 
to wealth accumulation than higher incomes. Analysis based on US survey 
data suggests that inherited wealth accounts for 19–35 percent of total ag-
gregate net worth (Wolff 2002). Corresponding estimates for Sweden put 
the size of transfer wealth somewhere in the range of 10–20 percent 
(Klevmarken 2004). Modigliani (1988) estimates that transfer wealth, con-
sisting of both inter-vivos (made between living persons) and bequests 
(made after the death of the giver), account for only 20 percent of the net 
worth of families in the United States. In a previous analysis, in contrast, 
Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), find that transfer wealth accounts for at least 
80 percent of total US net worth. In a later study Gale and Scholz (1994) 
estimate that inter-vivos transfers and bequests account for more than 50 
percent of family wealth in the United States. On the basis of an extensive 
literature survey, Davies and Shorrocks (2000) conclude that a reasonable 
rough estimate is that inheritance contributes some 35–45 percent to aggre-
gate net wealth. 
 In addition to the controversy over the size of inherited wealth, studies 
vary with respect to their conclusions on whether inheritance makes the dis-
tribution of wealth more or less equal. As some investigations suggest, in-
heritance has an equalizing effect (Laitner 1979; Tomes 1981). Others point 
to ways by which inheritance can exert a disequalizing effect with respect to 
the distribution of wealth (Davies 1982; De Nardi 2004; Leitner 2016). 
McNamee and Miller (1998) argue that inheritance inevitably leads to in-
creases in the wealth ownership of top wealth holders. Also a recent study 
on the Forbes list by Korom et al. (2015) demonstrates that despite declining 
power of inheritance, family wealth continues to play an important role in 
the longevity of fortunes among the super-rich. Further recent research sug-
gests that inheritance can probably best be seen as maintaining rigidity in 
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the wealth structure rather than either narrowing or widening them 
(Karagiannaki 2011a, b). 
 
Wealth as income 
However, wealth not only perpetuates inequality via the institution of inher-
itance, creates security and provides a safety net, it also can produce income 
(dividends, property income, rent, capital income) (income-effect). Wealth 
can create more wealth when it is reinvested and thus, wealth ownership 
involves the potential to commit resources with the goal of achieving a re-
turn. But income which derives from the ownership of wealth (assets, prop-
erty, land) is very unequally distributed across the income distribution (Nau 
2013). Indeed, empirical analyses on OECD economies reveal that capital 
incomes witnessed considerable increases throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
(Epstein and Jayadev 2005; Godechot 2012). As a consequence, research 
speaks of the “return to hegemony of the financial fraction of ruling classes” 
(Duménil and Lévy 2001: 578), also known as the ‘rentier class’ (Epstein 
and Jayadev 2005). Besides, more recent research documents that capital 
incomes partly contributed to the recent rise in income inequality across 
capitalist democracies. In a micro-data-based study, Adler and Schmid 
(2013) illustrate a positive association between capital income shares and 
market income concentration. Using EU-SILC data covering 17 EU coun-
tries from 2005 to 2011 also Schlenker and Schmid (2014) find that capital 
income shares are positively associated with the concentration of gross 
household income. Both Fräßdorf et al. (2011) in an analysis for the United 
Kingdom, Germany and the United States within the years between 1984 
and 2004, and García-Penalosa and Orgiazzi (2013) in a cross-country com-
parison covering Canada, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
and the United States over the last three decades of the 20th century show 
the relevance of capital income for the evolution of income inequality. 
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Wealth as power 
As many commentators note, the clear neglect of wealth in previous decades 
of sociological research surprises (Spilerman 2000; Keister and Moller 
2000). This becomes even more striking since wealth concentration in 
Western societies remained significantly high from the mid-18th century to 
the early 1900s, declined during the World Wars, only to go up again since 
the 1970s. In this more recent “New Gilded Age” (Bartels 2009), wealth 
concentration has been observed most remarkably in the United States (Saez 
and Zucman 2016; Kopczuk and Saez 2004; Keister 2014). According to 
Piketty (2014), we are currently witnessing the resurgence of “patrimonial 
capitalism”: in spite of a democratization of wealth with an increasing ac-
cumulation of property by the middle class, capitalism is once again charac-
terized by extreme wealth inequalities. 
 This matters because wealth goes hand in hand with power – “the proba-
bility that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry 
out his own will despite resistance” (Weber [1922]1978: 53) (power-effect). 
Wealth can provide access to political power, with significant implications 
for participatory democracy. Already classic elite studies point at the power 
deriving from wealth ownership (Pareto 1950; Mills 1956; Rubinstein 
1977). As contemporary commentators note, in times of growing wealth in-
equalities in capitalist societies, the political power of wealth owners has 
great implications for democracy – for citizen participation, government re-
sponsiveness and patterns of policymaking. Various works discuss the polit-
ical consequences of wealth concentration (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Bar-
tels 2009; Keister 2014). As recent research confirms, the top 1 percent of 
wealth holders have much more political influence than the rest of the popu-
lation (Gilens 2012; Page et al. 2013). Hager (2014, 2015) shows that US 
public debt has come to serve as an institution of power working in the in-
terests of the top one per cent of the wealth distribution over the past three 
decades. 
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Wealth as capabilities 
But wealth is more than just one driver of inequalities among many candi-
dates. Wealth matters because it embodies the capability and freedom to 
choose between different options (capability effect) (Simmel [1907]2004; 
Deutschmann 2001) – a feature which Grundmann (2011) calls 
“Handlungsvermögen”. So, unlike Piketty and Bourdieu, we should not 
speak of ‘capital’. Based on the sociology of money, we prefer to speak of 
‘wealth’ – like Georg Simmel at the beginning of the 20th century. In his 
sociological analysis of money and society, Simmel ([1907]2004) empha-
sizes freedom as the essential potential of money because money is transfer-
able in nearly everything. The advantages deriving from the ownership of 
money can be understood as an inevitable addition – the “superadditum of 
wealth” (Simmel [1907]2004). Through the formation of ties among innu-
merable individuals in modern society, money secures personal freedom and 
liberty. Money allows being free to choose and decide, it “is a mere potenti-
ality which stores up a merely subjectively anticipatable future in the form 
of an objectively existing present” (Simmel [1907]2004: 243). Thus, money 
does not only represent liquidity and a claim upon existing goods, it embod-
ies a wealth-potential and an imaginative dimension as well. However, 
whereas the wealth-poor by necessity have to use whatever little money they 
have as they spend it for specific purposes, the wealth-rich have the oppor-
tunity to reshape the purpose of money and can spend, save or invest money 
to accumulate more wealth.  
 Monetary resources not only possess a past and a present dimension, but 
also a future dimension. Typically, wealth was accumulated and generated 
in the past, is invested, stored and accumulated in the present, for returns or 
benefits in the future. Wealth ownership puts people in the position of being 
able to make choices and decisions – to realize their interests and ideas, to 
control uncertainty.  
“Since money is not related at all to a specific purpose, it acquires a relation to the to-
tality of purposes. Money is the tool that has the greatest possible number of unpre-
dictable uses and so possesses the maximum value attainable in this respect. The mere 
possibility of unlimited uses that money has, or represents, on account of its lack of 
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any content of its own, is manifested in a positive way by the restlessness of money, 
by its urge to be used, so to speak” (Simmel [1907]2004: 212). 
Wealth ownership means that people are not only able and free to choose 
between different material and social options, but between different spaces 
and temporalities as well. People are in the position to generate and stock up 
future options in the present. They gain control over material, social, spatial 
and temporal uncertainties. 
“This usurious interest upon wealth, these advantages that its possessor gains without 
being obliged to give anything in return, are bound up with the money form of value. 
For those phenomena obviously express or reflect that unlimited freedom of use which 
distinguishes money from all other values. This it is that creates the state of affairs in 
which a rich man has an influence not only by what he does but also by what he could 
do” (Simmel [1907]2004: 218). 
According to Simmel ([1907]2004), money in modern society is, therefore, 
not simply a means of economic exchange, it is an ‘absolute means’. He 
conceptualizes this potential using the German noun ‘Vermögen’, glossed as 
‘wealth’, ‘fortune’ or ‘means’. However, the semantics of the German 
‘Vermögen’ go beyond these denotations. ‘Vermögen’ actually denotes ‘the 
status of being able to do something’ in sense of a capacity, ability or pow-
er.  
 Because wealth ownership is encircled by numerous possibilities of use, 
“which extend far beyond the employment of the income from it on the ben-
efits which the income brings to other people” (Simmel [1907]2004: 218), 
wealth is not only closely associated with the mechanisms of ‘individualized 
society’ (Beck [1986]1992; Gross 1994) but also with the “colonization of 
the future” (Giddens 1991) – the management of future uncertainty as the 
basic foundation of economic action (Wilke 2012; 2016; Beckert 2014). 
 This is of major importance, since the new economic sociology has in-
deed chosen the management of uncertainty by various economic actors as 
its starting point for inquiry (Granovetter 1984; Beckert 2007, 2009). From 
the perspective of economic sociology, economic action and decisions in 
capitalist society are always oriented towards an unknown, uncertain and 
open future. Uncertainties result from (1) problems of double contingency, 
that is one’s own economic success depends on the actions of others and (2) 
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future events which are unknown in the present (Esposito 2011; Beckert 
2009, 2014; Luhmann [1991]1993). One the one hand, uncertainty produces 
insecurity and problems for the coordination of economic activities, on the 
other hand, uncertainty represent a source of opportunities (Esposito 2011, 
2013; Luhmann 1979). 
 People try to influence future outcomes with present decisions – the fu-
ture becomes the “present future” (Luhmann 1979). In this sense, people act 
in a way that is oriented towards “imagined futures” (Beckert 2013, 2011).  
“Present-day action is not to be understood just as the ultimate outcome of past events 
but rather as an outcome of perceptions of the future: it is not just that ‘history mat-
ters’, but also that the ‘future matters’” (Beckert 2014: 17). 
Whereas such a future represents unlimited possibilities and the “promise of 
absolute wealth” (Deutschmann 2001), it simultaneously means unpredicta-
ble, incalculable dangers and permanent threat to economic status. The in-
definite future represents both a “storehouse of possibilities” (Luhmann 
1976: 131), “a space of promises and hopes” and at the same time always “a 
space of possible damage and anguish” (Esposito 2011: 32). 
 Perhaps this holds true for economic decisions made with regard to 
wealth in particular. On the one hand, wealth (or better, the ‘prudent’ man-
agement of it) serves as a ‘tool-kit’ to be able to “colonize the future” 
(Giddens 1991). Assets can be used for speculation or for insuring against 
the unanticipated risks of an uncertain future. On the other hand, wealth it-
self is at risk from unforeseen future events and dynamics (crises, price 
movements, competition, political events or environmental catastrophes). 
Wealth and risk – as the explicit and implicit goods of an advanced moder-
nity – are inextricably interwoven (Beck [1984]1992: 18). 
“Risk comes into play when, beyond mere fate, one considers the way future events 
depend on present behaviour – that is, as opportunities to build or as possible failures 
(the two aspects are linked in that if we do not expose ourselves to possible damages, 
we cannot enjoy possible benefits” (Esposito 2011: 32). 
Since people have to decide without being able to anticipate the economic 
outcomes, even decisions to delay or not to decide have to be made under 
conditions of fundamental uncertainty. Any and all decisions and, therefore, 
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also any and all non-decisions are risky (Esposito 2011; Luhmann 
[1991]1993). As any and all decisions are ‘bets on the future’, then, safety is 
an illusion. 
 How, then, decisions are made in face of uncertainty of the outcomes of 
decisions? Problems of the uncertainty and openness of the future are man-
aged differently in different economic constellations, depending on the 
“embeddedness” of economic action in institutions, cultural frames and so-
cial structure (Granovetter 1985; Dobbin 2004; Beckert 2009, 2003). Such a 
perspective involves the view of economic action as a special case of social 
action (Weber [1922]1978; see also Luhmann 1988) which cannot be ex-
plained by a “natural propensity to truck, barter and exchange one thing for 
another” (Smith [1776]1993: 21). Accordingly, economic rationalities are 
shaped by the contexts in which they are socially “embedded” (Granovetter 
1985, 1992). Economic rationality cannot be analyzed abstractly, by isolat-
ing the economy from the influences of external social structures. Economy 
and society are intimately intertwined. Seemingly irrational behaviors are 
frequently motivated by considerations inappropriate to pure economic log-
ic, but are nevertheless meaningful and in no case arbitrary. “[T]he behavior 
and institutions to be analyzed are so constrained by ongoing social relations 
that to construe them as independent is a grievous misunderstanding” 
(Granovetter 1985: 482). The ‘social embeddedness’ of economic action 
refers to “the extent to which economic action is linked to or depends on 
action or institutions that are non-economic in content, goals or processes” 
(Granovetter 2005: 35). 
 Since economic life is situated and embedded in social life, courses of 
economic action are formed by institutional structures, social networks, and 
horizons of meaning (Beckert 2009; Fligstein and Dauter 2007; Zukin and 
DiMaggio 1990). Previous research has, thus, detected a number of social 
mechanisms – social networks, institutions, power relations and cognition – 
that provide the contexts, conduits, and categories integral to economic ac-
tion (Dobbin 2004; Fligstein 2001; Beckert 2009, 2010). 
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2.2. The Economic Sociology of Finance and Private Wealth 
Over the last fifteen years, ‘finance’ has developed into a renewed topic for 
sociology (Carruthers and Kim 2011; Preda 2007; Knorr-Cetina and Preda 
2005, 2012; Kalthoff and Vormbusch 2012; Kraemer and Nessel 2012). The 
sociology of finance typically concentrates on the professional world of fi-
nance (Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger 2002; Abolafia 1996; MacKenzie 2006; 
MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Beunza and Stark 2004; Beunza and Garud 
2007; Lépinay 2011). Finance capitalism is mainly studied along the prac-
tices and discourses related to stock exchanges, banks and funds, analysts 
and traders and sometimes non-financial firms.  
 However, in the aftermath of the US Subprime Crisis, research has in-
creasingly explored private households and their place in the ‘global game’ 
of finance. Yet, although we can witness increasing interest in household 
finance, sociologists have mainly looked at private debt and credit practices 
(Streeck 2014; Mertens 2015; Prasad 2012; Kus 2013). In contrast, private 
wealth and investment in an age of financialization are relatively unexplored 
topics in sociological research. Small investors and savers rarely occupy an 
own place in sociological studies dedicated to finance, despite economic 
sociology has recognized the role of popular investment beginning in the 
1980s (Lowry 1984; Useem 1996; Gaskin 1998). This recent neglect of pri-
vate investment surprises since the household is regarded as a 
“key institution in a financialised economy, where savings and investment circuits di-
vert middle class long term savings and expectations for retirement onto the stock 
market and where the household buffers the consequences for individuals who have 
not made the necessary savings” (Froud et al. 2002: 125). 
The focus on ‘popular finance’, ‘private finance’, ‘amateur financiers’ and 
‘small investors’ involves exploring the reception of a distinct (financial) 
context. How do households react and respond to socio-economic transfor-
mations and how new situations are perceived and utilized? The apparent 
neglect of ordinary people’s wealth in sociological research on financial 
topics appears surprising, because private wealth represents such a tradi-
tional subject of economic sociology dating back to the works of Weber 
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([1922]1978; [1927]1961) and Simmel ([1907]2004) to later works by Mills 
(1956) or Bourdieu (1963, 2005). 
 Only around the turn of the century, sociologists began to show increas-
ing interest in issues of wealth. More recently, researchers have produced 
various studies that explore the composition, evolution and distribution of 
private wealth, making use of various types of available data. In particular, 
the role of wealth for social inequality became a central issue in prominent 
sociological works: Lisa A. Keister’s Wealth in America (2000) or Conley’s 
Being Black, Living in the Red (1999), Oliver and Shapiro’s Black 
Wealth/White Wealth (1995), Seymour Spilerman’s Wealth and Stratifica-
tion Processes (2000) or Jens Beckert’s Inherited Wealth (2007). 
 However, the changing level, composition and distribution of private 
wealth in an age of financialization has absorbed little interest by empirical 
research. Although the ‘metamorphosis of private wealth’ is often discussed 
by sociologists (Deutschmann 2011, 2010; Schimank 2011; Davis 2009; 
Preda 2009; Langley 2008), there are only a few works which draw an em-
pirical picture. 
 A number of recent works by economists study the movements of wealth 
inequality in a cross-country comparative framework (Roine and 
Waldenström 2015; Piketty 2014; Wolff 2006) and examine cross-national 
private wealth inequality for single points in time (Cowell et al. 2012a, b; 
Sierminska et al. 2007; Davis 2008). Up to now, however, no sociological 
research has tried to look at dynamics of wealth inequality in a cross-
country perspective and to place it in a broader social context. This surprises 
because a number of more recent sociological studies explore the mecha-
nisms behind wealth ownership within a cross-country comparative frame-
work (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 2013; Skopek et al. 2014; Korom 
2016) 
 What is true for dynamics of wealth inequality is also true for dynamics 
of private wealth in general. So far, we miss sociological research which 
studies the historical trends, patterns and variations of private wealth in 
cross-country comparative perspectives. Perhaps this becomes even more 
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striking since economists have produced a number of stimulating works 
over the last couple of decades. Recent comparative research from the field 
of economics has explored the development of wealth-to-income ratios over 
time (Piketty and Zucman 2014; Piketty 2014), the evolution of household 
portfolios across time and space (Guiso et al. 2002), and long-term trends in 
household financial assets (De Bonis et al. 2013; Bartiloro et al. 2012; 
Ynesta 2008).  
 Despite the prominence of the concept of financialization across the so-
cial sciences and the increasing interest in private wealth as a topic, contem-
porary sociologists have rarely addressed the interrelationship between fi-
nancial markets and private wealth. Nevertheless, sociologists have not been 
totally ignorant. In analyzing German survey data, Wahl (2011) shows that 
risk perception and risky investment decisions are closely associated with 
social position and are manifestations of a distinct lifestyle. In the period 
1993–2003, certain groups of the middle and upper classes moved their fi-
nancial wealth from deposits, bank accounts and insurance towards invest-
ment funds and stocks. Also Wilke (2016) analyzes German survey data and 
takes a look at the development and social structure of private pension in-
vestment over the last decade. His findings reveal that investment decisions 
are product of a complex interaction between social, economic, mental and 
cultural factors. For the United States, Fligstein and Goldstein (2015) and 
Harrington (2008) discuss the emergence of a ‘finance culture’ and ‘invest-
ment culture’ within large segments of the American middle and upper clas-
ses. Whereas Fligstein and Goldstein (2015) trace the socio-structural 
embeddedness of financial practices and beliefs from 1989–2007 by making 
use of household survey data, Harrington (2008) explores community-
building via ‘investment clubs’ during the Dot.com bubble in a mixed-
methods design. There are also two qualitative studies for Germany which 
explore the ‘inner life’ of small investors. Both, Legnaro et al. (2005) and 
Schimank and Stopper (2012) show that financial activities of small inves-
tors are driven by profit-seeking and ‘making a quick buck’ on the one 
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hand, but are motivated by motives of old age provision and future-related 
fears on the other hand. 
 However, these studies are single-country studies, either referring to the 
German or the US case. What we miss are sociological investigations which 
look at investment practices and asset ownership within the framework of 
financialization in cross-national perspective. Up to now, research which 
explicitly deals with trends of private wealth in an era of financialization 
comes from heterodox (political) economists. In a comparative study which 
explicitly links financialization and private wealth dynamics, Erturk et al. 
(2005) find that household portfolios converge towards riskier investment, 
by making use of aggregate data for four European economies (France, 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) over the years 1980–2003. Gerba 
and Schelkle (2013) provide an aggregate data-based discussion of a 
‘household finance-welfare state nexus’. Their findings point at a two-way 
effect of public policy on household asset building, which is either comple-
mentary or substitutive, depending on country context. In another study, the 
same authors find a significant linkage between welfare state reforms and 
household asset formation in a case study for the United States (Gerba and 
Schelkle 2014). 
2.3. Wealth and Income: Defining the Concepts 
Before we start, we should make clear what we technically mean by the 
term ‘wealth’. Whereas income is a flow, wealth is a stock. Income as a 
flow of funds has to be defined in relation to a period of time – yearly, 
monthly, weekly, daily, and hourly). Typically, sources for income are wag-
es, salaries or own businesses, interest or dividend payments, gifts or social 
transfers. Income is either quantified at the household or the individual lev-
el. 
 In contrast to income, wealth as a stock refers to the assets people own at 
one single point in time. Typically, wealth is measured as net worth – all 
assets minus all debts. Assets include non-financial assets, also known as 
real assets, and financial assets. Generally, wealth as net worth is quantified 
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at the household level since assets, such as the main residence, tend to be 
jointly owned by married couples or the whole family. The category of non-
financial assets consists of real estate (home or primary residence, holiday 
homes and other real estate), business equity, vehicles as well as valuable 
art or jewelry. Financial assets consist of saving accounts and deposits, 
bonds, stocks, mutual funds, retirement accounts and insurance assets. Debts 
include home mortgages, student loans, consumer debt and other short-term 
liabilities.  
 As research has shown and as we will see later, wealth, compared to in-
come and earnings, is substantially more unequally distributed. In general, 
however, financial assets are even distributed more unequally than non-
financial assets (especially when it comes to housing wealth). 
2.4. Financial Inclusion in Historical Perspective 
Investment may be defined as the commitment of financial resources for 
future returns. While there exist multiple ways of making financial invest-
ments, the very existence of investment as such – defined as– has been a 
universal phenomenon throughout history. In antiquity and pre-modern 
times, from Mesopotamia to Egypt, from Greece to Rome, land was the 
basic investment vehicle. Although also lending on interest represented an-
other pillar of investment in pre-modern times, it was limited in its devel-
opment by its capital limitations on the one hand and usury laws on the oth-
er (Graeber 2011; Gelpi and Julien-Labruyere 2000; Esposito 2011; Le Goff 
[1986]1990). Trade and commerce as investment vehicles based on ex-
change value and spatial mobility gained importance and influence much 
later in medieval Europe – first in Genoa and Venice. 
 Throughout history the dominant forms of investment vehicles changed. 
Whereas agricultural land represented the main investment medium in an-
cient times, by the Middle Ages, investment in trade and commerce in-
creased heavily through financial instruments like marine insurance or early 
futures contracts. The Commercial Revolution, however, witnessed another 
shift in the main investment form towards lending on interest. Finance and 
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merchant elite families of the Italian city-states who had become wealthy 
and influential by maritime trade, engaged in lending to sovereigns, gov-
ernments and the Catholic Church all over Europe. 
 Although investment via lending to state powers continued to be an im-
portant investment practice, the emergence of the corporate form of the 
joint-stock company and the advent of public markets for shares, bonds or 
bills of exchange gave birth to the parallel existence of a larger set of in-
vestment forms for an increasing public. Eventually, investment became 
accessible and necessary for everyone with the emergence of the concept of 
retirement, which was reinforced further with the privatization of old age 
security over the second half of the 20th century.  
 Throughout history, the actors who mainly engaged (or were allowed to 
engage) in investment activities changed. In ancient and pre-modern times, 
investment was typically restricted to a ‘power elite’ including aristocracy, 
administrative or political elites and clergy. In the medieval city-state econ-
omy, during the Commercial Revolution, merchant elites and financiers in-
creasingly gained access to investment opportunities including international 
trade and lending to state powers. Broader parts of the population became 
involved within finance and investment in the course of the Industrial Revo-
lution with growing public markets for investment in railroads, mining and 
construction. Financial investment became a mass activity in the first part of 
the 20th century. Markets for war bonds made large parts of ordinary 
households becoming investors. Then, the privatization of old age security 
took the financial inclusion of populations in advanced societies to a next 
level. 
 In the following, we take a brief look at precursors to modern forms of 
financial investment. However, neither we hypothesize causations, nor do 
we give comprehensive historical accounts of ancient and pre-modern in-
vestment environments. Rather, we show that investment and its institution-
al and cultural environment was historically contingent and that practices of 
organizing investment changed throughout history. 
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2.4.1. Investment in Ancient and Pre-modern Times: Land, Lending, 
Trade and the Power Elite 
We can find an ample collection of approaches to ownership, trade, com-
merce and lending in early societies. All of these share a general under-
standing of the concept of investment, which at its basic level represented 
the principle of increasing wealth over time. Such an understanding implied 
that resources had to be organized and managed, so that in spite of Aristo-
tle’s aversion against the productiveness of money, individual and collective 
prosperity in the future could be realized (Esposito 2011). 
 From today’s point of view, pre-modern economic organization and prac-
tices of investment are unquestionably bizarre. For example, throughout ear-
ly history, different societies had to cope with how to ensure repayment of 
loans. In different contexts, different solutions were developed in order to 
handle such future uncertainty. While the ancient Egyptians relied on oaths 
given to gods (Rathbone 1991), the Persians made it possible to take a bor-
rower’s child as repayment and the Greeks and Egyptians made use of 
trustworthy and financially solvent local cosigners (Manning 2001). 
 Ancient and pre-modern societies developed complex political and reli-
gious frameworks that governed the organization of investment. This holds 
true of the (1) Jewish ‘isqua investment partnership (~1200) which was 
forced by rabbinical law and involved that the agent must be eligible for a 
greater percentage of the profits than he was liable for the losses (Udovitch 
1962), (2) the Byzantine investment instrument by maritime law called 
chreokoinonia (~600 BC) which exposed the agent to liability (his propor-
tional liability in the case of loss was equal to his proportional gain in the 
case of profit) (Laiou 2002), (3) the Islamic legal framework called 
mudaraba (~800) which was a contract between an investor and an agent 
who deployed the capital of the investor for long-distance trade (Cizakca 
1996), or (4) the commenda structure in medieval Italy (~1300) which re-
sembled the Islamic mudaraba and featured an active and a passive partner, 
with no liability to the former (Weber 1961[1927]; de Roover 1941) and an 
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underlying profit breakdown amounting to about one-quarter for the agent 
and three-quarters for the investor.  
 
Investment and land 
In antiquity, agricultural land was the main store of wealth, source of in-
come and resource of gains for investors (Weber [1927]1961; Braudel 
[1979]1983). In the ancient and pre-modern world, land literally referred to 
title, authority and rule. It was determined by factors of nobility, military 
rule or claims to divine right. The major characteristic of land investors in 
ancient societies was their high economic, social and political status. These 
investors can be described in what C. Wright Mills (1956) once called the 
“power elite”. Given that ancient and pre-modern societies associated agri-
culture with nobility and commerce or trade with low status, the dominant 
practice of storing and accumulating wealth in land and estates is not really 
surprising. However, the ancient landowners of the societal elite typically 
delegated the management of their assets to the hands of special managers – 
lower status people or slaves – because the landowners usually held other 
occupations or positions (political, military, administrative).  
 In Mesopotamia, the first known civilization, land was typically owned 
by the temple or the government. However, there is also evidence for the 
existence of private property which belonged to wealthy urban Mesopota-
mians who owned land in the countryside (Van De Mieroop 1999). Land-
ownership by the temple and state was managed by a rather advanced bu-
reaucracy which decided on when and how public property should be rented 
out. Farmers then had to compensate the temple or state for the license of 
farming with silver (van Driel 1999). 
 Estate management also played an important role in ancient Greece. 
However, Greek landowners, who were mostly privileged and well-born 
members of society, did not farm the land themselves but either hired man-
agers or made use of slaves (Michell 1957). In ancient Rome, estate man-
agement became more and more central (Kehoe 1997). Ownership of prop-
erty and land all over the rapidly expanding empire became increasingly 
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common. Investment in real estate played a great role for family wealth ac-
cumulation. The Roman elites were owners of numbers of land, estates and 
farms, which were either awarded for military or political reasons or pur-
chased as investments. Investments in the provinces (Greece, Spain and Af-
rica) accelerated as the Roman Empire witnessed further expansion (Frank 
1959). Like the Greek social elite, also the Roman elite delegated the man-
agement of their assets to the hands of procurators, financial and property 
managers and slaves (Andreau 1999). 
 
Investment and lending on interest 
Along with agriculture, lending was another practiced investment activity 
which existed already in antiquity (Gelpi and Julien-Labruyere 2000). Typi-
cally, lending was interpreted as a low-prestige and only fairly accepted ac-
tivity. However, this does not mean that only lower classes of society en-
gaged in lending activities. Lending was practiced, either overtly or secretly, 
by the privileged and wealthy. Coinage as well as increasing demand for 
capital by manufacturers and merchants fuelled investment activities 
(Toutain 1996). In the ancient and pre-modern period, interest-rates varied 
across time and space. Usually, non-interest-bearing consumption loans 
were made among relatives, friends, neighbors or respectable business peo-
ple. For credit that could not be obtained on an interest-free basis, people 
had to go to bankers who typically gave credit at high interest rates (Millett 
1991; Cohen 1992). During certain periods of Greek or Egyptian history, 
loans were made with extremely high interest rates (from 12–18 percent in 
Greece and from 50–100 percent in Egypt). Nevertheless, already in ancient 
times, lending was heavily regulated by state authorities and since lending 
and interest are tightly interrelated, questions of usury became part of eco-
nomic and religious discourse. 
 Maritime loans were a financial investment instrument actively used in 
ancient Greece. Contrary to modern lending however, in the case of sinking 
or shipwreck, the sailor was not held liable and the loss was borne in full by 
the lenders (Homer and Sylla 2005). Nevertheless, Greek maritime loans 
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were potentially beneficial for the lender. In general, a profit rate of 23–30 
percent could be realized for voyages between Athens and Istanbul. 
 Also in Rome, non-interest lending continued but on a much smaller 
scale. In comparison to other ancient societies, the Roman society seems to 
have been a comparatively more financialized and economically more liber-
al one. Next to the emergence of more complex financial relations and more 
sophisticated practices, Roman bankers and financiers attained higher social 
status (Andreau 1999). Whereas wealthy and powerful Greek bankers typi-
cally continued to belong to the lower classes, some of the Roman bankers’ 
sons later became senators. In Rome, lending at interest seems to have been 
very lucrative. The Roman upper class participated in lending for centuries 
– as lenders and borrowers. Politically ambitious noblemen, like Caesar for 
instance, usually were highly indebted because financing campaigns and 
wining voters required significant funds. It seems that they paid up to four 
times the legal cap of 12 percent interest (Toutain 1996). 
 
Investment and trade 
Historically, trade represented the riskiest form of investment in antiquity 
and medieval Europe. This holds true for long-distance trade on land and for 
maritime trade. Whereas trade by sea was limited by weather and piracy, 
trade by land was even more dangerous and arduous. Of course, these ven-
tures bore high risks of loss, but also the chance of extraordinary profit mar-
gins. Trade and commerce, craft and manufacturing, were typically prac-
ticed by lower classes (strangers or lowborn). The members of the elite and 
high society only rarely engaged in such businesses, even though they partly 
did investing in maritime trade operations. 
 While serious investment in trade and commerce had existed for large 
parts of history, a transition from investment leadership in agriculture to in-
vestment leadership in trade occurred only by the 11th century. Although a 
certain kind of market economy had already emerged during the Roman 
Empire (Scheidel et al. 2007), the Middle Ages witnessed further develop-
ment in the organization, scope and sophistication of trade. At the same 
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time, with the increasing importance of trade, the new class of traveling 
merchants took a special position within the social structure – they were nei-
ther unfree and poor, nor did they belong to the elite and nobility (Pirenne 
1952).  
 Although, by that time, trade was by no means the key economic sector 
in Europe, trade and commerce grew dynamically. Merchants as a social 
group became increasingly powerful and wealthy, with regard to the old 
landowners as well as to craftsmen and manufacturers (Lopez 1976). The 
eventual historical transition from an economy based on agricultural produc-
tion towards a trade-based economy, the so called Commercial Revolution, 
was a chief precursor to the later Industrial Revolution, which on her part 
embodied an economic shift towards investment as the cornerstone of a 
global economy.  
 By the 10th century, trade and commerce at an international level started 
to emerge in Southern Europe. The beginnings of the so called Commercial 
Revolution and the emergence of a new mode of capitalist development can 
be dated back to the Italian city-states of Genoa and Venice and, somewhat 
later, Florence (Arrighi [1994]2009; Braudel [1979]1983; Lopez 1976; 
Goldthwait 2009). During the Commercial Revolution, trade was mostly 
maritime trade and port cities, like Genoa and Venice, witnessed an explo-
sion in international trade and commercial activities. These trading activities 
required large sums of capital for financing of cargoes and for insuring 
against risks. Here, merchant banks as financiers and investors, such as the 
famous families of Peruzzi, Bardi and Medici, started to become increasing-
ly important. These banks innovated economic business in various ways: 
from corporate structure (decentralized), corporate finance (shareholders), 
geographical reach (branches) and diversification and investment beyond 
banking activities. The power and growth of these early banking and in-
vestment activities resulted from the networks formed by the merchants and 
businesspeople of the Italian city-states (Padgett and McLean 2011). 
 The commercial and financial elites of the Italian city-states were typical-
ly involved in lending money to European governments and sovereigns. On 
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the one hand, the commercial and financial elites had control over the re-
quired funds, on the other hand the large loans also gave access to political 
power, government contracts and other commercial missions. The Genoese 
heavily engaged in lending to King Phillip II of Spain, the Peruzzi and Bardi 
to King Edward III of England and the Medici mainly to the Catholic 
Church. 
2.4.2. The First Wave of Financial Inclusion: Joint-Stock Companies, 
Industrialization and the Ascent of Public Markets 
The 17th to 19th centuries witnessed the initial stages of powerful political 
democratization, as privileges and rights were extended to an ever-broader 
part of the population. The old ruling classes (aristocracy, clergy and land-
owners) of antiquity, Middle Ages and Renaissance had to give up large 
parts of their power. This prominent political democratization, with its ori-
gins in revolutions, political and religious conflicts and novel philosophical 
ideas, was inextricably related to an economic and financial democratiza-
tion. The democratization of investment – the inclusion of people who were 
not part of the elite in financial investment activities – is deeply rooted in 
three interrelated economic developments: the invention of the joint-stock 
company, the growing affluence during the Industrial Revolution and the 
ascent of public markets.  
 With the development of joint-stock companies it became possible for 
people and institutions to participate in investment as partial owners. In cre-
ating surpluses, the Industrial Revolution created the willingness and oppor-
tunity for investment for broader parts of society who were not part of the 
power elite. The emergence of public markets allowed people to participate 
in financial activities, who were exclude form such markets before. A grow-
ing middle class that consisted of financiers, rentiers, entrepreneurs, mer-
chants and manufacturers engaged within financial activities. 
 
The joint-stock company as a corporate form 
The first of these developments was the appearance of a new form of corpo-
rate organization characterized by limited liability, shared ownership, sepa-
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ration of ownership and management, stable existence and transferability of 
possession – the so called joint-stock company. This form of organizing 
corporate business made businessmen able to act flexible, limit risks, do du-
rable business and handle even complex and large financial activities. 
 Precursors to the joint-stock company can be found in the Roman 
societas publicanorum, the commenda and compagnia of medieval Genoa 
and Venice and other medieval forms of organizing and financing economic 
enterprise (Braudel [1979]1983). The so called societas publicanorum were 
related to financing public services. As Rome expanded, government reve-
nues and expenditures increased. In Rome, however, public services – col-
lection of tax revenues, public provision of goods and services and man-
agement of public property – were mostly put up for bid to private providers 
(Malmendier 2009). These responsibilities were allocated through public 
auctions. Since participation in such auctions required large funds, busi-
nessmen pooled their capital – in so called societas publicanorum 
(Malmendier 2005). In Rome, a variety of collective financial investment 
forms existed for private transactions as well – societas unius rei, societas 
alicuius negotiationis, societas omnium bonorum quae ex quaestu or 
societas omnium bonorum. These financial societies were joint-stock com-
panies managed a magister in Rome and managers in the provinces (a so 
called pro magistro). The shareholders were to be found in all parts of Ro-
man society, from noblemen and senators to common citizens (Toutain 
1996). By the 2nd century BC, share ownership was a popular activity, not 
only for raising funds, but also for speculative purposes (McMorran 1925). 
 Commenda and compagnia partnership forms in 13th century Genoa and 
Venice depended on the use of shares and in such a way differed from clas-
sical partnership forms in which all other partners had to agree to the sale of 
interests. In 12th century Genoa, it became increasingly common to finance 
sea trade business with so called loca (shares). The ship could be split into 
several shares, typically between 16 and 70, with the investment lasting one 
voyage. In the course of the 13th century, the practice of dividing a ship into 
loca began to disappear as maritime insurance gained of popularity which 
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made it no longer necessary to spread risk and raise capital to finance sea 
voyages. But for a short period of time, loca were widely en vogue among 
Genoese financiers and even investors who did not belong to the powerful 
and wealthy participated in the market for loca (Byrne 1930). 
 The first companies which possessed the full range of modern corporate 
characteristics were the Dutch and English joint-stock companies founded in 
the early 17th century – amongst them the prominent Vereenigde 
Oostindische Compagnie (VOC or Dutch East India Company) and the Brit-
ish East India Company. These companies had great market capitalizations, 
united many shareholders who not engaged in the company’s business activ-
ities, were of limited liability in the modern corporate sense and existed as 
permanent enterprises. Furthermore, the capital for the right to a share of the 
profits could not be claimed back from the company – the shares could only 
be traded and sold on the market (de Vries and van de Woude 1999). 
 
The Industrial Revolution and wealth accumulation 
The second development was the Industrial Revolution (~1760–1980) which 
brought about radical innovations in production, manufacturing and tech-
nology and changed global economy and labor on a large scale. Industriali-
zation, however, would have been impossible without the development of 
investment and banking systems. 
 First, industrialization contributed to economic growth, economic pros-
perity and wealth accumulation on a broad range. In the course of industrial-
ization, the elite lost its exclusive control over wealth and economic re-
sources. The 19th century witnessed a slowly growing possession of eco-
nomic resources and accumulation of wealth by ever-broader segments of 
society (Stearns 2007). Although this was a slow process which often went 
hand in hand with bad conditions for the working classes, the economic life 
of people changed sustainably (Cipolla 1994). Especially the commercial 
and financial middle classes started to get a bigger share of national wealth. 
Slowly, those beyond the upper classes accumulated savings, which of 
course could be used for investment purposes. Table 1 shows the develop-
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ment of GDP per capita from ~1000–2000. The figures leave little doubt 
that the industrialization of Europe and North America represents a signifi-
cant transformative and historically unprecedented process of increasing 
prosperity and sustained economic growth. For instance, the United King-
dom – the earliest ‘industrializer’ – witnessed GDP per capita triple from 
1700 to 1900. When compared with the slowly growing economies in the 
years leading up to the Industrial Revolution, this new ‘growth regime’ 
seems to represent indeed a historical singularity. Consistent with this eco-
nomic data, there are further measures (like sugar consumption) which hint 
at a rising standard of living over this period (Braudel [1979]1981; 
Hobsbawm 1999).  
Year France Germany Italy United Kingdom 
United 
States 
1000 425 410 450 400 – 
1500 727 688 1,100 714 – 
1600 841 791 1,100 974 – 
1700 910 910 1,100 1,250 527 
1820 1,135 1,077 1,117 1,706 1,257 
1850 1,597 1,428 1,350 2,330 1,806 
1870 1,876 1,839 1,499 3,190 2,445 
1900 2,876 2,985 1,785 4,492 4,091 
1920 3,227 2,796 2,587 4,548 5,552 
1930 4,532 3,973 2,918 5,441 6,213 
1950 5,186 3,881 3,502 6,939 9,561 
2000 20,422 18,944 18,774 20,353 28,467 
Data: Maddision (2001), Note: Values expressed in 1990 Int. GK$ 
Table 1: GDP per capita (1990 Int. GK$), 1000–2000 
The ascent of public markets 
To be honest, public markets for securities (loans) had already existed for a 
long part of history. Because trade in public loans and shares in private 
companies were unknown in ancient times, as economic historians note, the 
concept of public debt is one of the few economic phenomena that does not 
have its roots in ancient Greece and Rome (Andreau 1999; Goldsmith 
1987). Early markets for debt developed in the city-states of 12th century, 
early Renaissance Italy (Michie 2006; Obstfeld and Taylor 2004).  
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 Practices of securitizing public debt were particularly widespread and 
popular in Genoa. As early as 1164, the Genoese created a form of public 
debt in which members of an association (compera) paid to receive a share 
(luoghe) on the debt. A bit later in 1262, the city-state of Venice consolidat-
ed all of its outstanding liabilities in one fund – the Monte (Neal 1997). The 
shares earned 5 percent interest and were fully transferable. To be true, most 
investors were wealthy citizens, albeit some members of the middle classes 
and also some foreigners invested in Monte shares.  
 The center of financial activity and power shifted from Italy to northern 
Europe in the 15th and 16th centuries. Here, various exchanges, so called 
bourses, emerged. In particular, Antwerp became a very powerful financial 
center by the latter part of the 16th century. Nevertheless, bourses were es-
tablished also in Paris (1563), London (1571) and Frankfurt (1585). At first, 
the bourses were places where commodities, crafts and financial products 
were exchanged side by side – much like in the fairs of late medieval France 
(Braudel [1979]1983). In the course of time, however, trade in goods and 
trade in securities became separated. Especially the market for municipal 
annuities became popular. In Antwerp, most participants in the market for 
municipal annuities were wealthy citizens – noblemen and landowners. 
However, some participants also belonged to a middle class. For instance, in 
1545, 25 percent of purchasers were craftsmen, 21 percent were administra-
tive officials, 17 percent were widows and 16 percent were merchants (Van 
der Wee 1977). 
 By the beginning of the 17th century, negotiable securities (shares of a 
business or of government debt) became popular across Europe. As invest-
ment in such securities became increasingly common, formal markets were 
established for purchase and sale. The first stock market in its modern form 
developed in Amsterdam at the beginning of the 17th century (Braudel 
[1979]1983; Neal 1993). Amsterdam was established as the center of the 
European financial world, later followed by London in late 17th century. Of 
course, as we saw above, markets for public debt existed already earlier, but 
what was new at Amsterdam was “the volume, the fluidity of the market 
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and the publicity it received, and the speculative freedom of transactions” 
(Braudel [1979]1983: 101). Amsterdam’s powerful position was based on 
two major developments: (1) the creation of the Amsterdam Wisselbank 
clearinghouse in 1609 as the centralized location for account settlement and 
(2) the creation of a joint-stock company whose shares were bought and 
sold on a public market – the VOC, the Dutch East India Company 
(Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). 
 The English stock market developed at the turn of the 18th century in the 
coffeehouses on Exchange Alley, a street near the Royal Exchange market-
place in London. In 1760 there were 60,000 holders of British government 
debt, indicating the level of public participation in the financial markets 
(Michie 1999).3 There were even smaller numbers of shareholders in joint-
stock companies, although trading in equity was more common than in gov-
ernment debt at this time because company dividends were subject to much 
speculation. And, speculation was built into the stock market from the be-
ginning. Amsterdam witnessed the Tulip Mania (1634) and London the 
South Sea Bubble (1720).  
 The time period between the late 19th century and the early 1900s wit-
nessed the emergence of a truly global market for the first time in history, 
largely driven by historical context and technological progress. The Indus-
trial Revolution increased corporate demand for capital that was primarily 
directed towards investment in fixed capital such as machines and factories. 
At the same time, governments worldwide relaxed restrictions on corporate 
formation and finance (Verdier 2002). As a consequence, the combined cap-
italization of enterprises which issued equity exceeded the gross debt of na-
tions for the first time in the early twentieth century (Michie 2006). Fur-
thermore, technological innovations played an important role in the devel-
opment of public capital markets. Most influential were those path-breaking 
technologies that made information spread faster and easier, given the im-
portance of accurate data in making financial decisions (Preda 2009). The 
                                                       
3 This figure amounts to just over 1 percent of the English population at that time, estimat-
ed to be 5.75 million. 
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first in a row of such innovations came in 1844 with the invention of the 
telegraph, which resulted in a relatively convenient and immediate flow of 
communication between marketplaces and cities. By 1866, the first transat-
lantic cable made possible immediate communication between the global 
financial centers of New York and London. Such innovations were followed 
by the stock ticker in 1867 and the telephone in 1876. As a result of these 
new technological innovations that facilitated information flow, a network 
of buyers, sellers and intermediaries forming a global financial marketplace 
developed for the first time by 1870 (Preda 2001, 2009). Market participa-
tion reached unprecedented highs. It is suggested that there were £32.6 bil-
lion (nominal value) of securities outstanding in the world by 1910, owned 
by around 20 million investors worldwide (Michie 2006: 9–10). 
 In 1894 Max Weber ([1894]2000a: 316) wrote:  
“[…] in Germany, with about 50 million persons (comprising 11million families), 
about 10 million of them possess passbooks for savings accounts, about 2.5 to 4 mil-
lion receive interest from capital in some form, and of these about 1.5 to 2 million re-
ceive that interest in the form of interest paid on securities or ‘dividends’”. 
Beginning in the mid-1840s, financial investing was established as a wide-
spread, legitimate and socially attractive practice in Western Europe (Preda 
2001, 2009; Engel 2013; Stäheli 2013). In the late 19th century, ownership 
of financial securities was relatively widespread in France, Great Britain and 
the United States, even among farmers and factory workers (Weber 
[1894]2000b: 268). The middle classes – described as “spinsters, widows, 
retired naval and army officers, magistrates, retired merchants, parsons and 
orphanages” (Kindleberger and Aliber [1978]2005: 268) – actively engaged 
in financial speculation. A large amount of the literature in the second half 
of the 19th century dealt with changing experiences and perceptions of eco-
nomic risk. Émile Zola’s “La Curée” (1872) and “L’Argent” (1889) or 
Giovanni Vergas’s “Don Gesualdo“ (1889) which deal with speculations in 
the banking and real estate sector provide good examples. But also novels 
like Charles Dickens’s “Little Dorrit” (1857), Honoré de Balzac’s “César 
Birotteau” (1837), Robert Louis Stevenson’s “The Wrecker” (1892) or 
Friedrich Spielhagen’s “Sturmflut” (1877) and Anthony Trollope’s “The 
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Way We Live Now” (1873) are dedicated to economic action in financial 
markets and speculative businesses. 
 Economic historians diverge in at which point in history, we can speak of 
‘popular finance’. Of course, these different positions often refer to different 
contexts. While some investigate the historical constellation in the United 
States, others identify waves of popular investing and their role in shaping 
modern financial markets much earlier in Europe – in France and England. 
 As one group of economic historians claims, considerable popular finan-
cial investments occurred for the first time in the United States during WWI, 
when governments promoted investment in war bonds – so called ‘Liberty 
Bonds’ or ‘Victory Bonds’ (Geisst 1997; Mitchell 2008; Ott 2009; 
O’Sullivan 2007). Others argue that financial inclusion of broader parts of 
the population came about around 1900, due to the concentration of an in-
creasing middle class in financial centers (Baskin and Miranti 1997). A 
prominent position emphasizes the special significance of the railway busi-
ness for widespread involvement of larger parts of the population within the 
dynamics of financial markets in mid-19th century Western Europe (Michie 
1999, 2006; Chancellor 1999). Railways and particularly ‘railway manias’ 
deeply influenced the structure of the capital market and the level of in-
vestment (Reed 1975; Kindleberger 1984). Accordingly, the wave of rail-
way investments in the 1840s – culminating in the ‘Great Railway Mania’ – 
mainly contributed to the consolidation of financial markets in London and 
Paris (Kynaston 1994; Preda 2001). In England and France, railroad manias 
took place in the 1840s (Jenkins 1973; Morgan and Thomas 1962; Studeny 
1995; Guiral 1976) and in Germany a little bit later around 1870 (Borchardt 
1978). Although stock ownership in railway companies partly differed by 
region or city, in general, stock owners could be found all over Europe. 
Typically, owners of railway stocks belonged to the trading, manufacture 
and liberal professions (Reed 1975) and investment in railways attracted 
many small investors (Jenkins 1973; Caron 1979; Colling 1949). In 1853, 
railway stocks made up 21 percent of all securities quoted at the London 
Stock Exchange, by 1893 the number had increased to 50 percent (Michie 
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1999). The corresponding figures for the Paris bourse are 12 and 30 percent 
(Verley 2010). Via a law from 1839, the French state guaranteed interest 
payments on railway bonds (Adam 1972; Dobbin 1994), which resulted in a 
widespread popularity of railway investments. As a consequence of such 
investment waves all over the modern world, railway finance became the 
‘epitome of finance’ and occupied a central place in economic life for a long 
period of time. 
 Indeed, on the basis of historical data, we can show that ever broader 
parts of society became involved in financial investment since the beginning 
of the 20th century – with ups and downs of course (Table 2).  
 United States Great Britain Germany France 
1901  1.5%   
1907 1%    
1911  2.5%   
1924 2%    
1927 3–5%    
1929 6–8%    
1932 8–10%    
1940 6–7% 3%   
1950 4%    
1960 7% 6%   
1970 15% 4%   
1980  5% 5% 4.5% 
1990 21% 19% 6 % 16% 
2000 56%  10% 13% 
2010   6% 9% 
Note: Only direct shareholdings (excluding shareholdings in mutual funds). 
Data: For the United States: 1907 (Warshow 1924), 1924 (McCoy 1927), 1927 (McCoy 
1930; Berle and Means 1932; Berneim and Schneider 1935), 1929 and 1932 (Berle and 
Means 1932; Berneim and Schneider 1935), 1937 (Cox 1963), 1952 (Kimmel 1952), 1959 
and 1965 and 1970 (Traflet 2013), 1990–2000 (Deutsches Aktieninstitut Fact Book 2013). 
For Great Britain: 1901 (Register of Investors), 1911 (Foreman-Peck and Hannah 2012), 
1941 (Ellinger and Carter 1949), 1960 (Vernon et al. 1973), 1965 and 1968 (London Stock 
Exchange Fact Book 1965, 1968), 1980–1990 (Deutsches Aktieninstitut Fact Book 2013). 
For Germany and France: 1980–2010 (Deutsches Aktieninstitut Fact Book 2013). 
Table 2: Fraction of shareholders in total population, 1901–2010 
The United States is probably the most impressive case demonstrating the 
emergence of a ‘popular investment culture’. Whereas the fraction of share-
holders was about 1 percent in the first decade of the 20th century, this 
number reached 56 percent by 2000 – the peak of the Dot.com bubble. Most 
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of the historical research on retail investors is carried out for the United 
Kingdom and the United States. A number of authors document the expan-
sion of the US stock market from the mid-19th century to the early 1930s 
(O’Sullivan 2009; Ott 2008, 2009, 2011). However, there are also works 
which study the social structure of the widening ownership of stocks and 
shares in Great Britain between 1870 and 1935 (Rutterford et al. 2011).  
 The internationalization, liberalization and popularization of global capi-
tal markets was stopped and reversed by the WWI and a bit later by the af-
termath of the Great Depression in the 1930s. From mid-20th century on-
wards, the international flow of capital began to recover. While trade in fi-
nancial markets and financial agreements were limited and only bilateral in 
the 1950s, the second half of the 20th century experienced an increase in 
international capital mobility. By the 1980s, the volume and mobility of fi-
nancial of flows was finally at the level it had reached almost a century ear-
lier (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). New stock exchanges emerged around the 
globe, first in developing countries since the 1950s and later on in post-
communist countries (Weber et al. 2009). We will deal with these develop-
ments in more detail later on. 
2.4.3. The Second Wave of Financial Inclusion: Funding Retirement 
and the Collectivization of Investments 
While the advent of public markets and economic growth made many peo-
ple familiar with trade in financial markets, the emergence of the concept of 
retirement as such and the forms of its funding took the democratization of 
investment at a next level. As Harmes (2001: 105) notes: the “origins of 
mass investment lie in the privatization of pensions”.  
 Retirement as a legitimate and supported concept began to evolve by the 
second half of the 19th century and has witnessed steady expansion since 
(Wilke 2016; Haber and Gratton 1994). Although the concept of retirement 
was a novel innovation of that time, historically, the first known pension 
system was developed in ancient Rome. The Roman pension systems were 
designed for members of the military and for largely political purposes ra-
ther than altruistic ends. Already early, the Roman rulers granted land in 
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some parts of the Roman Empire to returning legionnaires and veterans. In 
13 BC under Augustus, a formal military pension system was established 
(Clark et al. 2003). However, already Augustus’s pension disbursements 
became under pressure, so that the years of service required to gain access 
to the pension plans were extended from sixteen years of active commitment 
and four years in the reserves to twenty years of active commitment and five 
years in reserves. 
 Of course, the inevitable coming of age is nothing new. Retirement was 
not wholly missing in previous ages, but it tended to have a different charac-
ter. What is rather new is that old age became a distinct phase of life. This 
life stage is much less structured by labor market activities whereas leisure 
and consumption become increasingly important (Kohli 1988). For a long 
part of history, retirement was either non-existent (people worked until they 
died) or mainly organized within families or small communities (guilds, 
neighborhoods). In the past, societies actually required children to support 
their retired parents. In the United States, the English Poor Law of 1601 
prescribed the family as the initial provider of support for parents and 
grandparents (Haber and Gratton 1994). Also in pre-modern times, state of-
ficials and soldiers received state assistance, while old age security for 
craftsmen was organized within guilds. However, in the course of urbaniza-
tion, industrialization and increasing life expectancy, more institutionalized 
forms of public assistance for the retired emerged. New but rather uncom-
monly institutions at the time – so called almshouses – were founded in the 
17th century. Poor elderly often resided in almshouses, not only a place for 
elderly but for ex-convicts and orphans as well.  
 Before its modern formation, retirement was effectively involuntary for 
those who were simply unable to participate in economic life. This called 
for the complicated and usually not very generous support by third parties. 
However, there were also forms of retirement which look much more mod-
ern in their character. But these forms were only accessible to a small frac-
tion of society – either those who had wealth (or at least were able to put 
something aside regularly) or those who belonged to groups which had de-
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veloped a sophisticated mechanism of community-support (church, state, 
army, guilds, etc.). 
 The 19th century saw the development of institutions which were dedi-
cated not just to generate profit, but to serve the social function of creating a 
place for the less moneyed to bank – so called saving fund societies in the 
United States or Sparkassen in Germany. These institutions intended to ena-
ble a ‘good’ later-life for those who were able to put aside money over the 
course of their working life but did not have money to gain access to con-
ventional banks. Whereas the wealthy and powerful had already access to 
savings institutions, less affluent had only limited access to such services. 
As research shows, ownership of such accounts was strongly determined by 
social structure. Certain depositors – namely, female servants – had a sav-
ings pattern resembling a deliberate attempt to store funds, although they 
had only little incomes (Alter et al. 1994; Wysocki 2005; Bracht 2013). 
Next to savings funds, the 19th century gave also birth to the institution of 
life insurance, which, however, was mainly restricted to a relatively wealthy 
middle class. Both in Germany and the United States life insurance was not 
regarded as a legitimate form of provision for a long time of the 19th centu-
ry (Borscheid 1998; Zelizer 1979). 
 Historical works document that private saving for retirement was a rela-
tively new mode of managing future uncertainty (Hardach 2003). For a long 
time in history, other, collective forms of old age provision prevailed (Con-
rad 1988). In Germany, the development of retirement provision was driven 
by bourgeois middle class attempts which aimed at establishing individual 
future provision as a normal, rational and emancipatory practice (Borscheid 
1983). With the introduction of public social security, this development took 
a temporary peak. 
 Whereas the emergence of the concept of retirement as a social idea, the 
establishment of institutions which gave larger parts of society access to fi-
nancial instruments directed at old age provision and the introduction of 
public social security made retirement funding a central part in economic 
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life, development since mid-20th century took retirement funding as an in-
vestment purpose at a higher level. 
 The second half of the 20th century experienced a major transformation 
in public pension provision. The privatization of public pensions and the 
global diffusion of pre-funded pension schemes changed economic life and 
thinking dramatically. The transformation of national pension systems was 
initiated and supported by transnational institutions like the World Bank, the 
IMF and the OECD. From the 1970s onwards, rising public debt and new 
ideological attractions have forced governments to retrench the post 1945 
welfare arrangements (Streeck 2013; Castles 2007; Münch 2009). Conse-
quently, people across the Western world experienced the erosion of state-
backed guarantees, which made them increasingly turn to financial markets 
to achieve access to housing, education and protection against unemploy-
ment, ill health – and old age security. One the one hand, this “great risk 
shift” (Hacker 2006, 2008) resulted in increasing demand for investment 
opportunities. One the other hand, this shift provided banks and financial 
actors with stable and continuous financial flows. 
 We are able to draw on historical aggregate data on household financial 
asset allocation for two countries for which data for a longer period of time 
is available to take a look at the development of financial investment over 
the course of the 20th century (Figure 1). We display the development of 
equity wealth and insurance wealth in Sweden and the United States from 
1914–2012. 
 Whereas equity wealth constituted a large part of private financial wealth 
in the first decades of the 20th century, it lost its significance in the course 
of time. In Sweden, equity assets made up around 60 percent of total finan-
cial wealth in the 1920s, decreased by more than 35 percent until the 1970s, 
witnessed a comeback in the late 1990s and early 2000s and make up 
around 25 percent of private financial assets today. In contrast to equity as-
sets, insurance assets became of increasing significance throughout the last 
century. While in both countries (Sweden and the United States) insurance 
wealth constituted less than ten percent by 1930, insurance assets experi-
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enced substantial growth during the 1930s and skyrocketed since the 1970s 
and early 1980s. Today, insurance assets amount to about 50 percent of total 
financial assets in Sweden and more than 40 percent in the United States. 
 
Figure 1: The development of equity and insurance assets (as % of total financial assets), 
1914–2012 (Data: WID) 
As a consequence of the privatization of old age security, a new group of 
financial actors entered the arena of global finance: institutional investors 
(also called organized investors or collective investors). These institutions – 
pension funds, life insurance companies and investment funds – emerged as 
a result of changes in pension legislation and resulting changes in saving 
behavior among the population. Assets managed by institutional investors 
increased massively and made institutional investors powerful and heavy-
weight global actors (Useem 1996; Davis and Thompson 1994; Jung and 
Dobbin 2012). These collective funds have increasingly more money at their 
disposal and invest a growing proportion in financial markets. As Table 3 
shows, whereas share ownership of private households witnessed massive 
declines since 1970, collective investors (insurance companies and pension 
funds, investment funds) increased their holdings in financial markets.  
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 1977 1990 2000 2010 1970 1990 2000 2010 1969 1990 2000 2010 
Households 20% 19% 14% 12% 31% 20% 12% 9% 50% 26% 16% 11% 
Nonfinancial Corporations 36% 33% 17% 21% 37% 38% 34% 36% 5% 3% 2% 2% 
Banks 12% 9% 5% 3% 9% 14% 14% 5% 2% 0% 1% 1% 
Insurance/Pension Funds 5% 7% 5% 4% 4% 8% 5% 9% 21% 49% 39% 13% 
Investment Funds 5% 9% 14% 12% 3% 2% 15% 6% 13% 8% 6% 21% 
Government 12% 7% 6% 9% 10% 4% 3% 2% 2% 2% 0% 3% 
Foreign Investors 10% 17% 40% 39% 12% 17% 17% 33% 7% 12% 37% 48% 
Data: Banque de France; Deutsches Aktieninstitut; Statistics United Kingdom; FESE 
Table 3: Aggregate share-ownership structure, 1970–2010 
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Throughout the time period from 1980–2010, financial assets of institutional 
investors increased in many countries (Figure 2). In the United States finan-
cial assets of institutional investors made up 80 percent of GDP and in-
creased by 150 percent until 2010. Also in Austria, a country not really fa-
mous for its financial culture, institutional investors increased their financial 
assets from 1980 to 2010 by 90 percent – from 10 percent of GDP in 1980 
to 100 percent of GDP in 2010. Institutional investors have become finan-
cially powerful particularly in the United States, the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands. Institutional investors play a much smaller role in Belgium, 
Austria or Spain. This apparently gradual shift from private to collectively 
managed investments was initially interpreted as an unseen socialization in 
property relations. Most famously, Peter Drucker (1976) wrote of the advent 
of “pension fund socialism”. In reality, however, the collectivization of in-
vestment led not so much to improvements in the position of employees or 
small investors, but rather to greater shareholder power, and ultimately to 
the emergence of an “investor capitalism” (Useem 1996). 
 
Figure 2: Financial assets of institutional investors (as % of GDP), 1980–2010 (Data: 
OECD) 
Retirement provision as a central object of investment and the related rise of 
collective investors, however, was not only fueled trends of privatization but 
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also by rising economic prosperity and growing private financial well-being 
during the economic recovery since the end of WWII.  
“[T]he growth of a true ‘patrimonial (or propertied) middle class’ was the principal 
structural transformation of the distribution of wealth in the developed countries in the 
twentieth century” (Piketty 2014: 260). 
Between 1970 and 2010, private wealth-to-national income ratios rose from 
about 200–300 percent in 1970 to 400–600 percent in 2010 (Piketty and 
Zucman 2014). The rising ownership of financial assets in the “affluent so-
ciety” (Galbraith 1958) and numbers of potential middle class investors 
searching for profitable investment opportunities stimulated an increasing 
demand for financial products and professional wealth management 
(Deutschmann 2010; Schimank 2007). 
Although asset ownership is unevenly distributed in that the largest part of 
private wealth is owned by those belonging to the top 1 percent of the dis-
tribution (Kus 2016; Carroll 2002), also the middle classes had been able to 
accumulate a considerable level of property and wealth over the prosperous 
post-WWII decades. This holds true for European societies in specific (Mau 
2015; Piketty 2014). 
2.4.4. Concluding Remarks – Private Investment and the National State 
While financial markets as such are an institution with a long history and a 
long past and financial activities were a part of economic life ever since, the 
recent growth of financial markets and the mass-participation within global 
finance are rather novel phenomena. For thousands of years, investment as 
an economic activity belonged almost exclusively to those with great wealth 
and power. Only those who were part of the ‘power elite’ in society could 
possess and organize resources in order to earn a return. The majority had 
neither the wealth nor the power to participate in investing their money for 
future returns. Nowadays, the majority has become investors – in general 
with the aim of providing funds for a happy and healthy retirement without 
worries. 
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 In ancient and pre-modern times, investment happened mostly via land, 
lending or trade, as the main investment vehicles. Financial investment was 
not only limited by the lack of necessary financial resources, but also by 
prevailing institutions, norms and beliefs. As we have seen, investment 
practices witnessed substantial transformation throughout history. From 
land as the main investment vehicle in ancient times and the early Middle 
Ages, investment was increasingly directed towards trade and commerce in 
the Renaissance. At this time, a larger fraction of people also got in touch 
with trade in public debts. 
 In the course of industrialization in the 18th and 19th century, due to de-
mands for capital, growing prosperity and technological progress, more and 
more people became involved within financial investment. The ascent of 
public financial markets and recurrent investment crazes in the railroad 
business, construction or mining made financial products available for a 
broader public. Especially during WWI, many people in Western Europe 
and North-America became small investors through the purchase of war 
bonds (so called ‘Liberty Bonds’ or ‘Victory Bonds’ in the United States). 
 What eventually made finance a mass-participatory activity was retire-
ment funding. The development of funding retirement as a major objective 
of investment has brought about deep consequences for society, including 
the emergence of pension funds, the growth of retirement savings plans, and 
the still lasting discussion about the future of the welfare state and social 
security in general. Still by the mid 19th century, family, friends or neigh-
bors provided old age security in most cases. Therefore, we take a more de-
tailed look at two key trends which contributed to the privatization of old 
age security and the unprecedented rise of finance since the 1970 across the 
developed world. We identify ‘marketization’ and ‘individualization’ as the 
most fundamental trends which made finance as such, and the accumulation 
of private wealth in specific, so powerful and significant. Marketization as 
the “process of taking goods and services that had previously been provided 
under bureaucratic, political, or professional means of resource allocation 
and transferring them to market arrangements” (Crouch 2009b: 878), made 
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markets the solution for economic coordination and distribution. This pro-
cess is closely intertwined with another prominent social diagnosis – indi-
vidualization. In the course of individualization, people have become 
‘disembedded’ from traditional social forms (like state-provided-welfare, 
trade unions or the church) and became ‘re-embedded’ into ‘new’ competi-
tion-dominated arrangements (like financial markets). Thus, we can speak 
of a new mode of societalization via the re-embedding of people into the 
destinies of global finance. 
 The financial inclusion of ever larger parts of society arose in combina-
tion with processes of economic growth and state formation. With the ex-
pansion of trade and industry, the money economy expanded in Europe and 
larger parts of society accumulated financial resources. Simultaneously, 
closely intertwined with the growth of the money economy, modern states 
began to develop. These states had to raise funds to finance their political 
and military rivalry. So states started to issue loans. As these government 
loans became more widespread, they also became more easily transferable 
and tradable. The state was also partly responsible for the emergence of 
joint-stock companies. The first Dutch and British joint-stock companies 
were established at government’s initiative and were also equipped with cer-
tain privileges from the government. At least in the beginning, joint stock 
companies were organizations with primarily public or semi-public tasks 
(colonial oversea trade, railroad building, etc.). Also the emergence of col-
lective investors was a result of action by the state – namely pension policy. 
Many citizens and employees turned into investors for funding their retire-
ment, in particular in the course of the privatization of public social security 
arrangements. 
2.5. The Resurrection of Finance 
At least since the 1980s, financial markets have once again become the cen-
tral arenas of economic globalization (Cohen 1996; Germain 1997). Since 
then, commentators speak of growing global economic integration. We can 
witness the ‘resurrection of finance capitalism’, which means that ‘finance’ 
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has become the central function in the economy and has expanded its influ-
ence to other areas of social life. These developments make national-level 
economic regulation and control increasingly more difficult and exert pres-
sures on actors worldwide – including states, organizations, corporations 
and households. Nevertheless, this process seems by no means a novel and 
unique phenomenon in modern economic history (Hirst et al. 2009). The 
‘first globalization wave’ (~1870–1914) can be characterized as a peak 
phase of worldwide financial expansion and integration and is, therefore, 
regarded as the “first global century” (Williamson and O’Rourke 2002; 
Baldwin and Martin 1999; O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). The second 
half of the 19th century witnessed an unleashing of market forces and a 
growing prominence of finance comparable to the dynamics the global 
economy experienced since the 1980s (Bairoch and Kozul-Wright 1996; 
Wade 1996). The decades before 1913 are widely considered a ‘golden age’ 
of international investment and trade. By mid-19th century, commentators 
speak of a “world market” (Kuznets 1966) and a “world economy” (Camer-
on 1993). Prior to the disruptions of the two World Wars and the collapse of 
commodity and financial markets in the Great Depression – when world-
wide economies turned inward, the world economy started to disintegrate 
and a broad public mistrust in ‘the financial’ gained ground – capital mar-
kets were as internationalized and integrated as since the 1980s (Wade 
1996; Kenwood and Lougheed 1994; O’Rourke and Williamson 1999; see 
also Koechlin 1995; Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). Accordingly, it is argued 
that 
“the reemergence of a global, capitalist market economy since 1950, and especially 
since the mid-1980s, in an important sense reestablishes the global market economy 
that had existed one hundred years earlier” (Sachs and Warner 1995: 5). 
Today, however, the heavy expansion and omnipresence of finance seems 
even to exceed its historical origins. Financial markets have witnessed ex-
treme growth and became integrated on a global level. The size of net trans-
national flows of bank capital, investment capital, bonds and derivatives cut 
out the revenues of major corporations or even states. As a consequence, 
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financial markets, financial logics and financial actors are now playing a 
key role in the economy. The omnipresence of finance in everyday life is 
reflected by the position of stock market news and reports from the financial 
world within the popular media (Knorr-Cetina and Preda 2005; Preda 2009). 
The world of finance occupies a big part within the ‘popular culture’ as well 
(Czarniawska 2005), which shows up in the guides on successful financial 
investment, biographies of famous financiers as well as belletristic literature 
and blockbuster movies which deal with the Wall Street. 
 The global neoliberal transformations which originated in the 1970s 
changed the situation of a regulated and controlled environment which had 
existed since the end of the first globalization wave, and in particular since 
the financial collapse of 1929 (Djelic 2006; Simmons et al. 2008; Fourcade-
Gourinchas and Babb 2002). The causes underlying these developments are 
manifold. A series of events that occurred since the late 1960s weakened the 
financial regime of the ‘Golden Age of Modern Capitalism’. Typically, the 
re-emergence of modern global finance is linked to the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods System (Strange 1986; Helleiner 1994). The Bretton Woods 
agreements of 1944 were central to the creation of a multilateral consensus 
around the liberalization of world trade and the establishment of a system of 
fixed exchange rates pegged to the US dollar. Due to experiences of hyper-
inflation, the Great Depression and war, a return to the economic liberaliza-
tion of the pre-WWI period seemed impossible. Therefore, a cooperative 
framework for economic development of the Western world was established 
via a system of fixed exchange rates, controls on the movement of private 
capital and two major international institutions, the World Bank and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF). After the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
System of fixed exchange rates at the beginning of the 1970s (Kindleberger 
1984; Eichengreen 2007), controls on the movement of capital were re-
moved, which created the basis for globally circulating investments (Sim-
mons 2001). In the course of the post-Bretton Woods era, states deregulated 
and liberalized restrictions on financial transactions. Trade in shares and 
‘innovative’ financial products flourished. As the old regulative financial 
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arrangements were unraveling, financial markets grew at speed. In the first 
decade after the demise of the old regime, financial market growth took 
place in an environment in which the ‘rules of the game’ set by regulative 
actors were changing dramatically and market conditions turned out to be 
volatile. The United States represented the financial super-power. However, 
the US economy did not remain the only one to experience a ‘free market’ 
financial transformation. The new model was quickly exported and repro-
duced around the world. As already mentioned above, the deregulation of 
domestic finance and the liberalization of cross-border movements of finan-
cial flows were central mechanisms for the spread of neoliberal market ide-
ology around the world. 
 Simultaneously, a stepwise structural shift of financial business took 
place since the 1980s, which involved the devaluation of the ‘traditional’ 
credit business (commercial banking) in favor of trade in stocks (investment 
banking). Whereas ‘banks as credit institutions’ provided capital for an 
agreed interest rate, ‘banks as investment institutions’ engaged in trade in 
securities and received a provision for every transaction. Consequently, 
long-term credit relationships were replaced by tendentiously short-term 
transactions and risks were increasingly shifted from the banks towards the 
investors (Rajan and Zingales 2003; Davis and Mizruchi 1999). 
 These changes, however, have to be viewed against the background of 
further important developments – namely, technological developments. Dig-
italization and technologization played a key role for growth and spread of 
modern financial products and markets (Preda 2006; Callon 2004; Barry and 
Slater 2002). As a consequence, volume and speed of transactions multi-
plied, which resulted in the emergence of a global market (Castells 1996; 
Sassen 2005). In the course, trade in shares, derivatives and loans developed 
into an enormously lucrative business and profit margins grew steadily 
(Dore 2008). 
 Since the 1980s, market capitalization of national stock exchanges in-
creased heavily (Rajan and Zingales 2003). Whereas stock market capitali-
zation (the total value of all listed shares in a stock market) witnessed slow 
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but continuous growth throughout the 1980s in most advanced economies, 
numbers exploded in the mid-1990s and reached a peak around the millen-
nium (Table 4). For instance, in 1990 stock market capitalization in Germa-
ny made up to around 20 percent of GDP, whereas 10 years later it arrived 
at its peak level of 67 percent of GDP. In the United Kingdom, stock market 
capitalization was about 83 percent of GDP in 1990 and reached about 173 
percent of GDP in 2000. The burst of the Dot.com bubble made stock mar-
ket capitalization shrink across economies worldwide. This, however, was 
only of short duration and levels of stock market capitalization recovered 
until 2007/2008 when the US Subprime Crisis reverberated throughout the 
world. 
 France Germany United Kingdom United States 
1913 0.78 0.44 1.09 0.39 
1929 n.a. 0.35 1.03 0.75 
1938 0.19 0.18 1.92 0.56 
1950 0.08 0.15 0.86 0.33 
1960 0.28 0.35 1.15 0.61 
1970 0.16 0.16 1.99 0.66 
1980 0.09 0.09 0.38 0.46 
1990 0.25 0.21 0.83 0.51 
2000 1.09 0.67 1.73 1.47 
2010 0.75 0.43 1.35 1.15 
Data: Germany, United Kingdom, United States, 1913–1980 (Rajan and Zingales 2003); France, 1913–1990 
(Bozio 2002); 1990–2010 (World Bank) 
Table 4: Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, 1913–2010 
Another key driver next to digitalization and financial product innovation 
was the rise of finance as a science. The development of new theoretical 
paradigms within the field of financial economics and their dissemination 
across business schools worldwide, has contributed considerably to the con-
struction of a standardized set of techniques. The rise of finance as an eco-
nomic discipline has not only produced a number of Nobel-Prize winners 
but also a set of practical mathematical formulae, models and theorems – 
Efficient-Market-Theory, Capital-Asset-Pricing-Model, Option-Pricing-
Model, Black-Scholes-Theorem (Bernstein 1992, 2007; MacKenzie 2006; 
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MacKenzie and Millo 2003). Today, these instruments belong to the stand-
ard repertoire utilized by traders worldwide. 
 To sum up, since the collapse of the Bretton Woods System and the 
emergence of a Eurodollar Market, financial deregulation and technological 
innovation have resulted in a global exchange network of capital flows and 
transactions. Whereas the traditional credit business lost importance, finan-
cial market instruments gained widespread significance for the operations of 
national governments, corporations and private households. In such a way, 
finance is not only linked to re-orientations in corporate strategies and 
changes in national financial institutional frameworks but also to new pres-
sures on private households and the emergence of new opportunities for in-
vestors and savers. 
2.6. Marketization and Individualization 
The rise of finance, transformations in investment practices and the dynam-
ics of private wealth since the 1970s cannot be understood without taking a 
look at two fundamental processes which have been taking place over the 
last part of the 20th century: marketization and individualization. 
 Generally, most of the literature claims that financial globalization since 
the 1970s was mainly driven by the demise of the Bretton Woods System in 
unleashing market forces. However, such an explanation seems too simplis-
tic. The rise of finance over the last decades was only possible due to the re-
emergence of a whole set of ideas, beliefs, practices and institutions 
strengthening global networks of finance.  
 
Marketization – The Real Great Transformation? 
In contemporary society, ‘markets’ have become absolute (Barber 1977; 
Fourcade 2007). They seem to represent the fundamental foundation of 
modern society. It is a myth that markets have ever been completely unregu-
lated but the intellectual tide of the past 40 and more years has unquestiona-
bly been in favor of the primacy of markets and against regulation. 
Throughout the last decades of the 20th century, the world witnessed the 
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paramount trend towards “marketization” (Djelic 2006; Fourcade-
Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Crouch 2011) – sometimes also called “econo-
mization” (Schimank and Volkmann 2008). The rise of finance has to be 
seen as closely intertwined with this development. Marketization entails 
both (1) market ideologies and (2) market-oriented reforms. A market ideol-
ogy reflects the belief that markets are more efficient in allocating re-
sources, creating affluence and guaranteeing steady growth than bureaucra-
cies, managers, cartels or state governments. Such a belief results in the in-
troduction and diffusion of market principles on a national and global level 
and eventually leads to the ‘commodification’ of nearly all spheres of social 
life. Market-oriented reforms refer to policy attempts shaped by market 
logics, which aim at cultivating the emergence of markets and weakening 
alternative institutional arrangements at the same time. 
 The striking increase in the size and power of global financial markets 
has been both constitutive of and coterminous with the spread of neoliberal 
processes of marketization across the globe. It is impossible to analyze one 
in isolation from the other. Marketization is closely interwoven with finan-
cial liberalization and deregulation, which meant structuration of the finan-
cial field on a global level (Van Zandt 1991; Ventresca et al. 2003) and 
global development of isomorphistic financial discourses, institutions, actors 
and practices (Simmons 2001; Kleiner 2003; Weber et al. 2009; Gordon and 
Roe 2004). 
 The transition from ‘organized’ post-war capitalism towards 
‘(neo)liberal’ capitalism is widely attributed to the re-discovery of liberal 
ideas in the 20th century (Djelic 2006; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Sim-
mons et al. 2008; Lash and Urry 1987). Since the 1970s, liberal thinking 
became popular on a global level, a way of thinking which supports free 
market trade and limited state intervention – generally described as “neolib-
eralism” (Duménil and Lévy [2000]2004, 2011; Crouch 2011). According to 
the neoliberal idea, the state is only responsible for guaranteeing freedom 
and law but in no case for intervening in the social outcomes created 
through economic activity (Swedberg 1994). At least since the beginning of 
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the 1980s, the spread and diffusion of marketization has given rise to pro-
found social, economic and political transformations. In the course, free-
market-orientated economic policy, in form of deregulation, privatization 
and liberalization, has spread rapidly all around the globe (Simmons et al. 
2008; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Ikenberry 1990; Eising 2002; 
Henisz et al. 2005; Kogut and Macpherson 2008; Simmons and Elkins 
2004; Brune et al. 2004). 
 In particular, processes of marketization imply a new understanding of 
the role of state action and therefore have great impact on regulation by the 
state (Carruthers et al. 2001; Helleiner 1994; Fligstein 1996). This develop-
ment can be illustrated by at least four aspects: (1) States delegate elements 
of their rule-making and monitoring power to independent regulatory actors 
(Gilardi 2005; Krippner 2007). (2) Regulatory thinking is moving towards 
structured self-regulation. Former regulatory fields experience privatization 
and transformation into markets, which means the introductions of competi-
tive mechanisms and efficiency principles. At the same time, “audit” replac-
es former “control” (Power 1997), which means the replacement of political 
authority by (scientific) professional expertise. (3) Public administrations 
experience re-structuring and modification (LeGalès and Scott 2008; 
Schimank 2005; Christensen and Laegreid 2001). This means a 
‘managerialization’ of state bureaucracies including the implementation of 
market mechanisms and ideas of competition. In the course, state bureau-
cracies experience shifts towards greater transparency. In the course, effi-
ciency criteria and customer-orientation become more important. (4) The 
role of the state has changed when it comes to welfare arrangements and 
social security. Consequently, the last decades saw the retrenchment of the 
welfare state from many traditional domains. This holds true for the emer-
gence of private pension schemes (Weyland 2005; Dixon 2008; Ebbinghaus 
and Whiteside 2012) but as well for the fields of education and health care 
which had to submit to the principles of markets (Ramirez 2006; Eaton et al. 
2016; Schimank 2005). 
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 In face of such changes, it is, however, important to mention that the “re-
birth of the liberal creed” (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002) resulting 
in the global spread of market logics is far from being the first wave of 
global-reaching economic change. For instance, the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648 resulted in the spread of the territorially bounded nation-state (Krasner 
1993; Thomas and Meyer 1984) with deep effects for economic life. Later, 
mercantilism, orthodox macroeconomic policies, socialism and Keynesian-
ism occupied certain en vogue-periods as global models for economic or-
ganization (Gourevitch 1986). The “first globalization wave” (O’Rourke 
and Williamson 2002) from mid-19th century until the beginning of WWI 
involved heavy consequences for economies on a global scale. What is, 
nonetheless, more distinctive about the late-20th century economic devel-
opments of liberalization, is its rapidness, its extensive global reach and its 
conjoining of political and economic reform (Simmons et al. 2008). 
 The spread of neoliberal marketization has to be understood as the inter-
play of different social forces within a distinct historical context. The dis-
tinct historical context which provided the ground for the global diffusion of 
market logics can be characterized by five distinct developments. (1) The 
1970s experienced heavy economic disruptions, mainly created by oil 
shocks with global impact. As a consequence, economic depression existed 
in parallel with rising inflation (so called ‘stagflation’), which demonstrated 
both the limits of Keynesian economic policy and the structural fragility in 
Western economies. (2) The crisis of the 1970s led to increasing dependen-
cy of governments worldwide on international financial institutions like the 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank. (3) The end of the 
Cold War meant a victory of capitalistic economic organization over com-
munism and its interventionist features. (4) As a consequence, the United 
States represented the only remaining super-power and cemented its global 
hegemonic status. Already since the end of WWII, the diffusion of ideas, 
models and practices has happened chiefly from the United States towards 
other Western societies (Djelic 1998; Zeitlin and Herrigel 2000; Useem 
1998). However, after the end of the Cold War this tendency even intensi-
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fied (see Simmons et al. 2008; Beck et al. 2003). (5) Both as an “epistemic 
community” (Haas 1992) and as ‘policy-makers’ or ‘modern gurus’, econ-
omists have achieved influence, power and reputation on a global level. 
 The global spread of market principles was strongly associated with the 
powerful influence of liberal economists and authorities (Djelic 2006). The 
institutionalization of neoliberalism started with the foundation of the Mont 
Pelerin Society in 1947, a ‘think-tank’ and international social network of 
influential and prominent economists (Mendes 2003; Plehwe 2009). In par-
allel, the Chicago School achieved growing popularity, attraction and influ-
ence. Chicago economists – especially Milton Friedman as its ‘public lead-
er’ – publicly propagated the advantages of market principles and their po-
tential to solve the contemporary economic problems created through 
Keynesian economic policy. While in the course of economic disruptions of 
the 1970s, Keynesianism became increasingly discredited, liberal ideas 
promised to provide solutions and increasingly caught political attention. 
Instigated by the rebirth of the liberal intellectual ideas, economists and pol-
icy-makers blamed heavy regulation and state intervention for structural 
economic problems. Under the influence of the Chicago School around Mil-
ton Friedman, fundamental market-liberal reforms as a remedy for econom-
ic depression were implemented in different countries – first in Chile under 
the Pinochet regime, then in Great Britain under the Thatcher government, 
then in the United States under the Reagan administration (Valdès 1995; 
Foxley 1983; Keegan 1984). 
 
Individualization – Liquid Life in the Risk Society 
The trend of ‘economic liberalism’ and the resulting central position of ‘the 
market’ is interacting with trends of ‘cultural liberalism’ of “modern 
actorhood” (Meyer and Jepperson 2000) and the central position of ‘the in-
dividual’ in modern society. Increasingly, life cannot follow fixed forms, 
predetermined courses or ‘normal’ patterns. People, in contrast, are perma-
nently forced to decide on their own and for themselves – in a ‘liquid’ socie-
ty which lacks orientations. One the one hand, options increase, whereas, on 
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the other hand, risks increase as well. The task of performing individual 
identities has not only become a choice but rather a compulsion. Nowadays, 
people have to “seek biographical solutions to systemic contradictions” 
(Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001: xxii), at the same time as everybody ex-
periences disintegration of previously existing collective social forms such 
as family, class, nation and welfare state. 
 These developments in the relation between society and individual start-
ed to become clear already at the end of the 19th century (see Simmel 
[1907]2004; Weber [1922]1978) and gained speed after WWII in most 
Western societies. The last century witnessed a kind of “metamorphosis” in 
the relation between individual and society, eventually leading to a “new 
mode of societalization” (Beck [1984]1992: 127). In general, this process is 
termed “individualization” (Beck [1984]1992; Giddens 1990, 1991; Bau-
man 2000, 2001; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001). The process of individ-
ualization happens along three dimensions (Beck [1984]1992: 127ff): the 
(1) “liberating dimension” means a disembedding from historically pre-
scribed social forms and commitments in the sense of traditional contexts of 
dominance and support, the (2) “disenchantment dimension” refers to the 
loss of traditional security with respect to practical knowledge, faith and 
guiding norms, the (3) “control or reintegration dimension” means a “re-
embedding” – a new type of social commitment – into modern institutions 
like financial markets, labor markets, education institutions or mass con-
sumption. The dimensions of individualization, (1) disembedding, (2) loss 
of traditional security, (3) re-embedding, refer to a weakening, perhaps even 
a collapse, of normative certainties and traditional modes of living. In the 
course, marriage and family, national state, industrial firm, trade union, par-
ties and church lose their binding force, since they contradict needs for free-
dom and flexibility. On the one hand, individualization refers to the erosion 
and disintegration of previously collective forms of social life and the de-
creasing necessities of previous modes of life. One the other hand, individu-
alization means a widening of scope and the free choice of alternatives leads 
to emancipation and self-fulfillment. Individualization described as “collec-
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tive fate” (Beck [1984]1992) has to be regarded as a universal social trans-
formation. Thus, individualization represents a social phenomenon which 
happens beyond the individual influence. The increase in options to choose 
from goes hand in hand with a loss of orientation. In the face of the totality 
of alternatives, everyday life becomes more complex and future becomes 
more uncertain. 
 Processes of marketization, transformations that took place with regard to 
industrial production (Boltanski and Chapiello [1999]2005; Fligstein 1990, 
2001) and the rebuilding of welfare state security (Pierson 2001; Crouch 
2009; Bourdieu 1999; Münch 2009) gave rise to a general sense of insecuri-
ty ad precariousness. The transformations lead to more freedom and auton-
omy, but at the same time more self-responsibilities and uncertainties (Beck 
[1984]1992, 2001; Sennett 1998, 2006). Contemporary market-orientation, 
thus, can be characterized as 
“a political rationality that tries to render the social domain economic and to link a re-
duction in (welfare) state services and security systems to the increasing call for ‘per-
sonal responsibility’ and ‘self-care’” (Lemke 2001: 203). 
These developments reflect a shift towards liberal thinking which involves 
to take control over one’s life, to actively design and arrange one’s life and 
to take responsibility for success and failure. The ideas of freedom and suc-
cess and their prominent place in society bring about fundamental conse-
quences for requirements and expectations. 
“[T]he responsibility for resolving the quandaries generated by vexingly volatile and 
constantly changing circumstances is shifted onto the shoulders of individuals – who 
are now expected to be ‘free choosers’ and to bear in full the consequences of their 
choices. The risks involved in every choice may be produced by forces which trans-
cend the comprehension and capacity to act of the individual, but it is the individual’s 
lot and duty to pay their price, because there are no authoritatively endorsed recipes 
which would allow errors to be avoided if they were properly learned and dutifully 
followed, or which could be blamed in the case of failure” (Bauman 2007: 3f). 
Within a “risk society” (Beck [1984]1992; see also Giddens 1991) decisions 
are made without being sure that these are the ‘right’ decisions. Future is 
marked by uncertainty. Therefore, risk can be understood as a “deadlock 
situation” (Esposito 2011): There are always worries that things cannot be 
avoided. This means, all decisions made – and also all decisions not made – 
59 
 
imply risk. Security is, thus, only an illusion. In the course, liberal mentali-
ties and orientations as well as competitive attitudes become central, which 
make actors actively design their lives and take responsibility for success or 
failure (Neckel 2010). Risk can be regarded as the universal condition of 
modernity, a condition which inevitably arises from increasing contingen-
cies, from the need to choose between various options. This holds not only 
true for economic life alone but for social life in general and thus also af-
fects areas such as family, education or politics. 
 The pressure to increasingly make one’s basic needs and one’s future de-
pended on financial markets is, nevertheless, only one side of the story. In 
an age of ‘finance capitalism’, the likelihood that a situation might occur is 
not to be feared but to be exploited as well (Sennett 2006; Boltanski and 
Chiapello [1999]2005; Voß and Pongratz 1998; Bröckling 2007). The pres-
sures resulting from the replacement of a tradition-bounded (passive) cer-
tainty by an active autonomy increase with the promises of an individual-
ized society – Try hard and you will be successful. The neoliberal climate in 
society suggests that everyone is responsible for his well-being. And, well-
being seems to be possible for everyone. ‘Do-it-yourself’ is the message. 
Thus, well-being seems only to be a question of entrepreneurial virtues and 
economic spirit. The goal of a self-determined and successful life can only 
be achieved by the price of self-governance, self-discipline and self-control. 
As a consequence, large parts of the population increasingly perceive risky 
financial investments as an option which has to be taken into account when 
making financial decisions. Risk itself becomes an encouraging factor to 
engage in financial markets for retirement provision, education or protection 
against unemployment and ill-health. By actively handling risk, people can 
prepare for a future marked by multiple uncertainties. In its essence, this 
means that life itself turns into a type of asset to be managed (Martin 2002; 
Davis 2009). Via policy reforms or marketing campaigns, people are forced 
or encouraged to actively engage in financial concerns (Langley 2008). 
“What emerged can be called a portfolio society, in which the investment 
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idiom becomes a dominant way of understanding the individual’s place in 
society” (Davis 2009: 6). 
 According to the neoliberal idea, everyone is free and equally able to 
check his chances and options and to calculate their efficiency. In the course 
of this generalization of freedom, mechanisms of economic integration 
change. The “entrepreneurial self” (Amoore 2004; Langley 2006; Bröckling 
2007) describes a social figure who is permanently called on to combine 
economic success with self-realization. Freedom does not only involve the 
unbinding from previously existing norms and traditions, but also the com-
pulsion to make use of this freedom – in the form of a self-responsible ‘en-
trepreneurship’. This freedom, however, is always threatened by the danger 
of failing – economically and socially – and is therefore inevitably related to 
the pressure to be successful, no matter how success is created and 
achieved. Market outcome increasingly represents the only simple measure 
for justification, evaluation and social-standing (Neckel 2008, 2010). 
2.7. Financialization as a Present-day Diagnosis 
Processes of marketization and individualization meet each other in the con-
cept of financialization. This means by no case that other prominent social 
trends like digitalization and medialization, globalization and Europeaniza-
tion, or precarization and flexibilization are irrelevant for the rise of finance. 
But drawing on the historical discussion by Doering-Manteuffel and Rapha-
el (2008), we identify the shift from state towards market and from society 
towards individual as the most characteristic developments of our times 
since the 1970s. 
 The increasing role of financial markets and their underlying financial 
logics have radically transformed economic life in present-day capitalist so-
cieties. To describe and articulate contemporary socio-economic phenomena 
and transformations, researchers from a range of disciplines make use of the 
concept of ‘financialization’, signaling the growing importance of finance 
and financial markets as being of elementary significance for economic ac-
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tion and the trajectories of modern societies (Krippner 2005; Epstein 2005; 
Van der Zwan 2014).4 
 Throughout the last four decades, research in political economy has 
mainly been a comparative effort in studying the complex nexus of econo-
my and social institutions, with the consequence of outlining distinct “varie-
ties of capitalism” (Shonfield 1965; Albert 1991; Hall and Soskice 2001; 
Amable 2003). However, in particular since the financial crisis of 2008, dis-
cussions on capitalism, rather focusing on its ‘common’ trends than its ‘va-
rieties’, became of increasing interest (Regini 2014; Streeck 2011b). The 
idea of financialization represents such an attempt, since financialization as 
a universal process is not confined to one distinct economy, but happens 
globally and thus affects economies all around the globe – albeit to different 
degrees. Financialization represents a ‘commonality’ of contemporary capi-
talistic economies.  
 Such an understanding asks for a view of financialization as a multifacet-
ed phenomenon which happens at different levels (Deutschmann 2011). In-
deed, so far, research has identified different contours of financialization: 
 
• Current processes of financialization are an expression of ‘long 
waves’ of capitalistic development and the rise and decline of finan-
cial supremacy (longue durée perspective).  
• Financialization involves economic transformations at the sector-
level of economies. Research has demonstrated realignments in the 
structure of the economy, in the distribution of national income be-
tween profits, rents, wages and taxes, and in the international divi-
sion of labor (sector perspective). 
• Processes of financialization relate to changes at the organizational 
and firm-level. A number of studies have examined transformations 
in corporate governance and shifts in the power balance between 
                                                       
4 It should be mentioned, nevertheless, that the concept of financialization is far from being 
new. Its origins can be found in the early 20th century literature (Hobson 1902; Hilferding 
1910) and in the interwar years (Tawney 1921; Berle and Means 1932; Keynes 1936). A 
historical introduction on this is found in Erturk et al. (2008). 
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corporate owners, management, shareholders, state, unions and em-
ployees. As a consequence, corporations embraced a stock market-
oriented conception, and non-financial firms started to act as banks 
and engaged in financial activities (shareholder value perspective). 
• Last but not least, financialization also relates to changes at the indi-
vidual and household level, reflected by the rise of credit financed 
consumerism and the spread of a middle class investor culture (eve-
ryday life perspective). 
 
Nevertheless, the question still remains: What is financialization? What do 
we exactly mean by this term? The related literature offers various defini-
tions. We will present some oft-cited and prominent ones. One of the most 
prominent and most encompassing definitions of financialization is present-
ed by Epstein (2005: 3), which for him means “the increasing role of finan-
cial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in 
the operation of the domestic and international economies”. 
 A few years earlier, for Dore (2000: 116f) financialization 
“refers to the increasing dominance of the finance industry in the sum total of eco-
nomic activity, of financial controllers in the management of corporations, of financial 
assets among total assets, of marketed securities, and particularly of equities, among 
financial assets, of the stock market as a market for corporate control in determining 
corporate strategies, and of fluctuations in the stock market as a determinant of busi-
ness cycles.” 
In a similar manner, Palley (2007: 1) conceptualizes financialization as 
“a process whereby financial markets, financial institutions and financial elites gain 
greater influence over economic policy and economic outcomes. Financialization 
transforms the functioning of economic system at both the macro and micro levels. Its 
principal impacts are to (1) elevate the significance of the financial sector relative to 
the real sector; (2) transfer income from the real sector to the financial sector; and (3) 
increase income inequality and contribute to wage stagnation. Additionally, there are 
reasons to believe that financialization may render the economy prone to risk of debt-
deflation and prolonged recession.” 
While these definitions offer good descriptions of financialization processes 
from a broader perspective, they invoke the impression that financialization 
does only imply quantitative change: The ‘financial’ gains far greater 
weight compared with the ‘real’. These conceptualizations also seem to use 
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‘the financial’, ‘the financial sector’ and ‘financial institutions’ interchange-
ably. Financialization, however, encompasses economy as a whole – includ-
ing not only the financial sector but also the governmental state, non-
financial corporations, various economic organizations and private house-
holds. Hence, it seems to be misleading to view the ‘real sector’ against the 
‘financial sector’ as if they were separate and opposing domains. Rather, 
contemporary financialization can be considered as a qualitative change in 
the logic of profit accumulation. This change is linked with the process of 
profit maximization – in our case financial profit in specific – in conditions 
of global economic crisis. There is no principled distinction between the 
‘real sector’ and the ‘financial sector’ (for any longer), since the ‘financial 
sector’ is (now a part of) the ‘real sector’ – and vice versa. 
 Accordingly, financialization could be conceptualized as a “pattern of 
accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels 
rather than through trade and commodity production” (Krippner 2005: 174). 
Or in other words, financialization is “the growing importance of financial 
activities as a source of profits in the economy” (Krippner 2011: 27). ‘Fi-
nancial’ refers to the economic activities transferring financial resources in 
the expectation of future profit or capital increases. Therefore, this ‘accumu-
lation-centered’ interpretation of financialization concentrates on how and 
where profits are created. Such a view implies not only mere numbers and 
fixed boundaries between sectors and actors but incorporates the meaning 
related to finance. 
2.7.1. The Longue Durée of Capitalism and Financialization 
Contemporary financialization has to be understood against the background 
of the ‘longue durée’ of capitalist development – recurring ‘long waves’ in 
economic history, which entail hegemonic and geographic shifts (Braudel 
[1979]1984; Arrighi [1994]2009; Arrighi and Silver 1999; Langley 2002; 
Phillips 1993). According to the economic historian Fernand Braudel, finan-
cial expansion occurs as a response to capital over-accumulation – i.e. in 
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response to the accumulation of capital on a scale beyond the ‘normal’ 
channels for investment.  
 “[F]inance capital is not a particular stage of world capitalism, let alone its latest and 
highest stage. Rather, it is a recurrent phenomenon which has marked the capitalist era 
from its earliest beginnings in late medieval and early modern Europe” (Arrighi 
[1994]2009: xi). 
Hence, financialization does not represent a completely new phase of pre-
sent-day capitalist development but is a regular and recurring phenomenon 
in the conjuncture of capitalist economies throughout economic history 
since the mid-13th century. For Braudel, periods of financial expansion are 
not just recurrent phenomena and fundamental periods of re-organization 
and re-production of world capitalism. Periods of financial expansion repre-
sent critical phases in history during which the center of capital accumula-
tion moves towards another location. 
 The ‘long waves’ consist of two parts (Arrighi [1994]2009). Whereas the 
upswings are marked by increasing manufacturing and trade, the downturns 
are characterized by a process of financialization, which means a shift to-
wards financial activities to ensure further growth as “the predominant capi-
talist response to the joint crisis of profitability and hegemony” (Arrighi 
2007: 161). Financial expansion represents “a sign of autumn” (Braudel 
[1979]1984: 246), a mark for the maturity of a distinct phase in the evolu-
tion of capitalist economies and the decline of hegemonic power positions. 
Throughout ‘autumn’, the scale of financial expansions skyrockets to en-
compass most of the globe (Arrighi 2003). The ‘autumn’ of the hegemonic 
country, however, is the ‘springtime’ for the rise of the next hegemonic 
power. 
 In his empirical study, Giovanni Arrighi ([1994]2009) illustrates the dy-
namics of the world economy as a sequence of “systemic cycles of accumu-
lation”. Each cycle represents the ascent and the decline of the hegemonic 
economy of world capitalism. Arrighi identifies four overlapping systemic 
cycles of accumulation since the 14th century: 
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• The Genoese cycle, dating from the 15th to the early 17th centuries, 
was mainly rooted in the financial interrelations between Habsburg-
Spain and the pecuniary power of Genoese financiers. 
• The Dutch cycle, from the late 16th to the late 18th centuries, de-
rived from the colonial expansion of the United Provinces and the 
importance of Amsterdam as Europe’s commercial and financial 
center. 
• The British cycle, from the mid 18th to the early 20th centuries, was 
based on the economic development after the Industrial Revolution 
and rise of London as an international financial hub. 
• The following US cycle covers the period from the late 19th century 
to the early 2000s. Here, the crisis of the 1970s signals the switch 
from commodity to money trades in the leading capitalist economy. 
The recent turmoil could be considered as a ‘terminal crisis’ of US 
hegemonic power. 
 
Following Braudel and Arrighi, the Mediterranean city states (Genoa, Ven-
ice) and later Amsterdam and England witnessed processes of 
financialization, when their hegemonic domination began to shrink, resem-
bling processes occurring today. Consistent with this perspective, the post-
1980 era represents such a financial expansion cycle of global capitalist de-
velopment – the US hegemonic cycle.5 However, what makes the present-
day era of financialization so unique is the far more brisk and striking dy-
namics of financialization, when compared with earlier expansions of fi-
nance (Arrighi et al. 1999). Originating from the profitability crisis of the 
1970s, current financialization is both outcome and integral element of pro-
cesses of neoliberal marketization since the 1970s (Arrighi [1994]2009; 
Stein 2011; Streeck 2014). The period from 1950–1970, which was not 
                                                       
5 In a similar vein, also Boyer (2000a; see also Stockhammer 2007) speaks of the emer-
gence of a new »finance-driven regime of accumulation« which indicates a systemic shift in 
capitalistic organization – from the »Fordist« form of capitalistic (manufacturing) produc-
tion towards a form of capitalism dominated by financial markets. The finance-driven re-
gime of accumulation describes the economic constellation that developed from the eco-
nomic situation in the 1970s, characterized by declining productivity and wage stagnation. 
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characterized by a financialized economy, was marked by a greater propor-
tionality between the development of the productive and the financial 
spheres. During this period of time, finance was heavily regulated by state 
authorities and international agreements that restricted the international 
movement of financial flows. The situation changed in the course of the 
economic crisis of the 1970s, which was mainly caused by falling profit-
rates in Western major economies – with the United States at the top. Reac-
tions to the crisis initiated various interrelated dynamics: liberalization of 
foreign trade, deregulation of goods and financial markets and welfare state 
reforms. 
2.7.2. Shifts in the Economy: The Growth of the Financial Sector 
Cut down to the bone, financialization shows up in the rising income share 
of finance (Figure 3). The share of GDP achieved in the financial sector has 
increased by around 3 percent in the United States since 1970, rising from 
around 4 to 7 percent (Greenwood and Scharfstein 2013). Other OECD 
countries witnessed similarly sharp increases over that period of time 
(Philippon and Reshef 2013). 
 Corresponding figures for the Netherlands make up 4.5 percent and 4 
percent for the United Kingdom, whereas French and German financial sec-
tors witnessed increases from about 1 percent over the last four decades. 
The development of the FIRE sector (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate) 
draws a similarly impressive picture (Appendix Figure 26). This develop-
ment goes hand in hand with the increasing cost of financial services (Bazot 
2014) and of economic rents (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011) fueled by 
financial deregulation (Krippner 2011) and extracted by high-paid financial 
elites (Godechot 2012; Bell and Van Reenen 2013; Denk 2015). 
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Figure 3: Finance share in GDP, 1970–2010 (Data: EU-KLEMS; OECD) 
 
Figure 4: Finance share in GDP, 1890–2010 (Data: Phillippon (2012); Smits et al. (2009); 
EU KLEMS) 
When looking at the development of the financial sector in a long-term per-
spective of 150 years, we can observe that there is something special of our 
age (Figure 4). We present the development of the financial sector through-
out the last 150 years (1860–2010) for three countries (Belgium, Finland, 
United States) for which such long-term data is available. Although finance 
exploded in the period between the two World Wars and amounted to about 
5 percent of GDP, the years after the Great Depression made the finance 
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sector shrink. Since the 1960s or 1970s respectively, the financial sector in 
the countries under analysis increased in size reaching historically unprece-
dented level. 
2.7.3. Shareholder Value and Financialization 
But not only has the financial sector increased its share of GDP, also the 
non-financial sector has increased its financial activities. This shows up in 
the change of revenue sources for non-financial firms towards portfolio in-
come. A number of studies illustrate that corporate profits now derive main-
ly from dividends, interests and capital gains (Orhangazi 2008; Krippner 
2011). In her seminal paper, Greta Krippner (2005) demonstrates that the 
US economy has witnessed economic growth principally via financial activ-
ities since the 1970s. Whereas manufacturing declined, at least from the 
mid-1990s, the FIRE sector (finance, insurance, real estate) witnessed ex-
traordinary growth and developed into the major source of total corporate 
profit. Accordingly, financialization denotes that firms shift from making 
money with products and customers to increasingly making money by fi-
nancial engagement. Here, financialization involves the “engagement of 
nonfinancial businesses in financial markets” (Stockhammer 2004: 721). 
 The internationalization of global markets represents the main driver for 
non-financial firms’ withdrawal from manufacturing and productive activi-
ty. In the face of increasing international competition and domestic demands 
for profitability, firms engaged in off-shoring and control of foreign supply 
chains in order to reduce costs. However, profits and gains have not been re-
invested into the respective corporation, but have rather been handed over to 
shareholders or used for investments in financial markets (Crotty 2005; 
Milberg 2008; Baud and Durand 2012; Aglietta and Breton 2001). 
 The financialization of the non-financial corporation is closely inter-
twined with the modification of management methods of the modern corpo-
ration (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Fligstein 1990, 2001; Froud et al. 
2000, 2002; Zorn et al. 2004). Financialization has to be attributed to the 
emergence of the “shareholder value conception of the firm” (Fligstein 
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1990, 2008; Dobbin and Zorn 2005) as the chief guiding principle of corpo-
rate behavior. Over the last decades, corporate governance and management 
practices witnessed a transformation from “retain and reinvest” to “down-
size and distribute” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). Financial results pro-
vide the basis for assessing competitiveness (Froud et al. 2000; Williams 
2000) in ways that shape management orientations, expectations and strate-
gies (Froud et al. 2006; Widmer 2011). These ‘new’ practices of organiza-
tional management imply a distinct “conception of control” (Fligstein 1990) 
interpreted as a device for maximizing invested capital utilized by managers 
under the pressure of shrinking growth rates, shareholder power and institu-
tional investors (Fligstein and Shin 2007). 
 The function of the modern corporation is subjected to the needs of short-
term profit. What matters now is the stock value of the corporation. Share-
holder value describes a set of ideas and practices that makes managers 
view the firm as a collection of assets and primarily serve the interests of 
their shareholders, thus concentrate on making profit and increasing the 
market value of the corporation, extracting maximum returns and raising the 
share price for the stock of the firm. Corporate managers are guided mainly 
by financial considerations and pressures to raise profitability, including al-
so indirect pressures resulting from powerful rating processes (Sinclair 
2005). The spread of this set of ideas led to a restructuration of the relations 
between boards of directors, management and financial markets (Fligstein 
2001; Davis and Stout 1992; Useem 1996: Zorn et al. 2004). 
 Since the financial sector of the economy has increased its status in the 
economy by increasing profit shares over the last decades, managers of non-
financial firms were driven to increasingly make use of financial instru-
ments in order to create profits. This also pushed managers of nonfinancial 
firms to increasingly making use of financial tools to produce profits. Thus, 
increasing the firm value via leveraged buyouts, stock re-purchases mergers 
and acquisitions or increasing profitability through active participation in 
financial markets as such became a common business strategy (Fligstein 
2001, 1990; Dobbin and Jung 2010). For meeting financial targets and 
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shareholders’ expectations, upper-level managers frequently receive shares 
and bonuses, which then ends up in a circulative self-perpetuating process. 
 Although at the beginning shareholder value implied a power shift to-
wards shareholders, it promoted top-level managers to exceptional degrees 
of income and wealth (Goldstein 2012). This functioned in particular via 
incentive payments. Caused by a shift in CEO compensation from a product 
market share benchmark towards stock options, executive payment has wit-
nessed steady increases since the 1980s and has created a “winner-take-all” 
constellation (Frank and Cook 1995). The CEOs of large corporations re-
ceive several hundred times higher incomes than the average employee 
(DiPrete et al. 2010; Godechot 2012; Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005; 
Tomaskovic-Dewey and Lin 2011; McCall and Percheski 2010). Although 
most of the research has its focus on the US case where new compensation 
practices emerged, stock market performance evaluation has increasingly 
been adopted by large European and Japanese corporations (Chizema 2010; 
Miyajima 2007). 
 The extent of executive compensation payment has continually increased, 
in spite of slumping corporate performance (Erturk et al. 2007). Thus, it 
seems that the “power of managers has been more significant than the pow-
er of financiers” (Boyer 2005: 40; see also Goldstein 2012). The shift from 
‘managerialism’ to the ‘shareholder value conception of the firm’ brought 
about massive social consequences for employees and contributed to in-
creasing income inequality (Fligstein and Shin 2007; Sjöberg 2009; Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey 2013; Dünhaupt 2014). 
2.7.4. Finance and Everyday Life 
Processes of financialization also involve private households and determine 
to what extent financial markets and financial motives play a crucial role for 
the way of household economic action. From this perspective, 
financialization is as much a matter of formal and informal institutional 
change as subject-formation and increasing integration of financial calcula-
tion into daily life (Martin 2002; Langley 2008; Davis 2009; Leyshon and 
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Thrift 2007). On the one hand, the emergence of “pop finance” in the 1980s 
guided household savings into securities (Harrington 2008; Schimank 2011; 
Erturk et al. 2007). On the other hand, the last decades witnessed the ascent 
of household debt (Jordà 2014a, b; Coletta et al. 2014). It is claimed that, in 
a slow-growth-world and in face of the welfare state re-building, households 
use credit to maintain or increase their standard of living in times of stag-
nant wages (Streeck 2014; Prasad 2012; Rajan 2010; Leicht and Fitzgerald 
2006; Crouch 2009). Recent research also relates increasing household debt 
with the emergence of a culture of aggressive financial risk-taking embraced 
by the upper and middle classes (Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). 
 Processes of financialization increasingly create an environment in which 
households are supposed to be financially independent and self-responsible 
‘entrepreneurs’ – ‘their own financial economists’ – who take on risk over 
their future financial security. The penetration of finance into daily life, de-
scribed as the “financialization of everyday life” (Langley 2008; Martin 
2002), finds its reflection in the increased exposure of private households to 
financial risks. Households are increasingly involved within the dynamics of 
financial markets more directly than before and thus are exposed to numer-
ous risks which were previously absorbed by collective actors or intermedi-
aries. While in preceding times, insurance and social security were provided 
by the welfare state, the employers or the savings account, there is now a 
must to own financial products in order to be protected against the uncer-
tainties of life.  
 Accordingly, contemporary financialization is characterized by massive 
shrinkage in the distance between ‘high finance’ and ‘everyday life’, which 
implies blurring boundaries between international banking and private 
household finance. Saving and borrowing are increasingly connected to 
global financial markets, which results in the emergence of a new form of 
‘finance rationality’ actors routinely perform. In particular for the Anglo-
American context, it has been suggested that private households increasing-
ly act as investors, weighing up the risks and awards related to financial 
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practices. Thus, everyday life is increasingly framed as an arena of invest-
ment, yielding both financial and personal profits (Davis 2009). 
“This [financialization of everyday life] not only makes material consumption more 
and more aspirational, but also positions the individual as an investor in a life project 
that requires the constant pursuit of opportunities and the negotiation of risks in order 
to yield rewards. With the growing calls for individuals to secure their own independ-
ence and autonomy not via the state but through financial markets, practices of in-
vestment, calculation, and speculation become associated less with financial distortion 
than with normalization and domestication and their embrace by ordinary individuals 
taken as a sign of personal initiative, self-management, and enterprise rather than 
moral or budgetary imprudence” (Allon 2010: 367). 
Consequently, such an interpretation of financialization does not merely in-
volve the distributive outcomes of financialization for larger parts of the 
population, but as well its impact on the subjective understandings and in-
terpretations of one’s position and responsibility within the political econo-
my. 
“Finance, the management of money’s ebbs and flows, is not simply in the service of 
accessible wealth, but presents itself as a merger of business and life cycles, as a 
means of the acquisition of the self. The financialisation of daily life is a proposal for 
how to get ahead” (Martin 2002: 3). 
Finance, thus, becomes crucial for identity formation and for the individual 
position in society. Described as “commercially inspired selfhood” (Martin 
2002: 76), financialization implies that households undertake greater finan-
cial responsibilities and risks – mainly as a result of the replacement of 
state-provided welfare benefits by personal pensions, private insurance and 
investment funds. Financial investment inevitably becomes a ‘life-strategy’. 
As a consequence, financial market dynamics become absolutely central to 
the unfolding and social diffusion of such strategies, as the performance – 
past, present and future – of assets and debts directly affects choices in eve-
ryday life. By participating in financial markets and performing a new cul-
ture of risk-taking, households and individuals develop novel subjectivities 
as investors or financial wealth owners, whereby finance develops into 
‘governmentality’ (Langley 2007b, 2009; Aitken 2003, 2005, 2007, 2010; 
DeGoede 2005). This process is deeply intertwined with the production of 
instability in daily life, the demand for flexibility and the need for financial 
literacy leading to a deeper polarization and segmentation within society. 
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The “investor subject” (Aitken 2005; Langley 2008; Martin 2002) is under-
stood as the autonomous individual who handles and solves life-cycle risks 
via self-discipline and financial literacy. What differentiates the investor 
subject form previous identities is an unconditional individualism. The in-
vestor subject acts all on his own, only for the benefit of his household. 
2.8. Towards a Financialized Society? 
Although the concept as such has its origins in the 1920s, the term was re-
invented by Giovanni Arrighi in his Long Twentieth Century in 1994 and 
made famous by Greta Krippner in her seminal paper The Financialization 
of the American Economy in 2005. Based on previous studies, we show that 
financialization is a multifaceted phenomenon, which takes place at differ-
ent levels of society. And, although financialization represents a ‘common-
ality’ (Streeck 2010) of contemporary capitalist societies, numerous studies 
demonstrate that its shape and extent differ cross-nationally. 
 Financialization can be analyzed in the ‘longue durée’ of capitalist de-
velopment, in the increasing size of the financial sector, the rise of the 
‘shareholder value conception of the firm’ and the penetration of finance 
into everyday life of ordinary people. Research on financialization docu-
ments the size, power and wealth of the financial industry over the last dec-
ades. Authors from different academic disciplines take a look at the origins 
and spread of financialization, including its effects on nation states and gov-
ernments (Trampusch 2015), organizations, firms (Krippner 2005; 
Orhangazi 2008) and households (Davis 2009; Langley 2008). 
Financialization has been linked to increasing income inequality (Kus 2012; 
Dünhaupt 2014; Flaherty 2015; Godechot 2015), growing political power of 
the financial industry (Johnson and Kwag 2010; Montagne 2006) as well as 
increasing economic instabilities (Jordà et al 2011a, b). However, this is on-
ly one part of the story because financialization entails the diffusion of fi-
nancial activities and logics throughout the rest of society. The rapidly ex-
panding size and role of financial markets has reshaped nearly all arenas of 
social life in modern market societies – at least since the 1980s. Indeed, a 
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more recent definition of financialization thus speaks of a “web of interre-
lated processes – economic, political, social, technological, cultural etc. – 
through which finance has extended its influence beyond the marketplace 
and into other realms of social life” (van der Zwan 2014: 101). 
 Typically, financialization is handled as an exogenous social fact. From 
such a perspective, people are rather victims of the increasing significance 
of financial markets and are only able to respond and react. However, as we 
show in line with Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael (2008), financialization 
is the outcome of the interrelation of several social forces. Perhaps even 
more important, people and organizations are not just exposed to the desti-
nies of financial markets, as typically described in the literature. Throughout 
this book, we show that processes of financialization are actively shaped, 
negotiated and forced by various actors in contemporary capitalist societies. 
Against this backdrop, the ‘rise of finance’ cannot be portrayed as an exog-
enous ‘shock’ for people. The financial sector and household finances are 
reciprocally intertwined. Trends and patterns of financialization reflect the 
complexity and unevenness of social life as well as its ambivalences. 
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3. Empirics 
3.1. A Short Note on Data 
Throughout the study, we draw on three types of data to explore the tem-
poral development, the composition, the distribution and the social structu-
ration of private wealth in cross-national perspective. We compiled aggre-
gate data on private wealth from national statistical offices, national central 
banks and a number of unofficial historical sources. Data on wealth inequal-
ity derive from wealth tax returns and were collected from by various au-
thors. We also analyze household-level survey data on private wealth, which 
were collected by national survey institutions. 
3.1.1. Data on Aggregate Private Wealth and its Components 
When taking a look at the evolution of private wealth for a set of advanced 
capitalist economies, we will rely on an assembled dataset with yearly data 
of OECD countries covering the years from 1970 to 2012. Although a time 
period of over 40 years may appear as a long one, Raymond Goldsmith 
(1985) starts his investigation into the development of wealth in the United 
Kingdom from the late 17th century onwards. More recently, also Daniel 
Waldenström (2015, 2016) collected detailed long-run wealth data for Swe-
den covering the period from 1810–2014. As already mentioned, also 
Piketty and Zucman (2014) trace the development of private wealth over a 
longer period of time. 
 Our sample includes 14 countries for the following years: Australia 
(1976–2012), Canada (1970–2012), Denmark (1973–2012), Finland (1975–
2012), France (1970–2012), Germany (1970–2012), Italy (1970–2012), Ja-
pan (1970–2012), The Netherlands (1990–2012), Portugal (1980–2012), 
Spain (1980–2012), Sweden (1970–2012), United Kingdom (1970–2012), 
United States (1970–2012). Since the coverage varies, the sample makes up 
an unbalanced panel. For all countries data on private wealth and debt was 
compiled by making use of official national sources (National Central 
Banks, National Statistical Offices), with the exception of Portugal (1980–
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1995), Sweden (for 1970–1995) and the United Kingdom (1970–1987), 
where we had to rely on unofficial sources to construct longer series.6 For 
Sweden pre-1995 data come from Waldenström (2015, 2016), pre-1988 data 
for the United Kingdom come from Sbano (2008), pre-1995 data for Den-
mark come from the WID (World Wealth and Income Database) and in the 
case of Portugal pre-1995 data comes from Cardoso et al. (2008). 
Financial instrument Description 
Currency and deposits 
(Deposits) 
This item includes currency in circulation, transferable and 
non-transferable deposits and repos, in national or foreign cur-
rency. 
Securities other than 
shares (Bonds) 
This asset class includes bearer financial assets that are nego-
tiable on the market, such as securities issued by the general 
government, firms and banks.  
Shares and other  
Equity (Shares) 
This category includes financial assets that represent property 
rights on corporations and quasi corporations. These assets can 
be divided into quoted shares, unquoted shares and other equi-
ty. Following ESA95 the item includes also mutual fund shares. 
Insurance technical re-
serves (Insurance) 
This item includes the provision of insurance corporations and 
pension fund products for future payments to beneficiaries. 
According to the current international statistical rules, this cate-
gory does not include the assets linked to public pension 
schemes. 
Other (Other) This item subsumes several financial asset types. For instance, 
households may also have loans on the asset side of their bal-
ance sheet but the figures are zero in some countries and negli-
gible in others. 
Liabilities (Debt) Household debts are liabilities which include home mortgage 
debt, consumer credit, bank loans not elsewhere classified, 
marginal loans, and loans against life insurance policies. How-
ever, they do not include fiscal or social debts and similar forms 
of (“unofficial”) liabilities. 
Housing (Housing) This category includes real estate, dwellings and land underly-
ing buildings owned by households. 
Table 5: Technical description of wealth items 
The main variable of interest private net wealth is measured as household 
financial assets (deposits, bonds (securities), shares (equity assets) including 
mutual funds, insurance (life insurance and pension funds), other) plus 
household housing assets (buildings and underlying land) minus household 
debt (liabilities including mortgage debt and consumer credit) as a percent-
                                                       
6 See the appendix for a detailed list of the specific sources of the variables in the analysis. 
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age of GDP.7 We decided to include housing wealth only to arrive at com-
parable values, since non-financial assets (which usually comprise machin-
ery and equipment or business assets) are not available for a larger number 
of countries. 
3.1.2. Data on Wealth Inequality 
It is fair to say that the majority of research on economic inequality has fo-
cused on incomes, which is mainly due to data availability. Despite the con-
vincing arguments for studying private wealth and its distribution, the em-
pirical literature on wealth inequality is still limited, in particular when it 
comes to long-run perspectives. 
 As Davies and Shorrocks (2000) and Davis (2008) point out, there are 
five commonly used sources of wealth data: (1) wealth tax returns, (2) estate 
tax returns, (3) investment income, (4) household surveys (like the US Sur-
vey of Consumer Finance) and (5) journalistic rich list (like the Forbes list). 
Historical data on wealth distribution comes primarily from wealth and es-
tate taxation statistics (Roine and Waldenström 2015; Piketty 2014; Piketty 
and Zucman 2015; Atkinson and Morelli 2014). Of the historical series pre-
sented below, all data derive from estate tax statistics and, specifically, 
samples of individual estate tax returns. However, the OECD data presented 
in the figures for a broader set of countries for around 2010 are compiled on 
the household level. Consequently, country values sometimes diverge (de-
pending on whether we plot household level or individual level data) and 
both figures are of course only partly comparable. 
3.1.3. Survey Data on Wealth at the Household Level 
In the household-level analysis, we make use of data from the Eurozone 
Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), the US Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF), the Canadian Survey of Financial Security 
                                                       
7 Due to statistical issues and data comparability, household data from the national accounts 
includes households (S14) and non-profit institutions serving households (S15). In general, 
the share of non-profit institutions is, however, negligible or very small. 
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(SFS), and the UK Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) and the Australian 
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics survey (HILDA). These surveys 
have varying release schedules, so our data span the time-period between 
end-2008 and start-2012.8 All these surveys capture the balance sheets of 
representative national cross-sections, only the Australian HILDA survey is 
a longitudinal panel. 
 Asset holdings and liabilities are measured using current market values. 
Typically, datasets on household income and wealth like the HFCS or the 
SCF show significant rates of non-response or partial response. All surveys 
use regression-based imputation methods to correct for non-response, miss-
ing or unreliable values, but only the SCF and the HFCS release multiple 
replicates. Results were estimated on the five sets of imputations contained 
in these datasets. Sampling weights were used to obtain unbiased results in 
the descriptive analyses, while regression models were performed with un-
weighted data. 
 Comparable assets and debt definitions are constructed from the variables 
in the surveys. Combining the surveys thus allows analyzing distinctions 
and similarities in financial market participation across countries during the 
‘Great Recession’. We present an empirical analysis for Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
3.2. The Anatomy of Private Wealth in Historical Perspective 
We have shown in the sections above that finance has developed into a 
global field throughout the last decades, increasingly infiltrating social life 
and economic reality in contemporary societies. But can we really speak of 
a universal trend on a global level as much of the financialization literature 
suggests? In what follows we take a look at the evolution of private house-
hold wealth over the last three decades. In a further step, we examine the 
cross-country variations in more detail, also when it comes to distribution, 
                                                       
8 The actual dates of the interviews are country-specific, but field-work was mostly con-
ducted in 2010. 
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and isolate factors which help to understand national distinctions in wealth 
dynamics in a next section. 
 One the one hand, contemporary economic globalization is characterized 
by an expansion in the reach of networks of consumption, production and 
finance across the globe, but also by a deepening and an intensification of 
interconnectedness (Held et al. 1999). Research suggests the existence of 
homogenizing pressures of globalization understood as the “diffusion of 
practices, values and technology that have an influence on people’s lives 
worldwide” (Albrow 1997: 88). Most prominent this is expressed in mod-
ernization theory (Williamson 1996; Bell 1973), cultural sociology (Ritzer 
1993) and the world society approach (Meyer and Hannan 1979; Meyer et 
al. 1997). As a result, “the world as a whole shows increasing structural 
similarities of form among societies without, however, showing increasing 
equalities of outcomes among societies” (Meyer and Hannan 1979: 3, 13ff). 
This also includes the homogenizing force of global finance, the global dif-
fusion of neoliberal logic and the universalization of ‘market-based’ princi-
ples (Strange 1987, 1988; Helleiner 1994, 1995; Djelic 2006). Economic 
globalization is closely intertwined with the emergence and spread of a 
(global) money economy. The sociology of money emphasizes instrumental 
rationality and the potential to transform social relations into abstract and 
numerical equivalents as the principal features of money (Simmel 
[1907]2004; Deutschmann 2001). Consequently, the expansion of a money 
economy – as a significant feature of globalization – is closely related with 
an increasing homogenization and convergence of social relations. 
 One the other hand, however, as relations and practices of accumulating, 
saving and investment have developed they have taken different institutional 
configurations across state-societies (Zysman 1983). A number of works 
document that financial market structures continue to be embedded in and 
regulated by national and regional institutions (Hall and Soskice 2001; 
Vitols 2004; Vogel 1996). This is confirmed by a strand of research which 
emphasizes that logics of economic order differ in many ways around the 
world (Crouch and Streeck 1997; Guillén 2001; Streeck and Thelen 2005; 
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Lamont and Thévenot 2000; Dobbin 1994; Hamilton and Biggart 1992; 
Whitley 1999).  
 For instance, in order to understand the dynamics of crises and bubbles, 
institutional market structures like regulations and laws as well as interest 
constellations between professionals, insiders and state regulators have to be 
considered (Abolafia and Kilduff 1988; Abolafia 1996). State politics or 
media coverage may trigger or intensify a speculative mania and may also 
try to interfere in times of euphoria. Of course, the US Subprime Crisis in 
2007 has exhibited that the financial world represents a global field. Sub-
prime mortgages connected various actors all over the world, including bor-
rowers, investment banks, rating agencies, insurance companies, mortgage 
providers, mutual funds as well as hedge funds and insofar created unantici-
pated and striking outcomes (Fligstein and Goldstein 2010; Fligstein and 
Habinek 2014). The fallout from the crisis, however, informs on remarkable 
local, regional and national distinctions (Harvey 2010; Schelkle 2012; 
Hardie and Howarth 2009). The effects of the credit crunch varied across 
financial centers at a global level (Engelen and Grote 2009) and across na-
tional economies as such (Fligstein and Habinek 2014; Tridico 2013; 
Schwartz and Seabrooke 2009; Aalbers 2009). Not every national or supra-
national government had to intervene in its financial system to the same de-
gree. For instance, governments of the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United 
States and the United Kingdom had to bail out large financial institutions. 
Whereas the credit crisis has evidently revealed global interconnectedness, 
not every locality has been connected to the same degree.  
 Thus, not surprisingly, previous research has found distinctions in house-
hold financial practices across countries. Cross-country comparisons of 
wealth and investment practices at the household level reveal substantial 
differences in household portfolios and stock market participation between 
Continental European countries, the United Kingdom and the United States 
(Guiso et al. 2002, 2003; Sierminska and Doorley 2012; Christelis et al. 
2013; Sierminska et al. 2007). A plurality of social relations have been de-
tected that structure private wealth within and across societies. Previous 
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comparative research documents the unequal distribution and varying com-
position of private wealth across different ‘welfare regimes’ (Skopek et al. 
2014; Conley and Gifford 2006), ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Erturk et al. 
2005; Vitols 2004), ‘pension systems’ (Jackson and Vitols 2001; Davis and 
Steil 2001; Mertens and Eppler 2014), ‘residential capitalisms’ (Kemeny 
1980; Castles 1998; Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008; Kurz and Blossfeld 
2004), ‘intergenerational transfer regimes’ (Albertini et al. 2007; Albertini 
and Kohli 2013) and ‘financial systems’ (De Bonis and Pozzolo 2012; Bian-
co et al. 1997; DeBondt 1998). 
 These findings suggest that state-firm-household interactions in different 
societies have produced unique ‘cultures of household finance’. Processes 
of financialization are culturally constructed as designed popular appeals 
(Davis 2009; Langley 2008; Harrington 2008). Financialization has to be 
understood as nationally-specific: Economic activities and practices in gen-
eral are formulated and regulated by state authority (Fligstein 1996, 2001), 
which suggests that financialization as such is contingent upon national and 
regional forms (Engelen and Konings 2010). 
 Already Max Weber understood financial markets as political institutions 
and argued that financial trading cannot be separated from interests and 
power relationships (Weber [1894]2000a, b). In his historical investigation 
into the relationship between politics and the rise of financial markets in 
18th century England, Bruce Carruthers (1996) points out that economic 
thoughts influence politics and vice versa. Accordingly, modern financial 
markets – the emergence of which is at the closest related to public debt – 
are marked by the intertwinement of economic with national political inter-
ests. 
 Diffusionist research has revealed that different economies are differen-
tially affected by transnational processes (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 
2002; Djelic 1998; Westney 1987; Jacoby 2000). Thus, as a result of vary-
ing nationally-specific regulatory regimes, financialization (as a transna-
tional process) unfolds differently in different contexts. Cross-national 
quantitative research (Garrett 1995) and careful comparative case studies 
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(Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; see also Djelic 1998) have revealed 
that national institutional structures affect the process of neoliberal reforms. 
The global diffusion of neoliberal policy reforms is also mediated by elites 
and state authorities (Clift and Tomlinson 2004; Prasad 2006) and the de-
gree of integration into global ideological and economic networks (Swank 
2006; Frenkel 2005; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Henisz et al. 2005; Djelic 
2004). 
 Besides, national institutions form interlocking arrangements with high 
mutual ‘complementarity’. The distinct ways of coordination of partial or-
ders results in country-specific packets of institutions (Hall and Soskice 
2001; Crouch and Streeck 1997; Friedland and Alford 1991) between the 
domains of education and employment, family, labor markets and welfare 
state, between religion, politics and law – and, of course, finance. This high 
complementarity of nationally-grown patterns implies a certain “power of 
inertia” (Becker 1995) – a certain rigidity and path-dependency of structures 
and practices, which make it difficult for actors to react fully flexibly to ex-
ternal pressures and trends (North 1990; Pierson 2000a, b; Dobbin 1994). 
3.2.1. Trajectories of Private Wealth 
Levels of private wealth differ cross-nationally (Figure 5). Data for 2012 
reveal that private net wealth ratios are the highest in Spain (around 620 
percent of GDP), as result of skyrocketing property prices, and in Italy 
(around 420 percent of GDP), as a result of economic stagnation. In con-
trast, private wealth ratios are much lower in Portugal and Finland, making 
up 290 percent and 178 percent respectively. 
 Recent studies document that the second half of the 20th century has seen 
a comeback of increasing private wealth ratios (Piketty 2014; Piketty and 
Zucman 2014; De Bonis et al. 2013; Erturk et al. 2005). Indeed, as our data 
show, average private net wealth ratio has increased by around 180 percent 
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for our sample of 11 countries between 1970 and 2012 (Figure 6). 9 Around 
1970, the average private wealth-to-GDP ratio in the 11 countries under 
study was about 200 percent. Private wealth witnessed its unprecedented 
high in 2006 when the figure was slightly over 380 percent of GDP and ex-
perienced a drop of about 30 percent in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
of 2007/2008. By 2012, however, average private net wealth ratio has re-
covered and reached old levels amounting to nearly 380 percent of GDP. 
 
Figure 5: Private wealth as % of GDP across countries 
                                                       
9 We do not include data for the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain in this analysis in order to 
avoid biased results because data is only available since 1980 for Portugal and Spain and 
since 1990 for the Netherlands.  
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Figure 6: Private wealth as % of GDP since 1970 
Looking more closely at the performance of individual countries, the first 
thing that meets the eye is the big variation among the 11 advanced coun-
tries in the sample. The growth of private wealth happens on different levels 
across different (groups of) countries. The notion of a uniform or converg-
ing trend in increasing private net wealth-to-GDP ratios across Western 
countries throughout the last decades is wrong and misleading, as shown in 
Figure 7. On the contrary, the visual impression underscores the divergence 
of household financial performance in recent decades. While household 
wealth increased by 300–400 percentage points of GDP in Italy, France and 
Japan since 1970, growth was far slower in Finland and the United States, 
where ratios increased by around 50–100 percent of domestic GDP (Figure 
8). Whereas in Spain, private net wealth witnessed extreme growth since 
1980, Portugal experienced a decline in the net wealth ratio of 65 percent, 
mostly due to stagnating real estate prices. 
100%
200%
300%
400%
500%
600%
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
85 
 
 
Figure 7: Development of private net wealth in eleven countries, 1970–2012 
 
Figure 8: Increases in private wealth since 1970 
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As already presented in Figure 7, the evolution of private wealth can in no 
way be regarded as a continuous and stable process of growth over time. 
Next to the cross-national variation, the development of private wealth is 
marked by temporal ups and downs – an ‘uneven development’ which can 
be divided into six distinct phases: 
 
• 1970–1992 These ‘moderate years’ were characterized by slowly 
growing private wealth ratios. However, we should mention the ra-
ther turbulent years at the beginning of the 1970s in some countries 
(United States, United Kingdom and Japan). 
• 1993–1999 The ‘new economy boom’ in the second half of the 
1990s led to sharp increases asset prices and resulted in wealth levels 
reaching an historical high. 
• 2000–2002 The burst of the Dot.com bubble in the years from 2000 
to 2003 resulted in a heavy ‘destruction’ of private financial wealth. 
• 2003–2007 During these years, private wealth levels recovered until 
the US Subprime Crisis which reverberated throughout the world. 
• 2008–2009 The effects of the financial crisis from the second half of 
2007 until 2009 had considerable impact on the development private 
assets. 
• 2010–2012 During the aftermath of the crisis, different trends can be 
observed across countries. Whereas some countries witness a stagna-
tion of their wealth levels, private wealth ratios are on the rise again 
in other countries. 
3.2.2. The Trajectories of the Components of Private Wealth 
Next to levels and their temporal dynamics, countries also differ in the com-
position of private wealth. As previous studies based on survey data for sin-
gle points in time reveal, household portfolios and asset allocation show 
substantial cross-country variation (Sierminska et al. 2007; Christelis et al. 
2013; Sierminska and Doorley 2013). Our aggregate data show that whereas 
financial assets are especially prominent in the United States, Japan, Canada 
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and Denmark, comprising 70, 62, 61, and 60 percent of total assets respec-
tively (Figure 9 and Appendix Figure 27), housing assets constitute the main 
part of household wealth in Spain (76 percent), France (62 percent) or Aus-
tralia (55 percent). In other countries like Finland or the United Kingdom, 
the composition of household wealth is rather 50/50 balanced. A look at the 
composition of private financial wealth reveals further remarkable cross-
national differences. Whereas bank deposits play a large role in Japan and 
Portugal, equity assets (shares) are of significance in Canada, Sweden and 
the United States in particular. Whereas bonds play only a minor or negligi-
ble role in most of the countries, such assets are more important in Italy. In-
surance wealth constitutes a larger part of private financial assets in the 
Netherlands (37 percent), Denmark (30 percent) and the United Kingdom 
(28 percent of total financial assets). Private debt, measured in relation to 
private financial wealth, is highest in Denmark and Finland, making up 32 
percent and 28 percent of total financial assets respectively. 
 
Figure 9: The composition of private wealth across countries (Data for 2010) 
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When taking a look at what forms of wealth are responsible for making pri-
vate wealth ratios increase on average (Figure 10), we can see that ‘wealth 
is not wealth’. Depending on country context, the dynamics of economy-
wide private wealth levels have been either driven by increases in its (1) 
housing, its (2) financial or its (3) debt component. Whereas growing pri-
vate wealth levels are primarily driven by increases in housing wealth in 
Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom, financial wealth represents the 
main driver in Sweden, the United States, Finland and Japan in particular. 
Debt has increased the most in Australia. It should be noted, however, that 
those countries with the sharpest increasing household wealth levels (Spain, 
Italy and France) are also countries in which growing housing wealth main-
ly contributed to the overall increases in private wealth. 
 
Figure 10: Dynamics in the composition of private wealth since 1970 
Although the significance of financial wealth witnessed substantial increas-
es across all selected countries over the last three decades, this process 
seems to happen on different levels across (groups of) countries (Figure 11). 
Throughout the whole period 1970–2012, households in the United States 
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and Japan possess the highest financial wealth ratios. Also the United King-
dom and Denmark show high ratios. Sweden, Italy and Australia households 
take a position in between, followed by France and Germany. Finnish (and 
not shown in the graph, Spanish and Portuguese) households hold financial 
assets to a much lesser extent. Although the data show increasing financial 
wealth ratios across all countries in the analysis throughout the last 42 years, 
it is striking that the volatility of private financial assets has increased, in 
particular since 1999. 
 
Figure 11: Development of private financial wealth in eleven countries, 1970–2012 
There are also substantial cross-national differences when it comes to the 
development of housing assets (Figure 12). In Italy, France, Australia and 
the United Kingdom the private housing wealth-to-GDP ratio lies between 
260 and 345 percent. In Italy the importance of housing assets is ascribable 
to many structural phenomena like the social role of the family and its ef-
fects on intergenerational transfers (Bernardi and Poggio 2004). Traditional-
ly, real estate is regarded as a safe investment against inflation in an envi-
ronment marked by relatively underdeveloped financial markets and a small 
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and unregulated market for rented property. Like in other Southern Euro-
pean welfare states, housing is central part of retirement strategies of an age-
ing population, pressured by deep reforms in public pension provision. 
 
Figure 12: Development of private housing wealth in eleven countries, 1970–2012 
The United Kingdom witnessed massive increases in housing wealth since 
the mid-1990s, mostly driven by mounting real estate prices in the center of 
London. Also in France, growth in housing assets was mainly fueled by ris-
ing prices and the massive concentration of people in Paris. In Finland, the 
United States, Denmark, Canada and Sweden private housing wealth ratios 
are lower. Private housing assets make up between 127 percent of GDP 
(Finland) to 170 percent (Sweden). As already mentioned above, housing 
assets are lower in the United States when compared to other countries. The 
United States are characterized by a traditionally strong reliance on financial 
market investments. Also, the real estate boom between 1998 and 2006 was 
mainly a phenomenon related to coastal areas, touching metropolitan areas 
in particular and leaving inner states largely unaffected. However, during 
the boom, the ratio of housing assets in the United States approached the 
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levels of Japan but as soon as the bubble burst the value of housing assets 
arrived at a level comparable to the 1980s. 
 Although we are only able to analyze Spanish data on private housing 
wealth for the time since 1980, Spain represents a special case as far as the 
significance of housing assets is concerned (Figure 28 in the Appendix). 
Housing wealth was already considerable in the 1990s, like in other South-
ern European societies, probably reflecting the low investment of house-
holds in financial products as discussed above. This incomparable predomi-
nance of housing wealth in Spain was exacerbated by the boom in property 
prices from 2000–2007. According to our data, the ratio of private housing 
assets was around 540 percent of GDP in Spain in 2012. 
 
The composition of financial wealth over time 
Financial wealth consists of various categories of asset. In the following, we 
trace the development of the composition of private financial wealth for a 
number of fourteen countries from 1970–2012 for which data is available. 
In specific, we trace the evolution of four different forms of assets: (1) de-
posits, (2) bonds (securities), (3) shares (including mutual funds) and (4) 
insurance (including pension funds) (see also Table 5 above).10 
 First, we can see a decline in deposit assets over time (Figure 13). While, 
on average, deposits made up 45 percent of total financial wealth in 1970 
and reached a maximum of 53 percent in 1983, deposit assets witnessed 
steady decreases until the end of the 1990s and remained relatively constant 
around the 30 percent mark since the turn of the millennium. Bonds kept a 
relatively constant average level of around 8 to 10 percent throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, experienced strong shrinkage during the 1990s and stayed 
at constant levels of around 3 percent of total financial wealth since 2000. 
Average wealth held in shares (including mutual funds) constituted around 
20 percent of total private financial assets throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
At the beginning of the 1990s shares witnessed steady increases and made 
                                                       
10 An additional fifth category (»other assets«) accounts for forms of wealth which are dif-
ficult to classify. This category, however, is negligible for most countries. 
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up 34 percent at the turn of the century. After the burst of the Dot.com bub-
ble shares as investment lost a little of significance and moved around a 
proportion of 25 percent afterwards. The striking discovery when looking at 
the evolution of private financial wealth is the constantly rising proportion 
of insurance assets in total financial wealth. While insurance wealth made 
up fewer than 20 percent until the late 1980s, insurance assets experienced 
sharp growth in the 1990s and continued to rise more slowly but stable. 
Nowadays the proportion of insurance assets in total financial household 
wealth amounts to 35 percent. 
 
Figure 13: Development of the composition of private financial wealth, 1970–2010 (mean 
values for 14 countries) 
In the following, we display figures on the development of the composition 
of wealth for a number of countries separately. We present detailed figures 
for the United States and Japan (two countries with very high levels of pri-
vate financial wealth), for Canada, Italy and Sweden (three countries with 
medium levels of financial wealth) and for Germany (a country with rela-
tively low levels of financial wealth) (Figures 14–19). We present detailed 
figures for other countries in the appendix (Figures 30–37). 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Deposits Bonds Shares Insurance Other
93 
 
 One of the paradoxes of financialization is the seemingly undisputed sig-
nificance of deposits in many Western economies (see also Cingolani 2013; 
Erturk et al. 2005). Despite an average downward trend over the last four 
decades, deposit wealth is of ongoing significant in Germany and Spain, but 
particularly in Japan. While the importance of deposits witnessed partly 
massive decreases in many countries until 2001 (or 2007 at least), the pro-
portion of deposits as the principle element of private wealth remained sta-
ble over time in Japan, accounting for about 50 percent of total financial 
wealth. The financial crisis of 2007/2008 resulted in a real ‘comeback’ of 
deposit wealth in many countries. Private wealth organized in deposit ac-
counts expanded in all analyzed countries since the US Subprime Crisis. 
Nevertheless, in some countries (particularly the United Kingdom and Ger-
many), this general trend can already be observed since the burst of the 
Dot.com bubble in 2001. Although previous research discusses the escape in 
‘safe’ investments (Vitols 2001) subsequent to crisis-events, the phenome-
non as such remains largely overlooked in the literature. Household finan-
cial market investment behavior seems to follow a regular pattern of ‘boom–
enter–crisis–exit’. 
 While private wealth held in bonds (or debt securities) remained stable in 
most economies and experienced considerable decline in Germany, they 
represent a significant wealth component in Italy (see Figure 16). Whereas 
the proportion of wealth held directly in bonds is considerable high in Italy 
(20 percent), the corresponding number in other countries is smaller than 5 
percent. Nonetheless, in many other countries households hold bonds indi-
rectly through banks, other financial intermediaries or institutional inves-
tors. 
 Shares and equity represented a main component of private financial 
wealth in the United States throughout the last four decades (see Figure 19). 
The same holds true for France in the early 1990s, when political authorities 
and economic elite networks promoted financial market development via 
reform attempts (Schmidt et al. 1999; Goyer 2006, 2007; O’Sullivan 2007). 
But also in Italy, households strongly turned to investment in the stock mar-
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ket in the years from 1997 to 2007 (Filippa and Franzosi 2001; Coraggio 
and Franzosi 2008). The item ‘shares (and other equity)’ is characterized by 
a lot of heterogeneity since it does not only include publicly traded shares 
and mutual funds shares, but unquoted shares as well. For instance, whereas 
quoted shares are of great significance in the United States, unquoted shares 
issued by small and medium enterprises (SMEs) represent a crucial invest-
ment vehicle in France, Spain and Italy (Bartiloro et al. 2012). Shares are of 
minor importance in Germany where the level of shares as a percentage of 
private financial wealth was only 18 percent in 2012. Besides, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Japan are characterized by low wealth in di-
rectly held shares. In these countries, however, household participation in 
financial markets happens rather indirectly via investments in life insurance 
and pension funds, as we will show soon. 
 
Figure 14: The composition of private financial wealth (Canada), 1970–2012 
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Figure 15: The composition of private financial wealth (Germany), 1970–2012 
 
 
 
Figure 16: The composition of private financial wealth (Italy), 1970–2012 
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Figure 17: The composition of private financial wealth (Japan), 1970–2012 
 
 
 
Figure 18: The composition of private financial wealth (Sweden), 1970–2012 
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Figure 19: The composition of private financial wealth (United States), 1970–2012 
As already mentioned, the perhaps most outstanding phenomenon since the 
1970s, and at the same time most common feature across all countries, is the 
steady expansion of private insurance and pension wealth. The increasing 
significance of professional organization and control of private wealth re-
flects the tendency of households to delegate the management of their 
wealth to institutional investors – namely pension funds, life insurance 
companies (and mutual funds). Due to welfare state re-building and public 
policy reforms, people are increasingly forced to take responsibility for their 
own life-cycle needs, including retirement but also unemployment, health or 
education. Institutional investors offer expert knowledge and standardized 
investment services, which makes it possible to diversify and pool financial 
risks. But the possibility for households to minimize investment risk through 
institutional investor services represents only one side of the story. With the 
trend of organized wealth management by institutional investors, house-
holds are in no case liberated from the risk financial market investment. 
Traditional risks related to the volatility of equities partly disappeared, but 
‘new’ risks (financial scandals, principal-agents problems) emerged. 
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Whereas ‘Do-It-Yourself-Finance’ is typically characterized by a lack of 
financial knowledge and monetary resources, the institutionalization of pri-
vate wealth is in no case free of limitations. The effects of the US Subprime 
Crisis, the Euro Crisis and the following Great Recession made this clear 
when market dynamics had also heavy effects on assets in the portfolios of 
global players. 
 
The organization of wealth in collective funds 
For all countries in the analysis, today the portion of insurance and pension 
wealth in total financial wealth show higher levels than 40 years ago. The 
delegation of financial wealth to the hands of institutional investors is most 
pronounced in the Netherlands, but also in Australia, Denmark and the 
United Kingdom (Figure 20, 21).  
 
Figure 20: The delegation of private wealth to institutional investors, 1995–2012 
Countries like Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Italy witnessed the 
sharpest increases since 1995. Although private insurance wealth is on the 
rise since 1995 in many non-liberal welfare states, levels in Italy and Fin-
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land are only half as high as in the Netherlands, and in countries like Ger-
many or France household institutionalized wealth only makes up two-thirds 
of the figure in the Netherlands. It is remarkable that lowest degree of pri-
vate insurance wealth is especially reported for ‘family-based’ welfare states 
(Esping-Andersen 1999) like Italy, Spain and Portugal. 
 Because we can detect large cross-national differences in the proportion 
of household wealth either delegated to the management of organized inves-
tors or held directly by the households themselves (Figure 21), a closer look 
at the composition of private wealth held by institutional investors seems 
promising. We present a finer-grained analysis for 2010 (Figure 22).11 In-
vestment in pension funds make up the bulk of wealth delegated to collec-
tive investors in Australia (95 percent of total private financial assets man-
aged by institutional investors), Netherlands (80 percent), United States (71 
percent), Canada (62 percent) or Sweden (60 percent).  
 
Figure 21: Direct and managed ownership of private financial wealth (Data for 2010) 
                                                       
11 For the United Kingdom, we only have data available which aggregates life insurance 
and pension assets. 
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Figure 22: Private wealth delegated to different types of institutional investors (as % of 
total wealth managed by institutional investors) (Data for 2010) 
When it comes to pension funds, France represents a notable exception. 
Here, pension funds are nonexistent, due to ‘Pay-As-You-Go’ (PAYG) se-
cond pillar vehicles. Whereas life insurance plays a historically less signifi-
cant role in the United States, life insurance investments are important in 
France where such investment amount to 74 percent of all private assets 
held by institutional investors. Investment funds play a prominent role in 
Canada, Finland, Spain, Italy and the United States, contributing to about 30 
percent of all financial assets held in institutional investments. 
 Although increasingly larger parts of private wealth were delegated to the 
hands of global institutional investors over time across the countries under 
analysis, this development happened at different nationally-specific levels. 
But the evolution of private wealth managed by institutional investors seems 
only to be broadly linked to the institutional make-up of capitalistic market 
societies as proposed by the comparative capitalism literature (Amable 
2003; Hall and Soskice 2001; Crouch and Streeck 1997). We can distin-
guish an ‘Anglo-Saxonized’ group of countries (Australia, United Kingdom, 
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Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark) but without the United States. The 
United States (and also Sweden) can be rather located in the 
‘Coordinatedized’ group of countries (Japan, France, Germany). We can 
clearly identify a ‘Mediterranean’ group of countries (Italy, Spain, Portu-
gal). Finland seems to be an outlier. Perhaps the most outstanding finding is 
that Dutch households are the largest consumers of financial products of-
fered by institutional investors to private households since the turn of the 
millennium. 
 Throughout human economic history, we can observe a radical historical 
transformation: the transition to a democratization of investment, i.e. the 
increasing inclusion of larger parts of the population within investment ac-
tivities. For the most part of history, land, lending and commerce have func-
tioned as the chief investment vehicles. However, in ancient and partly also 
in medieval times, investment activities were restricted to members of the 
‘power elite’ – aristocracy, government and clergy and later also merchant 
elites. Even though, the management of investment in land and trade was 
regularly delegated towards slaves, peasants or commoners of lower status. 
For instance, the Roman elite typically owned a number of properties in a 
variety of regions of the Empire, whether awarded for military or political 
services or acquired as investments (Frank 1959). The Roman elites were 
usually absentee owners and the management of their assets was normally 
delegated to family members, procurators, financial and property managers 
or slaves (Andreau 1999). 
 Nowadays, this has changed. We can rather observe the opposite: where-
as financial investment is accessible to the majority in contemporary society 
through various financial products, the management of investment is typi-
cally delegated to the hands of financial elites and experts who accumulate 
fortunes by systematically taking fees on financial transactions and activi-
ties. This trend of delegating one’s wealth to the hands of investors is an 
expression of an “advised society” (“beratene Gesellschaft”) (Schützeichel 
2004) which itself is an expression of the rise of a “service society” (Bell 
1973; Castells 1996). Responsibilities and decisions in the ‘liquid life’ of 
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contemporary ‘risk society’ are increasingly handled with the help of third-
party-professionals (advisors, coaches, managers, every kind of ‘experts’). 
In an era of financialization, investors resort to professional financial ex-
perts to handle the complexity and uncertainty in global financial markets. 
As research shows, professional financial advice is an integral part of the 
everyday life of finance and a private ‘finance culture’ (Bode and Wilke 
2014; Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). As a result of transferring investment 
decision towards professional hands, private household are increasingly 
thrown into the workings of a financialized “asymmetric society” (Coleman 
1982) which is marked by a loss of power and autonomy for private inves-
tors although they are the ones who risk their assets and are responsible for 
investment performance at the end of the day. 
3.2.3. Private Wealth Distributions 
Thanks to Atkinson and Piketty (2007, 2010) we have a good idea of the 
development of income inequality in a great number of countries over the 
last century. Compared to this, research on historical and cross-national 
trends in wealth inequality has been rather modest. There are single-country 
studies for Britain (Atkinson and Harrison 1978), France (Piketty et al. 
2006, 2013), Sweden (Roine and Waldenström 2009) and the United States 
(Kopczuk and Saez 2007; Saez and Zucman 2016), which look at the evolu-
tion of wealth inequality from a long-run perspective (see also Wolff 2006; 
Davies 2008). Although we can draw on a few cross-national studies on 
wealth inequality for single points in time (Vermeulen 2014; Skopek et al. 
2014; Cowell et al. 2012a, b; Sierminska et al. 2007), cross-national com-
parisons over longer period of time are much rarer. To our knowledge, there 
are only two attempts which provide a systematical cross-country compara-
tive analysis of wealth inequality over several decades in a descriptive man-
ner. Whereas Piketty (2014) and (Piketty and Zucman 2015) compare de-
velopments of wealth inequality for the United States and Europe (France, 
Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom), Roine and Waldenström (2015) com-
pare time series for a larger set of countries. As a result, Kus (2016) in a re-
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cent literature overview points at the urgent need for sociologists to study 
the dynamics of wealth distributions. In the following, we will take a look at 
wealth inequality in cross-country comparisons and discuss some develop-
ment throughout history. 
 We have to be cautious in using traditional inequality measures like the 
Gini index for cross-national comparisons on household wealth. Although 
the Gini index is the most commonly used measure of economic inequality 
and distribution, it is not very helpful for measures of wealth because there 
are large fractions of households with zero or negative wealth, values with 
cannot be handled with the Gini index. Therefore, more recent comparative 
research on wealth distribution has largely relied on top-shares, i.e. the top 
10 or top 1 percent of the wealth distribution. 
 
Trajectories of wealth inequality 
As Figure 23 shows, at the beginning of the 20th century wealth concentra-
tion at the top (top 1 percent) made up 60–70 percent in European societies 
(France, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom) and was little bit lower in 
the United States accounting for 45 percent. This is also confirmed by 
Piketty (2014) who demonstrates that in 19th century Europe, the top 10 
percent of wealth-owners possessed 80–90 percent of total wealth, and the 
top 1 percent owned 50–60 percent (Piketty 2014). These ‘patrimonial soci-
eties’ were characterized by a massive concentration of private wealth. In-
heritance, marriage and rentier-incomes, rather than labor incomes or educa-
tion, guaranteed social status and economic well-being. 
 Inequality was compressed in the course of the two World Wars and the 
Great Depression. The top 1 decile-share fell around one-third in European 
societies throughout that period. Private wealth became increasingly located 
in the hands of a “patrimonial middle class” (Piketty 2014: 346). This has 
been a similar trajectory across European nations – the emergence of a 
prosperous middle class represents a distinct ‘commonality’ in the European 
socio-structural transformation since WWII (Mau 2015; Piketty and 
Zucman 2015). Since the 1970s, however, levels of wealth concentration 
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have started to recover. This holds true for the United States, in particular. 
Although, when compared to Europe, wealth inequality was much less pro-
nounced in 19th century United States, since mid-20th century wealth own-
ership became increasingly concentrated in the hands of the top 1 share and 
wealth inequality eventually exceeded European levels (Saez and Zucman 
2016). Today, the top 10 percent in the United States and the United King-
dom own more than 70 percent of net wealth, whereas levels in Europe are 
less alarming since they make up around 60 percent in France and Sweden. 
 
Figure 23: Wealth concentration, 1900–2010 
Although the ‘social democratic’ Nordic countries are typically regarded as 
welfare societies characterized by equality in life chances and generous so-
cial protection, in the past, wealth ownership was highly concentrated and 
unequally distributed there as well. For instance, the top 1 percent owned 
about half of the total private wealth in Sweden and Denmark up until the 
early 20th century (Roine and Waldenström 2015). Around 1800 figures 
were less dramatic (Soltow 1989; see Table 6). In Finland and Norway, 
wealth concentration was less high with the top 1 share amounting to about 
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a third of total wealth. After WWI, however, wealth inequality witnessed 
massive decline in all of the Nordic countries. 
Country Wealth owned by the top 1 percent 
Denmark 47% 
Finland 19% 
Norway 33% 
Scotland 32% 
Sweden 31% 
United States 13% 
Data: Soltow (1989) 
Table 6: Top 1 wealth shares around 1800.  
Thanks to studies by economic historians, we know a few things about 
wealth inequality in earlier periods of history. By analyzing data from the 
Florentine Catasto of 1427 (the tax census for Florence and Tuscan cities), 
Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber (1985) and Goldthwaite (2009) find that the 
wealth share owned by the top 1 (no more than 100 families) percent made 
up approximately 30 percent. More recently, Alfani (2010, 2015) studies 
wealth inequality in 16th to 17th century Piedmont Italy based on records of 
the estimi, a tax on the value of real estate owned by households. He shows 
that the top 10 wealth share lied between 45–60 percent around 1300 and 
increased to between 60–80 percent around 1700. By 1911 England could 
look back on more than 30 years of democratic reform and challenges to 
dominance of the landed aristocracy. However, the wealthiest 1 percent 
owned 66 percent of total wealth (Soltow and van Zanden 1998). Also in the 
United States of the so called ‘Gilded Age’, the top 1 percent in the United 
States in 1912 owned about 56 percent of total wealth (Williamson and 
Lindert 1980; for a bit smaller estimates, see Saez and Zucman 2016). 
 Of course, the quality of all these data presented here differs substantially 
across countries and in some cases even within single countries over time. 
However, we try to draw broad conclusions from the data. First, looking at 
the development of the wealth share of the top percentile among the coun-
tries analyzed here, industrialization seems to have resulted in increased 
wealth shares for the top percentile. We can observe much lower top shares 
in the Renaissance and around 1800 compared to the skyrocketing levels at 
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the beginning of the 20th century. Research from economic historians con-
firms this finding (Roine and Waldenström 2015: Piketty et al. 2006). Se-
cond, top wealth shares peaked in the first decade of the 20th century, but 
decreased sharply in the course of the two World Wars in all countries stud-
ied here – with the exception of Switzerland and the United States. In Swit-
zerland the top wealth share kept relatively constant, with a short period of 
decrease from 1970 until the turn of the millennium. In the United States, 
the fall during the first half of the 20th century has been small, but historical 
levels also were not as high as in most European countries. In the other 
countries, on average, the magnitude of the decrease seems to be that the top 
percentile lost its share of total wealth by about a factor of two (from around 
50–70 percent in the first years of the 20th century to around 20–30 percent 
today). It seems that the low-point in most countries was around 1980 and 
that the top 1 percent wealth share stared to climb after that.  
 
Wealth inequality in cross-national perspective 
There exists broad agreement in the literature that (1) wealth inequality is 
bigger than income inequality and that (2) that income and wealth inequality 
are positively correlated (Davies 2008; Spilerman 2000). Whereas, wealth 
represents a stock, which allows for seemingly indefinite accumulation, as 
Simmel ([1907]2004) already discussed more than 100 years ago and also 
Piketty (2014) reminds us of, income earnings consist of flows which are 
naturally limited. The proposed close correlation between income and 
wealth derives from a simple logic which assumes that high income earners 
have more opportunities to save and invest parts of their income and accu-
mulate assets. With other word: wealth is stated to generate additional in-
come. As a consequence of such a seeming logic, authors have directly in-
ferred wealth inequality estimates from income inequality estimates (Davies 
et al. 2009). 
 As recent research reveals, the relationship between wealth inequality 
and income inequality is not that straightforward. On the basis of Gini 
measures for income and wealth derived from survey data, Skopek et al. 
107 
 
(2014) demonstrate that wealth inequality in egalitarian, social democratic 
welfare states (Sweden, Denmark) is much higher than their low levels of 
income inequality would suggest. And, conversely, Southern European so-
cieties with high income inequality exhibit low levels of wealth inequality. 
The findings can be explained by tax policies which make wealth accumula-
tion more difficult, by public pension provision which make private wealth 
accumulation less necessary, by debt levels and by ‘winner-take-all’ labor 
markets. To cut a long story short: for many countries the distribution of 
wealth is driven by mechanism which go beyond labor market processes. 
This is confirmed by a number of studies that find rather weak correlations 
between income and wealth (Skopek et al. 2012; Keister and Moeller 2000). 
 
Figure 24: Top shares in net wealth (Data for 2010) 
Our findings show that, indeed, wealth distributions are heavily skewed – 
much more so than income distributions. Across all countries in our analysis 
top wealth holders hold the vast majority of total household wealth (Figure 
24). According to our data, the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution in 
Switzerland and the United States own nearly 40 percent of total private net 
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wealth, whereas the top 10 percent in these countries owns around 75 per-
cent. The lightest concentration of wealth can be observed for Finland, Bel-
gium and Australia, where the top 1 share makes up 13 percent and the top 
decile of the distribution owns about 45 percent of total private net wealth. 
 
Figure 25: Top 1 shares in wealth and income (Data for 2010) 
We can observe clear cross-national differences in the combination of levels 
of income and wealth inequality. We display the combinations of income 
and wealth inequality, using the top 1 shares, for a set of 12 countries for 
which comparable data on both items is available (Figure 25).12 We distin-
guish four different groups of countries with the United States and Switzer-
land representing clear outliers. The group of countries in the lower-left side 
of the plot (Finland, Spain, Australia and Italy, perhaps also Sweden and 
France) combines low wealth inequality with low income inequality. A se-
cond group of countries in the mid-left side of the graph (United Kingdom, 
Canada) is marked by a combination of high income inequalities and rela-
tively low level of wealth inequality. In contrast, a third group of countries 
(Portugal, Netherlands) in the mid-right part is characterized by high wealth 
inequality and comparably low inequality in incomes. Germany, in the up-
                                                       
12 For a plot displaying top 10 shares see Figure 37 in the appendix. Here, we get a similar 
picture with only slight differences. 
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per-middle area of the plot, combines high income inequality with high 
wealth inequality. The United States are located in the furthest upper-right 
part of the plot, far away from the field of the other countries. Switzerland is 
located in the furthest lower-right area of the graph, far away from the main 
field. 
 Based on our findings, we can conclude that conventional welfare regime 
typologies (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999) and varieties of capitalism (Hall 
and Soskice 2001; Amable 2003) are only able to explain income distribu-
tion – the stratification of society through the position in the labor market. 
When it comes to wealth, as a further separate dimension of inequality and 
stratification, conventional typologies are of little explanatory power. Both 
levels of wealth inequality as well as combination of wealth and income in-
equality seem to follow patterns which go beyond existing models of capi-
talism. Future research will have to engage in a comprehensive examination 
of such phenomena. 
3.2.4. Discussion 
 In this analysis, we studied the dynamics of private household wealth in 
advanced economies over more than 40 years (1970–2012). Above all, the 
findings point at the complex relations between the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ 
and the ambivalent relationship between ‘individual risks’ and ‘collective 
risks’. 
 Like financialization, also the growth of private wealth (the 
‘wealthization’ or ‘patrimonialization’) represents a ‘commonality’ of ad-
vanced capitalist societies. Throughout the last four decades, private wealth 
levels witnessed massive increases across advanced economies – albeit with 
nationally distinctions. This historical development has also been discussed 
in previous research (Piketty and Zucman 2014; Piketty 2014; De Bonis et 
al. 2013). Apart from this universal trend in the ‘longue durée’, specific 
events (financial crises, stock-market booms, political events) have a tem-
poral impact on the evolution of private wealth across the whole set of coun-
tries under analysis. However, also here, there is cross-national variation in 
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extent and duration. As the findings show, wealth accumulation and 
financialization have to be considered with their institutional distinctions 
and cultural constructions as well as its contradictions, contingencies and 
ambivalences. Overall, we can find both converging as well as diverging 
trends across advanced capitalist societies. 
 What becomes clear, when looking at the long-term dynamics of private 
wealth over the last decades, is a universal shift towards investment in more 
risky forms of assets and a decline of traditional investment forms like 
bonds and bank deposits. This trends can be detected across the whole set of 
countries under investigation. We interpret this development as an expres-
sion of a ‘world risk society’ (Beck 1999) in which local events can have 
great global financial impact – and vice versa. 
 However, it would be misleading to confuse banking disintermediation 
and the decline of deposits and savings with a loss of importance of banks in 
the new financial structure. Although commercial banks have lost penetra-
tion in traditional deposit and credit markets, they represent key participants 
in the global financial markets and are characterized by enormous financial 
power and influence to control financial markets. “[B]anks should be con-
sidered as major capitalist actors in their own right rather than primarily as 
intermediaries or servants of other actors” (Erturk and Solari 2009: 386). In 
a more recent study, Orsi and Solari (2010) examined the changes in finan-
cial systems of Southern European economies throughout the last fifteen 
years. The authors show that Southern European economies are indeed 
‘bank-based’ because banks control all credit, the stock market and financial 
investment by functioning as advisers, mediators, issuers, treasurers and in-
vestors at the same time. Consequently, in Southern Europe, universal banks 
are in the position to decide who can invest or borrow, where investments 
can be placed, who makes profits and who suffers from losses. Besides, and 
perhaps even more important, the 30 years lasting ‘decline of deposits’ 
found an abrupt end with the burst of the Dot.com bubble in 2001. Since 
then, the development of deposit wealth was rather marked by stagnation 
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(like in the United States, Japan or France) or even by re-climbing levels 
(like in Spain, Portugal or Finland). 
 When we take a look at the development of the composition of private 
wealth, housing wealth and private insurance wealth can be identified as 
mainly responsible for the increases over the last 40 and more years. Thus, 
on the one hand, we can detect the reliance on supposedly ‘safe’ housing 
assets in times of increasing financial instability and complexity. On the 
other hand, we can observe an increasing ‘collectivization’ of assets in the 
hands of organized investors (so called institutional investors). The phe-
nomenon of the collectivization of financial assets expresses the full ambiv-
alence of contemporary ‘finance capitalism’. In times of individualization 
and self-responsibilization, people increasingly resort to the professional 
management of their wealth by experts and specialists who promise to pro-
vide ‘certainty in an uncertain world’. We interpret this delegation of assets 
into the hands of experts and financial collectives as a strategy to reduce 
uncertainty and handle risk in “liquid times” (Bauman 2000) marked by 
fundamental uncertainty and seemingly unmanageable complexity. 
 Reforms of national pension systems are creating novel relations between 
households and global financial markets. Local institutions of old age provi-
sion become increasingly integrated in actor-networks, cultures and practic-
es of international finance. Throughout the last decades, numerous continen-
tal European economies witnessed a change from unfunded ‘pay-as-you-go’ 
to funded ‘capital market-based’ pension plans (Ebbinghaus and Gronwald 
2011; Orenstein 2008; Myles and Pierson 2001). Consequently, large and 
powerful pension funds are not any longer a phenomenon of countries like 
the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands or Switzerland 
(Ebbinghaus 2011; Dixon 2008; Clark 2000). The privatization of old age 
pension and the rise of pension funds seem to be major drivers in deepening 
the financialization of national political economies. 
 Due to globalization, these partly ambivalent developments are subject to 
globally-dynamic influences. As the analysis reveals, phenomena like mani-
as and crises, bust and booms have synchronous effects on whole economies 
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and economic action in general. This overtly demonstrates the global inter-
dependencies and the network-character of the financial world. Today in-
deed, financial investors and savers live in a ‘world risk society’, to employ 
Ulrich Beck’s famous social diagnosis. The enmeshment of household 
wealth into global financial markets means that certain locals are influenced 
by global dynamics, while local incidents may have worldwide consequenc-
es (Aalbers 2008; Gotham 2006). Globalized processes of financialization 
are clearly reflected in their “linking of localities” (Robertson 1995). 
 Price bubbles, boom years and times of economic euphoria in financial 
markets are not novel phenomena, as already recognized widely (e.g. 
Kindleberger and Aliber [1978]2005; Weber [1927]1961; Carruthers 2012; 
Neal 1990). That markets are subject to fluctuations and cycles has been 
accepted at least since the Napoleonic Wars, with their reappearing booms 
and crashes in the beginning of the 19th century. Economic crises can al-
ready be found in the 17th century – the Kipper- und Wipperzeit and the Tu-
lip Craze (Kindleberger and Aliber [1978]2005; Posthumus 1929; Weber 
[1927]1961: 214ff). Generally speaking, crises with their effects on eco-
nomic life have existed “always and everywhere” (Weber [1927]1961: 217), 
including the Ancient World as well as Far Eastern and Oriental societies 
(Morris and Manning 2005). However, the first ‘modern’ crises, described 
by ‘rational’ speculation and calculation, date back as far as the first half of 
the 19th century (Weber [1927]1961; Kindleberger and Aliber [1978]2005). 
Ever since that time, financial crises seem to have followed a ‘regular’ and 
cyclical pattern of booms and busts (Kindleberger and Aliber [1978]2005; 
Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Laeven and Valencia 2008, 2012). 
 The first decades following WWII were characterized by a financial oasis 
of calm. Domestic finance was tightly regulated and the Bretton-Woods Sys-
tem put heavy restrictions on international capital movements. As a conse-
quence, the three decades from the end of WWII until 1974 did not witness 
a big, severe financial crisis (Jordà et al. 2013; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). 
From the mid-1970s onwards, financial instability witnessed a dramatic 
comeback in national economies. The frequency of financial crises and their 
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severity has heavily increased since the 1980s (Jordà et al. 2013; Reinhart 
and Rogoff 2009). But although financial booms and crises are of global 
nature, extent and precise temporal occurrence of crises varies across coun-
tries (Kindleberger and Aliber [1978]2005). We therefore need to place in-
vestment waves within a broader social context by taking account of the so-
cial and political conditions which create the basis for the spread of finan-
cial practices. This suggests that dynamics of financial markets cannot be 
conceptualized as exogenous, social factors like state institutions or politics 
are of major significance. ‘Herding’, ‘collective contagion’, ‘financial exu-
berance’ as well as ‘panics’ are driven by “fictional expectations” (Beckert 
2013, 2014) which are based on contingent interpretations of the situation in 
the context of prevailing institutional structures, cultural templates, and so-
cial networks. 
 To cut a long story short: financial phenomena take on different shapes in 
different national contexts. It seems that “the economy […] differentiates 
and proliferates culturally in much the same way as other spheres of social 
life do, without losing national and even international connectedness” 
(Zelizer 1999: 207). The data show that although across all countries in the 
analysis households became more financialized throughout the last four 
decades, this trend happened at different levels with graduations across 
countries and groups of countries. Cross-country comparison reveals con-
textual differences regarding shape and evolution of financialization. In par-
ticular, national patterns and developments are marked by a characteristic 
stability. In this way, the results resemble findings from research on corpo-
rate governance practices and shareholder value structures suggesting the 
possible existence of ‘hybrid forms’, which combine the ‘new’ practices 
within a ‘traditional’ framework of capitalism (Guillén 2001; Vitols 2004; 
Fiss and Zajac 2004; Deeg 2005, 2010; Salento 2013). 
 This implicates that household reactions to the changing conditions and 
events of the last decades seem to be more complex than both the literature 
on financialization and multiple capitalisms make believe. On the aggregate 
country level, the investigation shows ‘path-dependence’ in financial prac-
114 
 
tices as well as quick shifts and ‘ricochet-effects’. We can observe a ‘solid’ 
financialization transforming into a ‘liquid’ financialization, which means 
that trajectories of financialization cannot keep their shape for any longer. 
Although global processes of financialization seem to be undeniable and 
financialization can be understood as a “commonality” (Streeck 2011b) of 
contemporary capitalism, there are clear limits in reach, shape and extent. 
Financialization per se is neither inevitably occurring nor resulting in con-
vergence (Boyer 2000b). Rather, the analysis suggest the existence of dif-
ferent trajectories of financialization (Engelen and Konings 2010; Davis 
2012; Erturk et al. 2005) since financialization is refracted differently in dif-
ferent national contexts. 
 Although the analysis of wealth inequality has flourished more recently, 
there are only few current studies which discuss the dynamics of wealth 
ownership in a comparative long-term perspective. Of course, this is mainly 
due to the unavailability of adequate longitudinal and comparable data. In 
taking a look at existing longitudinal data as well as cross-sectional data 
from 2010 for a larger number of countries, we find that wealth inequality is 
on the rise again in advanced economies – at least since the 1970s. Never-
theless, the levels are still relatively low when compared with the levels of 
wealth inequality at the beginning of the 20th century. In cross-national 
comparison, levels of wealth inequality exhibit large differences. Also when 
looking at wealth inequality and income inequality levels simultaneously, 
we can discover large differences between countries. However, the structure 
of inequality combinations fits only partly into traditional typologies of cap-
italist societies (Hall and Soskice 2001; Esping-Andersen 1990). While 
Germany combines high income inequality with high private wealth ine-
quality, countries like Finland, Australia, Italy and Spain combine low in-
come inequality with low private wealth inequality. While countries like 
Canada and the United Kingdom combine high income inequality with low 
private wealth inequality, in turn, countries like Sweden and the Netherlands 
combine low income inequality with high private wealth inequality. Solely, 
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the United States is a clear outlier in combining very high income inequality 
with very high private wealth inequality. 
3.3. Explaining Variations in Private Wealth 
What can explain the dynamics in private wealth throughout the last decades 
– cross-nationally and across time? And, perhaps more important, what can 
explain the growth in the two components which are mostly responsible for 
the growth in private net wealth-ratios – housing and insurance? While there 
is a great deal of variation in the levels of private wealth across countries, 
what we have seen is a common trend of increasing private wealth-ratios 
across the whole spectrum. To provide an empirical backing for the discus-
sion of private wealth in the last decade, we propose a set of cross-country 
regressions relating the dynamics of the private wealth-to-GDP ratio to a 
number of explanatory factors. Which variables can potentially account for 
the variations in private wealth ratios in advanced economies over the last 
four decades? 
3.3.1. Theoretical Background 
Although we have a lot of research on the variations of wealth ownership at 
the micro-level, up to now, there is no study which systematically and com-
prehensively examines the determinants of private-wealth ratios at the mac-
ro level for a larger sample of countries (13) and for a long time span (from 
1970 to 2012). Even though Piketty (2014) and Piketty and Zucamn (2013) 
study the cross-national movements in wealth-to-income ratios, their analy-
sis remains descriptively and their explanations rather hypothetically. How-
ever, classical as well as more recent studies link different factors with 
cross-national and temporal variations in private wealth or private saving. 
Based on that, we can distill at least two distinct vantage points on cross-
national differences in private saving and wealth, which have proved to at-
tract continuing interest in academic research: (1) welfare state arrange-
ments, especially with regard to old age pension provision and (2) national 
organization of corporate finance. 
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Private finance and the welfare state 
The welfare state represents an essential factor in defining dominant strate-
gies among private households (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999). Because 
welfare states differ in their mix of private and public ways of guaranteeing 
citizens’ welfare, household strategies differ across different welfare states. 
 The relationship between publicly-provided welfare and private finance 
has already been explicitly discussed in the welfare state for the case of re-
tirement provision and housing finance. The well-known “welfare trade-
off”-thesis (Kemeny 1980; Castles 1998) suggests that private finance sub-
stitutes public welfare – and vice versa. However, both authors argue for 
different motivations and causal linkages. Kemeny states that resistant tax-
payers are responsible for low public pensions in welfare states where 
homeownership rates are high (‘tax-payer effect’). Castles claims that less 
generous welfare states provide incentives for the accumulation of housing 
assets which function as a private insurance (‘nest-egg-effect’). Indeed, 
more recent research confirms this ‘nest-egg effect’ (Conley and Gifford 
2006; Ansell 2014). 
 More recently, research increasingly addresses the nexus of interrelation-
ships between welfare state policies and financial markets (Crouch 2009, 
2011; Prasad 2012; Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008, 2009; Gerba and 
Schelkle 2013). Accordingly, welfare arrangements and policies directed 
towards private organization of insurance, including (debt-financed) home-
ownership, make public welfare states increasingly becoming redundant – 
and vice versa. This means, homes increasingly serve as savings, invest-
ments and mortgage collateral for private old age pensions as well as educa-
tion and health care expenditure. Such argumentation is backed by research 
which finds an association between asset-ownership and attitudes towards 
government redistribution and welfare state policies (Ansell 2014; André 
and De Wilde 2015). 
 Much of the economic literature has also paid a lot of attention to the re-
lationship between public social insurance and individual private saving. 
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Empirical evidence on how and to what extent the welfare state arrange-
ments impact private wealth accumulation is, however, rather mixed.  
 On the one hand, research has detected a strong negative relationship be-
tween social security and private saving (Feldstein 1974, 1976, 1980; Callen 
and Thimann 1997). Accordingly, expectations about future public pensions 
reduce the incentive to accumulate private wealth and create a ‘wealth re-
placement effect’. Or with other words: welfare state generosity tends to 
crowd out private savings. On the other hand, however, research has found 
the relationship between public security and private wealth to be positively 
related, or at least non-existent (Barro 1978; Kopits and Gotur 1980; Leimer 
and Lesnoy 1982). Further research demonstrates that social insurance re-
duces private saving via institutional rules which prohibit the combination 
of private wealth and social benefits (O’Brien 2008). People in positions 
marked by (anticipated) precarious incomes do not have incentives to accu-
mulate wealth because public welfare is only accessible in the case of non-
asset-ownership.  
 Although the last decades saw the rollback of the welfare state in many 
societal fields and a general demise of the welfare state as a “collective pig-
gy bank” (Barr 2001), there still are considerable differences in shape, gen-
erosity and outcome of welfare state arrangements across Western advanced 
societies (Esping-Andersen 1999; Prasad 2012; Castles 2007; Pierson 2001). 
Whereas some contributions (e.g. Crouch 2009, 2011; Prasad 2012) rely on 
a conventional welfare state typology and thus contrast the ‘Anglo-
American’ model with ‘Continental’ Europe, other studies, however, show 
that the strong relationship between welfare policy and financial deepening 
is not a unique phenomenon of ‘liberal’ welfare states, but also applies to 
‘conservative’ or ‘social democratic’ welfare regime types (Gerba and 
Schelkle 2013; Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008, 2009; Engelen et al. 2010; 
Trampusch 2006; Belfrage 2008; Belfrage and Ryner 2009). 
 National pension arrangements represent one, perhaps even the most 
prominent, arena where processes and distinctions of household 
financialization become strikingly observable. Already 1976, Peter Drucker 
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(1976) recognized the increasing influence of pension funds on capitalist 
dynamics – though from a rather optimistic viewpoint. Since then, public 
pension insurance cutoffs and a continuing fiscal crisis in advanced econo-
mies have resulted in the globally increasing significance of private pension 
plans (Ebbinghaus and Gronwald 2011). In particular, individualized old 
age contribution plans are supported politically – on the level of national 
governments as well as on the supra-national level (EU, OECD, IMF). As a 
consequence, institutional investors – pension funds, insurance companies 
and investment funds – who manage private wealth have grown considera-
bly and have become powerful and heavyweight global actors (Useem 1996; 
Davis and Thompson 1994; Jung and Dobbin 2012). 
 Although the last decades witnessed processes of pension financialization 
across all developed economies, these dynamics are in no way marked by 
linearity and uniformity. The embeddedness of global investment practices 
in distinct local contexts takes place through complex processes of endoge-
nous institutional change (Dixon and Sorsa 2009). Depending on the distinct 
context, institutional change takes the form of “displacement”, “layering”, 
“conversion”, “drift” and “exhaustion” (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney 
and Thelen 2010). This means that pre-existing institutional arrangements 
and practices survive and that new financial institutions are created by pow-
erful actors and ‘institutional entrepreneurs’; i.e. the “increasingly relational 
proximity of a particular political economy to global finance does not re-
quire necessarily a major ‘convergence’ to other capitalist forms” (Dixon 
and Sorsa 2009: 348). 
 The literature proposes that the public-private mix of pension provision is 
closely related to household financial practices (Jackson and Vitols 2001; 
Gerba and Schelkle 2013). The welfare state shapes the accumulation of 
pension savings by defining the mix of public and private pension provision, 
as well as by regulation of investment policies of private pension capital. 
Typically, household financial market participation is thus higher in ‘indi-
vidualistic’ welfare states emphasizing capitalized private pension schemes. 
On the contrary, ‘solidaristic’ retirement arrangements are usually character-
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ized by transfer between generations – at the societal, firm or family level 
(Jackson and Vitols 2001). While ‘solidaristic’ welfare states publicly pro-
vide many services which are prime motives for household saving, such as 
education and retirement, ‘individualistic’ welfare state arrangements are 
supposed to create incentives and needs for private ‘safety nets’ via the ac-
cumulation of private wealth and engagement in financial markets. 
 
Private finance and corporate finance 
Forms of corporate finance have undergone fundamental change throughout 
the last decades. In the course, many Continental and Southern European 
economies’ financial systems were renovated in a ‘market-based’ fashion 
since the 1990s (Deeg 2005, 2010; Jackson and Deeg 2012) – with deep im-
plications for household saving and investment. A prevalent view involves 
the general trend of convergence towards a ‘market-based’ financial organi-
zation (Rajan and Zingales 2003; Allen and Gale 2000; Hölzl 2006). How-
ever, despite such universal trends (or ‘commonalities’) can be detected 
across all advanced economies and “changing them [financial systems] has 
ripple or knock-on effects throughout” (Deeg 2005: 522; see also Deeg and 
Jackson 2007), empirical research demonstrates that all financial systems 
have changed in different ways and to varying degrees (Deeg 2005, 2010; 
Bianco et al. 1997; Bruno et al. 2012) and that institutional and cultural 
changes are of limited extent depending on the concrete national institution-
al and cultural context (Amable 2003). 
 Traditionally, corporate finance is organized in different ways depending 
on the distinct context, with banks, markets, firms, households and the state 
taking on different roles (Zysman 1983; Hall and Soskice 2001; LaPorta et 
al. 1998; Verdier 2002). The literature on comparative capitalisms suggests 
that household saving and investment is embedded in a broader institutional 
and cultural environment (Hall and Soskice 2001; Jackson and Deeg 2008, 
2012; Vitols 2001). This means that there is a variety of investment strate-
gies and possible allocation of savings. Economic historians have long rec-
ognized significant national variations in the relative roles played by banks 
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and financial markets in financing economic development (Rajan and 
Zingales 2003). Whereas early ‘industrializers’ like Great Britain were 
characterized by highly developed, liquid securities markets (Carruthers 
1996), for late ‘industrializers’ such as Germany or Italy, universal banks 
functioned as a substitute for financial markets throughout the 19th century 
(Gerschenkron 1966; Cameron 1972). Although this thesis has been widely 
criticized (Vitols 2001; Verdier 2002, 2003), the basic underlying distinc-
tion between banks and markets remains central in comparative research. 
Typically, financial environments are distinguished as “bank-based” or 
“market-based”, depending upon which financial channel is more central 
(Zysman 1983; Allen and Gale 2001; Albert 1993; Vogel 1996). The first 
type, exemplified by Germany, France and Japan, involves trust-based rela-
tions between firms and banks and firms rely on bank loans and develop 
long-term relationships. The second type, exemplified by the United States 
and the United Kingdom, involves arms-length relations between firms and 
stock markets and firms generally mobilize capital through capital markets, 
relying on a balance of publicly traded stocks and bonds. This distinction is 
integral to the well known, ideal-typological varieties of capitalism ap-
proach (Hall and Soskice 2001). Accordingly, so called ‘Coordinated Mar-
ket Economies’ (CMEs) supposedly benefit from patient, long-term and low 
risk financial capital investments, while ‘Liberal Market Economies’ 
(LMEs) benefit from short-term and high-risk capital investments. 
 Household investments are not only expected to meet the requirements of 
institutional complementarity, but any possibility of ‘path-departure’ would 
be constrained attributable to historical legacies in governance and horizons 
of investment. Since practices of household saving and investment are em-
bedded in a broader institutional environment, we suppose that accumula-
tion of private wealth – and household finance as such – is closely associat-
ed with the size and power of the financial sector. A financial organization 
based on shareholder value and ‘market-based’ finance is supposed to show 
heavy effects on dynamics of private wealth. 
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3.3.2. Data and Methods 
We conduct a panel-data analysis to examine the relationship between our 
main explanatory variables of interest – namely, welfare state size, welfare 
state generosity and the organization of corporate finance – and the de-
pendent variables, the dynamics of (1) private net wealth, (2) housing 
wealth, and (3) insurance wealth. The analysis involves data from 13 OECD 
countries13 for which data covering the period of 1970–2012 is available. 
The units of observation of dependent and independent variables are the 
country-years. To help isolate the relationship between the main explanatory 
variables and the dependent variable, we include a set of control variables 
derived from the literature – namely, old age dependency, life expectancy, 
household saving rates, income inequality, property and equity prices, eco-
nomic growth, inflation, GDP per capita, the occurrence of a financial crisis 
and private indebtedness. This makes up an unbalanced panel, in that neither 
the dependent nor the independent variables are always available uniformly 
for the entire period 1970–2012. Table 17 in the appendix provides the 
summary statistics for the variables included in the analysis.14 
 We will estimate a panel regression with year effects, country fixed-
effects and a lagged dependent variable of the following form: 
∆ ௜ܻ,௧ ൌ ߚଵ ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߟ௜ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
where ∆Y denotes the annual change in the private wealth-to-GDP ratio, Yt–1 
is the lagged private wealth-to-GDP ratio and X is a vector of explanatory 
variables, whereas ηi are country fixed-effects, θt represents a full set of time 
dummies and εit captures all the omitted factors.  
 The country fixed-effects take into account the constant unobserved het-
erogeneity. It enables us to measure the impact of within-country variation 
of the dependent variables on within-country variation in private wealth-to-
GDP ratios. The period year fixed-effects capture temporal variations com-
                                                       
13 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. 
14 Data sources and definitions are given in Table 18 in the appendix. 
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mon to different countries. The parameters for the independent variables 
will therefore capture only the effects of specific within-country variations 
in time in each country. It is well-known that panel-data analysis has several 
statistical challenges – most notably, that of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity in the error term. To circumvent these problems, we cal-
culate panel-corrected standard errors, following Beck and Katz (1995), and 
estimate Prais-Winsten regressions.  
 As already mentioned our main explanatory variables of interest are the 
organization of public welfare and the organization of corporate finance. We 
measure welfare state size in terms of social transfers as a percentage of 
GDP. As measures of welfare state generosity, we include three variables 
covering different welfare state domains – the pension replacement rate, the 
unemployment replacement rate and the sick pay replacement rate. We use 
the stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP as an indicator to 
capture the organization of corporate finance.  
 Next to our main independent variables of interest, we include a number 
of control variables deriving from the literature. As prior research suggests, 
a variety of factors (demographic, social, economic, political, cultural) de-
termine the ownership of wealth. We already argued for looking at macro-
level factors concerning economic development, institutions and policies. 
However, much research has explored micro-level factors of wealth owner-
ship – the characteristics of individuals and their families (age, education, 
race, gender, and marital status). Among the countless factors that might 
influence private, we consider a number of variables which are well docu-
mented by the literature and available as aggregates for the time period 
1970–2012. 
 Consistent with sociological theory, it can be presupposed that we find a 
so called “Matthew-effect” (Merton 1968) in the dynamics of private wealth 
(see also DiPrete and Eirich 2006). Accordingly, past wealth levels (Yt–1) 
have an impact on present-day dynamics. The famous “life-cycle” hypothe-
sis (Ando and Modigliani 1963; Modigliani and Brumberg 1954; Modigliani 
1988) states that people start saving during early adulthood, reach peak lev-
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els of savings during middle age, and spend down their assets in retirement. 
Accordingly, it can be assumed that older societies (captured by the depend-
ency ratio, i.e. the population older than 65 as a percentage of the total pop-
ulation) are less motivated to accumulate wealth, whereas life expectancy at 
birth will have a positive impact on household asset building. Already John 
Maynard Keynes (1936) made the claim that differences in saving behavior 
are related to differences in income. As prior research suggests, income ine-
quality plays a significant role for investment decisions since different in-
come groups have different preferences for various types of assets (Carroll 
2002; Keister 2000; Kremp 2009). Therefore, volatility in asset and proper-
ty prices as such will not only affect the dynamics of private wealth, but also 
investment practices deriving from income disparities will show up in the 
dynamics of private wealth. We, thus, use the share of the top 1 percent of 
the income distribution as our indicator of economic inequality. We enter 
real GDP growth and inflation (CPI) as explanatory variables: GDP growth 
and inflation determine the development of nominal GDP, the denominator 
of the wealth-to-GDP ratio. Also Thomas Piketty (2014) highlights slow 
economic growth and high saving rates as the main factors contributing to 
constantly rising wealth levels in contemporary capitalist societies. The nu-
merator for the saving-to-GDP ratio is gross saving. Financial crises have 
become an important risk factor for household finances (Bucher-Koenen 
and Ziegelmeyer 2011; Ampudia et al. 2014: Fligstein and Rucks-Ahidiana 
2016). We have demonstrated this phenomenon already in the descriptive 
time-series analysis above. The impact of crises on private wealth trajecto-
ries is approximated through a dummy variable. Further covariates include 
per capita GDP and private debt calculated as total household liabilities as a 
percentage of GDP. 
3.3.3. Findings 
We estimate two Models (Model 1 and Model 2) for each of the three de-
pendent variables (private net wealth, housing wealth, insurance wealth). 
Model 1 is always estimated with welfare state size (social transfers as a 
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percentage of GDP) as an explanatory variable, Model 2 is always estimated 
with welfare state generosity in different domains (pension, unemployment 
and sick pay generosity) as explanatory variables. The tables below show 
the results for the changes in private net wealth (Table 7), housing wealth 
(Table 8) and insurance wealth (Table 9). 
∆Private Net Wealth Model 1 Model 2 
Coef. SE Coef. SE 
  
Private Net Wealth t-1 -0.662 *** 0.029 -0.777 *** 0.027 
Welfare State Size -0.203 * 0.520 – – 
Pension Generosity – – -0.680 *** 13.837 
Unemployment Generosity – – 0.241 *** 7.013 
Sick Pay Generosity – – 0.036  9.933 
Stock Market Size 0.403 *** 0.034 0.415 *** 0.025 
Dependency Ratio -0.251 ** 0.482 -0.238 *** 0.314 
Life Expectancy 0.259  1.619 0.455 ** 1.430 
Saving Rate -0.120  0.250 -0.132 * 0.215 
Income Inequality -0.342 *** 0.656 -0.124  0.657 
∆Equity Prices 0.023  0.001 0.028  0.001 
∆Property Prices 0.198 *** 0.090 0.181 *** 0.075 
Inflation  -0.229 *** 0.352 -0.365 *** 0.306 
GDP Growth -0.053 ** 0.469 -0.173 *** 0.363 
GDP per capita 0.266  45.075 0.264  31.327 
Financial Crisis -0.122 *** 3.703 -0.134 *** 3.484 
R-Squared .486 .525 
Obs. / Countries 440 / 13 418 / 13 
Note: OLS regression with panel-corrected standard errors. Models estimated with constant. We display country 
demeaned standard estimates. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-sided tests). Models include country fixed 
effects and year effects. Time period: 1970–2012. 
Table 7: Determinants of the change in the private net wealth-to-GDP ratio, 1970–2012 
We begin with examining the effect of our main explanatory variables of 
interest, welfare state arrangements and modes of corporate finance, on pri-
vate net wealth, housing and insurance wealth. Controlling for a set of vari-
ous other potential factors, we find that welfare state size displays a signifi-
cant negative association with increasing private net wealth ratios. When 
looking at welfare state generosity, this relationship becomes a bit more dif-
ferentiated. Whereas pension generosity has a highly significant negative 
effect on private wealth dynamics, unemployment generosity exhibits a 
clearly significant positive influence on private wealth accumulation. Wel-
125 
 
fare state size shows also negative effect on the private housing wealth-to 
GDP ratio, but it is not significant. Contrary, once again, pension generosity 
is negatively associated and unemployment generosity positively associated 
with the accumulation of housing assets. When looking at the models for 
insurance wealth, we can find a significant negative association with welfare 
state size once again. Not surprisingly, also pension generosity shows a sig-
nificant and negative effect on dynamics of insurance wealth. However, dif-
ferent from the models for net wealth and housing wealth, unemployment 
generosity possesses a highly significant negative relationship with accumu-
lation of insurance assets. 
 The results lend support to research which finds close linkages between 
welfare state policy and household finance (Prasad 2012; Gerba and 
Schelkle 2013; Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008; Fessler und Schürz 2015). 
The data suggests that the re-building of public welfare has contributed to 
households seeking private substitutes, which is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that increasing commodification has led to the financialization of pri-
vate social safety nets.  
 However, to understand the influence of welfare on private wealth and 
household finance in general, the quality of welfare spending matters more 
than quantity. The institutional make-up of different welfare regimes may 
influence people in different ways to accumulate wealth. Thus, we can ob-
serve a ‘substitution effect’ as proposed by much of the welfare-trade-off 
literature, next to a ‘complementary effect’ (Gerba and Schelkle 2013), 
namely that more generous welfare state arrangements push people towards 
the accumulation of assets because the state provides the socio-economic 
security to do so. In countries with generous unemployment provision, 
higher wealth ratios are more common because social protection is more 
extensive, which allows people to continue saving and investing. A gener-
ous unemployment protection creates more stable income prospects for fam-
ilies in the labor market, who can expect to be assured of a minimum in-
come all their life. As a consequence, such welfare programs make people 
less risk adverse and more confident, so they can invest their money or take 
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on debts to accumulate assets. In contrast, in countries characterized by less 
generous pension schemes, where benefits are more narrow and tend to tar-
get the already employed and the elderly, people have to accumulate assets 
as nest-eggs and their safety-net. Much of the welfare state literature shows 
that public welfare re-shapes and re-stratifies society (Esping-Andersen 
1990), and therefore not only affects income and wealth or the stability of 
positions in society, it also contributes to people’s prospects for the future, 
and people’s prospects for the future influence their willingness and need to 
take accumulate assets. 
 The mode of corporate finance matters for each of the wealth variables in 
our estimations. Households in countries with a more shareholder value ori-
ented organization of corporate governance, expressed by the size of a coun-
tries stock market, have significantly accumulated more housing assets, 
more insurance assets and more wealth as such. 
∆Private Housing Wealth Model 1 Model 2 
Coef. SE Coef. SE 
  
Private Housing Wealth t-1 -0.242 0.028 -0.287 ** 0.025 
Welfare State Size -0.272 0.450 – – 
Pension Generosity – – -0.578 *** 9.173 
Unemployment Generosity – – 0.371 *** 6.643 
Sick Pay Generosity – – -0.103  6.385 
Stock Market Size 0.242 ** 0.031 0.279 *** 0.018 
Dependency Ratio -0.367 ** 0.444 -0.292 *** 0.294 
Life Expectancy 0.081  1.242 0.094  1.116 
Saving Rate -0.206 ** 0.200 -0.147 * 0.164 
Income Inequality -0.429 *** 0.371 -0.233 *** 0.365 
∆Equity Prices 0.021  0.001 0.028  0.001 
∆Property Prices 0.329 *** 0.080 0.314 *** 0.059 
Inflation  -0.165 * 0.277 -0.262 *** 0.226 
GDP Growth 0.044 ** 0.413 -0.073  0.289 
GDP per capita 0.996  42.075 0.780 ** 19.333 
Financial Crisis -0.069 * 2.996 -0.085 ** 2.338 
Private Debt -0.005  0.066 0.085  0.061 
R-Squared .375 .413 
Obs. / Countries 441 / 13 419 / 13 
Note: OLS regression with panel-corrected standard errors. Models estimated with constant. We display country 
demeaned standard estimates. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-sided tests). Models include country fixed 
effects and year effects. Time period: 1970–2012. 
Table 8: Determinants of the change in the housing wealth-to-GDP ratio, 1970–2012  
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Across all models, the estimates reveal that countries with already high pri-
vate wealth levels have accumulated less wealth, whereas households in 
countries with smaller levels have generally accumulated more throughout 
the last four decades. Economic growth and inflation play a significant role 
for private net wealth dynamics; housing wealth and insurance wealth re-
main unaffected by economic growth dynamics. High growth and inflation 
dampened the increase in the private net wealth-to-GDP ratio. The negative 
coefficients on economic growth and inflation also indicate an overall coun-
ter-cyclical stance of private wealth accumulation. 
∆Private Insurance Wealth Model 1 Model 2 
Coef. SE Coef. SE 
  
Private Insurance Wealth t-1 -0.921 *** 0.040 -0.952 ** 0.044 
Welfare State Size -0.216 * 0.171 – – 
Pension Generosity – – -0.309 ** 5.051 
Unemployment Generosity – – -0.096 ** 3.344 
Sick Pay Generosity – – 0.306  5.377 
Stock Market Size 0.303 ** 0.013 0.304 ** 0.013 
Dependency Ratio 0.291  0.191 0.235  0.209 
Life Expectancy 0.171  0.547 0.274  0.614 
Saving Rate 0.320 ** 0.103 0.277 * 0.099 
Income Inequality 0.183 * 0.228 0.219 * 0.225 
∆Equity Prices 0.090 *** 0.000 0.084 *** 0.000 
∆Property Prices -0.147 *** 0.029 -0.151 *** 0.030 
Inflation  -0.041  0.134 -0.126 *** 0.156 
GDP Growth 0.005  0.173 0.009  0.171 
GDP per capita -1.665 *** 14.928 -1.244 * 14.155 
Financial Crisis -0.185 ** 1.673 -0.187 *** 1.653 
Private Debt 0.286  0.039 0.298  0.038 
R-Squared .363 .374 
Obs. / Countries 445 / 13 423 / 13 
Note: OLS regression with panel-corrected standard errors. Models estimated with constant. We display country 
demeaned standard estimates. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-sided tests). Models include country fixed 
effects and year effects. Time period: 1970–2012. 
Table 9: Determinants of the change in the insurance wealth-to-GDP ratio, 1970–2012  
As expected, financial crises go hand in hand with significant decreases in 
private wealth – a result which refers to each of the wealth variables under 
analysis. A prevalent view in the literature treats the increasing accumula-
tion of private wealth as a consequence of financial euphoria that carries 
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equity (or property) prices to unsustainable levels (Shiller 2000, 2008). Be-
cause phases of “financial exuberance” (Shiller 2000) typically lead to a 
panic and a financial crisis (Kindleberger and Aliber [1978]2005; Minsky 
1980, 1982, 1986), investment functions the other way round as well. Every 
new investment craze ends up with the destruction of massive amounts of 
wealth for large parts of the population who became involved in global fi-
nancial markets. Usually, financial market participation rates diminish after 
a great investment craze or stock market boom (Kremp 2009). 
 Other than those, three more variables stand out as important drivers of 
private wealth in recent decades: income inequality, the dependency ratio 
and household saving. The strong relation between private wealth and in-
come inequality underlines the importance of looking at wealth accumula-
tion and inequality jointly. This result is not new since it plays a key part in 
Piketty’s (2014) famous work. However, surprisingly, the results are rather 
mixed depending on the wealth component under analysis. Since 1970, 
higher income inequality had a substantial dampening effect on the rate of 
increases in private net wealth and private housing wealth, whereas private 
insurance wealth generally witnessed more increases in countries with high-
er levels of income inequality. A potential channel may be located on the 
micro-level. As we know, households with higher incomes tend to make 
significantly higher investment in private pension products (Wilke 2012). In 
any case, the results lead further support to the thesis that growing inequali-
ties and the trajectories of private wealth cannot be looked at in isolation – 
especially when it comes to financial assets like pension products. 
 The age profile of a society seems to matter too. All else equal, countries 
with a larger proportion of elderly people showed a tendency to accumulate 
less wealth – particularly with reference to net wealth and housing assets. 
While this finding may be explained by the ‘life cycle thesis’, the old age 
dependency ratio can also function as a rough proxy for pressure on pension 
systems. In this case, we point at the private finance-welfare nexus de-
scribed above. In the long run, wealth is typically linked to the accumulation 
of saving (Piketty 2014), but in the short run this connection is more diffi-
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cult to detect. As the models show, higher saving rates have even a negative 
effect on private wealth dynamics for the case net wealth and housing 
wealth. However, we can find a significant positive association of saving 
with the accumulation of insurance assets. Accordingly, we can conclude 
that savings alone can only partially explain variations in private wealth. 
Besides, the propensity to save declined in most OECD countries due to low 
interest rates, unrealized capital gains, increasing access of credit, ageing 
and slowly growing disposable income (Hüfner and Koske 2010). 
 Yet, it is equally interesting to note what factors do not matter: a greater 
life expectancy did not make households accumulate more assets. Further-
more, GDP per capita, a rough proxy for the overall affluence of an econo-
my, shows only significant (negative) associations in the models for private 
insurance. Also levels of private debt bears no meaningful relation to 
changes in private wealth ratios. Since we display country demeaned stand-
ard estimates, we can compare the effects of different variables. Pension 
generosity, stock market size, dependency ratio and also income inequality 
and financial crises have comparably great effect on dynamics of private 
wealth. 
3.3.4. Discussion 
As our analyses of cross-country panel data show, it is not so much the size 
of the welfare state which impacts private wealth accumulation. The welfare 
state displays only partly significantly negative associations with private 
wealth. However, this picture becomes more differentiated when looking at 
the effect of welfare state generosity in different areas (pension, unemploy-
ment and sick pay generosity) on different wealth components. Net wealth, 
housing and insurance wealth are significantly and negatively associated 
with pension arrangements. Besides, a more shareholder-oriented organiza-
tion of corporate finance exhibits significantly positive effects on private 
wealth across all models. 
 The results suggest that the increasing accumulation of private wealth in 
contemporary capitalist societies has to be seen as being part of processes of 
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“individualization” (Beck [1984]1992; Bauman 2001; Giddens 1991). Now-
adays, people search for “biographical solutions to systemic contradictions” 
(Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001: xxii). We can witness a disintegration of 
past collective social forms (welfare state, unions). Today, re-embedding 
happens within processes of ‘financialization’. This also means the emer-
gence of a new form of societalization.  
 Due to the erosion of social security provided by post-war welfare state 
arrangements, the consequences of shareholder value and flexibilization of 
work life, plus the volatility of financial market movements, households are 
increasingly situated in a “risk society” (Beck [1984]1992) – or even a 
“world risk society” (Beck 1999) – in which they themselves are responsible 
for coping with the uncertainties of life (Cutler and Waine 2001; Watson 
2007). This “big risk shift” (Hacker 2006, 2008) has structured life-chances 
and strategies in modern market societies. Financial risks are increasingly 
shifted directly onto households who were protected from such risks in the 
past via labor market regulations or state provision. As a consequence, 
households are confronted with increased risk over the whole life course and 
at the same time are facing a decrease of support and resources for manag-
ing economic challenges. It is claimed that reliance on solidarity within 
family, trade unions or welfare state is increasingly replaced by the necessi-
ty to rely on self-assistance and to take responsibility for one’s life. This in-
cludes to be prepared for life-events such as job loss, ill health of oneself or 
a family member, birth of children and retirement. 
 For many commentators, “the origins of mass investment lie in the pri-
vatization of pensions” (Harmes 2001: 105). Ordinary private households 
are not in the market just to make quick profits – although this factor is al-
ways relevant – but rather as a result of institutional changes that include the 
transformation of provision of old age insurance from a collective responsi-
bility into a problem that everyone has to solve for himself. In many ad-
vanced economies the social safety net for citizens is shrinking. The demise 
of the welfare state as the “collective piggy bank” (Barr 2001) has produced 
a number of social, political and economic problems. The public sector is 
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withdrawing from social security provision at the very time that large parts 
of the population is approaching retirement age. The coincidence of demo-
graphic change and institutional transformations has initiated the need for 
private retirement savings. For many people, financial markets seem the on-
ly way to make enough money to evade old age poverty – or at least to fund 
an adequate consumption level in retirement. 
“The end result is, in some respects, a 21st century reinvention of the buffer role the 
household played in 19th century industrial society before the development of modern 
social security” (Froud et al. 2002: 145) . 
The last decades witnessed major path departures in pension policy across 
all advance economies (Orenstein 2008), most prominently demonstrated by 
the shifts from ‘pay-as-you-go’ pension schemes to funded pension 
schemes, from defined-benefit to defined-contribution plans, and from pub-
licly to privately managed pension systems (Clark 2003; Engelen 2003; 
Langley 2006, 2008; Blackburn 2006). By this, personal pension plans 
which involve individual decisions on investment strategies and risk profiles 
increasingly replace solutions which are collectively arranged and do not 
entail making crucial decisions. Consequently, these areas “become a play-
ground for the notoriously capricious and inherently unpredictable market 
forces and/or are left to the private initiative and care of individuals” (Bau-
man 2007: 2). 
 These deep transformations are the results of pension privatization 
(Orenstein 2013; Ebbinghaus 2011), containment of public finances (Myles 
and Pierson 2001) and more general re-negotiating of responsibilities be-
tween public and private actors (Clark and Whiteside 2005; Ebbinghaus and 
Whiteside 2012). Due to these processes public pension provision cannot be 
regarded as safe – at least for younger generations. This holds true, especial-
ly, within a situation where trust in the institutional framework decreases 
(e.g. Buhlman 2003). This makes necessary financial attempts of one’s own, 
reflecting over financial issues and planning one’s financial future. Of 
course, economic action and decision-making was already oriented towards 
an uncertain and open future in pre-capitalist societies; today in “liquid 
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times” (Bauman 2007) however, one’s ‘own’ secure future seems as im-
portant as never before. 
 In the analysis, we developed a framework to study variations in private 
wealth across time and space. The regression models reveal that private 
wealth occurs at significantly greater levels in countries with a less generous 
welfare state and a higher developed ‘market-based’ organization of corpo-
rate finance. In such a way, the regression results broadly confirm argu-
ments from the comparative capitalisms literature which attributes house-
hold saving to a country’s financial system and its pension arrangements 
(Vitols 2001; Jackson and Vitols 2001). 
 The findings add to a growing literature which takes a look at private 
households within times of financialization. Household participation in fi-
nancial market appears either via the ‘credit-channel’ or via the ‘investment-
channel’. While much of the literature has focused on credit and debt, little 
research has engaged within investment issues, perhaps with housing assets 
representing an exception. The analysis contributes to a central agenda in 
economic sociology, to understand how social structures encourage certain 
kinds of economic practice and, more specifically, the socio-structural foun-
dations for increasing financialization and financial activity within contem-
porary capitalism. 
3.4. The Social Structure of Financial Investment 
A lot of empirical research suggests that wealth ownership and investment 
decisions differ across social categories. From a cross-country perspective, 
previous empirical studies based on survey data document a variety of fac-
tors that shape patterns of wealth ownership and investment practices at the 
household level. While there are a number of country case studies based on 
survey data, which study wealth ownership when it comes to life course dy-
namics (Ando and Modigliani 1963; Modigliani 1988), social class (Wolff 
1988), inheritance (Szydlik 2004; Nau and Tumin 2012), race and ethnicity 
(Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Conley 1999; Henretta 1979; Semyonov and 
Lewin-Epstein 2011), religion (Keister 2008, 2011) or household structure 
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(Keister 2004; Zagorsky 2005), cross-national studies at the household level 
have been rarely undertaken. In one of the few early comparative, survey 
data-based studies, Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein (2013) find that in spite of 
considerable cross-country variation in the distribution of wealth, the effects 
of income and inheritance on net worth are uniform across societies. Re-
cently, also Korom (2016), Arrondel et al. (2014) and Fessler and Schürz 
(2015) highlight wealth transfers and income as the major determinants of 
household net wealth. 
 However, while there are studies which deal with the determinants of 
wealth ownership, both at the national and cross-national level, fewer stud-
ies have engaged in investigating the determinants of the ownership of dif-
ferent types of assets. Perhaps we should mention that the determinants of 
housing wealth are an exception since there is a traditionally great interest in 
homeownership by sociologists (Kurz and Blossfeld 2004; Kemeny 1992). 
For instance, previous work shows that class, labor market position, ethnici-
ty and parental status are closely associated with homeownership (Kurz 
2004; Henretta 1979; Filandri and Olagnero 2014). 
 Comparative research on household wealth portfolios for European coun-
tries not only underscores cross-national differences in average wealth port-
folios, but differences in the social structure of national wealth portfolios 
(Skopek et al. 2012; Cowell et al. 2012b). As a study by Christelis et al. 
(2013) reveals, households of comparable characteristics tend to have quite 
different probabilities of participating in different assets and holdings in dif-
ferent assets across countries. In a data analysis for Canada, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Spain and the United States, Sierminska and Doorley (2013) 
show that socio-economic characteristics (income, education, birth cohort) 
explain a sizable portion of asset participation, with variations across coun-
tries and types of assets. 
 Next to the research on the micro-level determinants of homeownership, 
there are a small number of empirical investigations dedicated to specific 
types of assets (stock and private pension investments). In a longitudinal 
study for Germany, Wahl (2011) examines the determinants of risky and 
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conservative assets and finds significant effects for labor status and educa-
tion on the riskiness of investments. In a cross-nationally comparative inves-
tigation, Guiso et al. (2003) demonstrate that stock market participation is 
robustly associated with wealth and education, which have only small ef-
fects, however, on the asset share invested in stocks. A study on the cross-
national differences in portfolios of the ‘rich’ (top 1 and top 5 percent of the 
net worth distribution), finds that the ‘rich’ hold larger parts of their wealth 
in risky forms and own entrepreneurial projects than the rest (Carroll 2002). 
A striking difference across countries is in the relation of financial and non-
financial forms of wealth. The United States and Italy represent two extreme 
cases. Whereas the ratio of non-financial to financial wealth for ‘rich’ in the 
United States is about 1.5, this ratio is approximately 7 in Italy. Wilke 
(2010, 2016) shows that ownership of private pension products is deeply 
embedded in social structure. He finds positive effects of children, income, 
education, status in the labor market and region on investment in private 
pension assets. For the United States, Kremp (2009) finds that stock market 
investment is significantly determined by economic, cultural and social cap-
ital (income, wealth, education, networks), but also by a socially-embedded 
subjective risk tolerance. In a similar vein, using an own survey of more 
than 3,100 investors in six European countries, De Bondt (2005) shows how 
stock market investment strategies are determined by investors’ values and 
beliefs which themselves are found to be embedded in national and social 
structures.  
 While economists have shown interest in explaining the choice between 
different types of financial products, sociologists have only rarely addressed 
investment decisions. Although sociological research has explored the de-
terminants of wealth ownership as such and has dealt with the determinants 
of homeownership in specific, as we have seen, only very little research has 
discussed the ownership of specific types of financial assets. It still remains 
underinvestigated why do some households engage in the accumulation of 
financial investments such as stocks, shares and mutual funds and others do 
not? 
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 As we have already shown, recent trends in the financialization of private 
wealth are marked by two aspects: (1) the increasing popularity of risky as-
sets and (2) the delegation of wealth to the hands of institutional investors 
(insurance companies, pension funds and investment funds). Consequently, 
in what follows, we take a look at the household-level determinants of mak-
ing such investment decisions.  
3.4.1. Theoretical Background 
Sociological explanations of investment decisions differ in many ways from 
their counterparts in economics. Before we take a look at a sociologically-
grounded approach towards investment decisions, we will briefly discuss 
existing approaches in financial economics. 
 
The view from economics 
While orthodox capital market theory assumes financial markets as 
informationally efficient in sense of the “efficient market theory” (Fama 
1970), behavioral finance perspectives account for departures of stock val-
ues from their “rational level” (Shleifer 2000) and offer psychological ex-
planations of investment behavior. Where psychology comes in, and hence 
where behavioral finance makes its contribution, is in questioning assump-
tions of economic rationality and market efficiency in financial markets 
(Shiller 2000; Malkiel 2003). 
 From the perspective of standard portfolio theory in economic science, 
the willingness to invest one’s wealth in risky assets is conceptualized as a 
function of one’s degree of risk aversion/indifference/preference (Merton 
1969 1971; Samuelson 1969). Accordingly, investors marked by a higher 
degree of risk aversion hold safer wealth portfolios – and vice versa. The 
literature suggests that all differences in portfolio composition across inves-
tors derive from differences in risk preferences (Gollier 2001). Furthermore, 
it is argued that households invest at least a part of their wealth in risky as-
sets to take advantage of equity premiums. Indeed, empirical research docu-
ments significant effects of self-reported attitude towards risk on the likeli-
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hood of having investments in risky assets (Haliassos and Bertaut 1995; 
Guiso and Paiella 2008; Keller and Siegrist 2006). 
 There exists evidence that standard theory explanations fail because deci-
sions in financial markets “cannot depend on strict mathematical expecta-
tion, since the basis for making such calculations does not exist” (Keynes 
1936: 162f). Behavioral finance accounts depart from the assumption of ef-
ficient markets and of utility maximization as the basis of investors’ finan-
cial decision-making. Empirical research shows that small investors act far 
from what can be regarded as rational and rather perform poorly (Barber 
and Odean 2000). Research under the umbrella of behavioral finance ex-
plains why small investors invest in stocks and participate in financial activ-
ities directly although direct stock-ownership and active wealth manage-
ment proof not to be an inevitably rational strategy. The underlying idea is 
that small investors systematically overestimate their own skills and abilities 
to manage their wealth portfolios (Odean 1998). Consequently, direct stock-
ownership and engagement in active wealth management is a function of an 
investor’s degree of so called ‘overconfidence’. However, the operationali-
zation of overconfidence as an analytical concept has shown to be very 
problematic. One possible strategy practiced within empirical research in 
the field of behavioral finance has been to draw on gender as a proxy-
variable for overconfidence (Barber and Odean 2001) since psychological 
investigations have documented significant differences in overconfidence 
between men and women (Prince 2003; Lundeberg et al. 1994). Indeed, em-
pirical economic studies found that gender (women vs. men) is a relevant 
factor for risk aversion in investment decision-making processes 
(Badunenko et al. 2009; Yao and Hanna 2005) 
 In face of the existence of liquidity constraints (Deaton 1991), the as-
sumption of efficient markets and rational economic behavior cannot be 
maintained. At least a part of the low degree of stock market participation 
among households located in the lower half of the income distribution can 
be explained by missing opportunity of low-income households to either 
save or borrow to invest in financial products (Haliassos and Michaelides 
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2003; Vissing-Jorgensen 2003). To cut a long story short, making stock 
market investments requires at least a minimum level of income. 
 In general, financial decisions can be regarded as marked by high com-
plexity. Here accounts from sociology and economics agree. From the per-
spective of financial economics, information costs in form of lacking trans-
parency represent an important barrier of entry in stock market activity. 
Low cognitive abilities are likely to increase these costs substantially be-
cause information – if available and collected – has to be interpreted by 
market participants. Thus, if stock-market investment calls for a special 
know-how – what is typically called ‘financial literacy’ – households will 
decide not make investments unless they are capable of ‘making sense’ of 
information, which depends on their cognitive abilities (King and Leape 
1998). In fact, empirical investigations have revealed that stock-market par-
ticipation is associated with cognitive skills (e.g. Christelis et al. 2010; 
Grinblatt et al. 2011), financial literacy and education (van Rooij et al. 2011; 
Bertaut 1998; Cole et al. 2014; Campbell 2006). 
 
Economic sociology I: The investment habitus 
From the perspective of economic sociology, economic action and decisions 
are always oriented towards an unknown, uncertain and open future 
(Beckert 2009, 2013). Economic actors must decide without being able to 
anticipate the economic outcomes. Since the prediction of the proper strate-
gies to follow is impossible, actors resort to socially anchored “scripts” or 
“conventions” (Biggart and Beamish 2003) that serve as a “collectively rec-
ognized reference” (Beckert 2009: 251). 
 Different social groups develop different responses to a given economic 
context, depending on a distinct (economic) ‘habitus’ – a subjectively em-
bodied, structured set of (economic) ‘dispositions’ that generate practices 
and perceptions (Bourdieu 1984, 1990, 2005). Economic dispositions in-
volve logics of action (DiMaggio 1997: 277) which have both a limiting and 
an enabling effect on (1) the perception of incentives and opportunities and 
on (2) the practical realization of economic strategies. In shaping how peo-
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ple relate to their interests and are aware of their position (Bourdieu 1992; 
Swedberg 2005), dispositions have to be conceived as relationally con-
structed. The knowledge of the ‘rules of the game’ conditions the perception 
of motives and incentives which can then ‘add up’ to individuals. In these 
terms, economic dispositions can be linked to attitudes towards risk and fu-
ture expectations – or “imagined futures” (Beckert 2011): 
“[T]he ‘rational’ habitus […] is the product of particular economic condition, the one 
defined by possession of the economic and cultural capital required in order to seize 
the ‘potential opportunities’ theoretically available to all. […] The art of estimating 
and seizing chances, the capacity to anticipate the future by a kind of practical induc-
tion or even to take a calculated gamble on the possible against the probable are dis-
positions that can only be acquired […] in certain social conditions” (Bourdieu 1990: 
62f). 
Thus, higher levels of economic and cultural capital imply the (cap)ability 
to calculate and seize economic chances or opportunities and thus to make 
financial investments marked by higher risk. This is because higher levels of 
cultural and economic capital are generally bound to a lower exposure to 
economic insecurity and market volatility and involve being more familiar 
with and also more motivated to familiarize oneself with the ‘field-specific 
logics’, codes and scripts of household finance (Aldridge 1998). 
 From such a perspective, variations in attitudes towards financial risk and 
economic calculation have to be understood as the product of internalized 
economic dispositions which are anchored in the accessible economic and 
cultural resources. Economic practices – including investment decisions – 
are result of one’s position in the social structure (Fourcade 2007). 
 
Economic sociology II: Conspicuous investment 
That investment practices function as an important aspect of defining and 
showing one’s position in the social structure seems particularly true in 
financialized societies. Recent research discusses the diffusion of financial-
ly-oriented cultural frames (Preda 2009; Davis 2009; Fligstein and Gold-
stein 2015). In a society characterized by increasing uncertainties with re-
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gard to old age provision, education of the children, health-care and future 
consumption, alongside the general necessity for self-determination and 
self-fulfillment, inflation of status symbols via investment or consumption 
becomes elementary. Possession of financial assets and property becomes 
condition of social integration, for present days and even more for the fu-
ture. In a society wherein aspirations are shaped by “concrete indices of the 
accessible and the inaccessible” (Bourdieu 1990: 76) and “signs of social 
value” (Bourdieu 1984) accessible via money (‘economic capital’), house-
hold financial market investment has to be viewed as a manifestation of so-
cial status. 
 Research on stratification and consumption has revealed that people 
demonstrate their social status position by adopting forms of “conspicuous 
consumption” (Veblen 1992). Accordingly, class and status boundaries are 
not so much determined by relations of production but are rather the out-
come of people’s (conscious and unconscious) strategies aiming at signaling 
their social position (see also Bourdieu 1984; Simmel [1907]2004; Frank 
2007; Weber [1922]1978). This idea can be applied to investment decisions 
as well, so that investments and financial activities become a form of ‘con-
spicuous investment’. 
 
Economic sociology III: ‘Special assets’ 
Money exhibits multiple definitions and uses. There are different cognitive 
classifications and evocative meanings associated with money in different 
social domains. This includes the values, attitudes and beliefs of people that 
influence their behavior with respect to money. 
 People earn, spend, save and invest their money for different reasons and 
with different intentions. This means that money as an “absolute means” 
(Simmel [1907]2004) is often ‘earmarked’ or ‘pinned’ and refers to specific 
purposes and functions. Zelizer’s (1989) analysis of money, for instance, 
shows that men’s income and women’s earnings (‘pin money’) are concep-
tualized and treated much differently. Accordingly, a euro of ‘pin money’ – 
although numerically equivalent to a euro of a man’s salary – is not viewed 
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as ‘serious’ or ‘real’ money. ‘Pin money’ is rather supplementary, like a 
gift, and is spent less freely and for different purposes (household expenses). 
Even while the sociology of money considers multiple money uses – eco-
nomic and non-economic – money is restricted in important social ways. 
People attach “special meanings to particular amounts” (Zelizer 1997:29). 
Money is indeed not as colorless, neutral and objective as economic theories 
of money suggest. Money is shaped by social relations and meanings (cul-
ture). “Culture and social structure mark the quality of money by institu-
tionalizing controls, restrictions, and distinctions in the sources, uses, modes 
of allocation, and even the quantity of money” (Zelizer 1989: 342). Here, 
Zelizer (1989) develops the concept of “special monies” to denote that mon-
ey is not restricted by social limitations but rather represents more socially 
composed ‘currencies’ linked to social circumstances and invested with spe-
cific motives, values and norms, especially where social interaction is 
marked by specific interests. Of course, this idea refers not only to the ways 
money is spent, but to the ways money is saved and invested as well. Ac-
cordingly, we can speak of ‘special assets’, investments made with a special 
function (e.g. old age provision, safety net) and directed towards a special 
motive. 
3.4.2. Data and Methods 
In the following, we study the embeddedness of financial practices. Who 
makes what kind of financial investments? 
 We make use of data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and 
the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) con-
ducted in 2010. The SCF dataset contains 6,482 US households, whereas the 
HFCS dataset contains 3.565 households for Germany, 7.951 for Italy and 
1.301 for the Netherlands. The countries were selected because they are in-
dividually important and together illustrate a range of different economic 
traditions. The United States (LME) and Germany (CME) represent oppos-
ing poles of capitalist societies, what makes them ideal cases to investigate 
(Hall and Soskice 2001; Crouch and Streeck 1997). In between the ‘classic’ 
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poles, Italy and the Netherlands represent interesting cases. The Netherlands 
is often regarded as a Nordic country and an early ‘financializer’. In contrast 
Italy is often described as a Southern-style mixed-market economy (MME) 
marked by traditional financial practices. 
 To examine how socio-structural variables are associated with financial 
investment practices, we use logistic regression models to predict the odds 
of having investments in three different forms (mutual funds, life insurance 
and pension funds, stocks) for each of the households within the four coun-
tries. The columns show the coefficients of binary logit models of the odds 
of having investments in one of the three forms for each country in the ana-
lysis separately (see Long 1997).  
 Whereas behavioral finance assumes risk tastes as exogenous individual 
preferences, economic sociology assumes that distinct ‘risk mentalities’ are 
product of the economic and cultural resources people can draw on. From 
this perspective, attitudes towards financial risk are embedded in the social 
structure of society. By entering the whole set of variables into the models, 
we control for the embeddedness of subjective risk-taking. In order to study 
the role of risk mentalities in making financial investments, we include a 
measure of attitude towards financial risk, as an independent variable (en-
tered as a set of dummy variables) in the models. This variable measures 
subjective risk on an ordinal-scale (see Grable and Lytton 2001). Higher 
levels indicate a greater willingness of financial risk-taking. Respondents 
were presented a selection of four financial reasonings linking risk and ex-
pected returns and asked to pick the statement that came closest to the de-
gree of financial risk they were willing to take when they save or make in-
vestments: (1) not willing to take any financial risk, (2) take average finan-
cial risks expecting to earn average returns, (3) take above average finan-
cial risks expecting to earn above average returns, (4) take substantial fi-
nancial risk expecting to earn substantial returns. 
 To study the effect of ‘special assets’, we enter a set variables related to 
investment motives. We distinguish between investment reasons (1) related 
to big investment projects (purchase an own home, major expenses, set 
142 
 
up/finance own business), (2) related to a safety-net and buffer (to be pre-
pared for unexpected events, old age provision), (3) related to consumption 
purposes (travels/holidays) and (4) related to descendants (education of 
(grand)children, bequests). 
 To account for the effects of socio-structural variables, we enter a varia-
ble gender of the household-head (with female as the reference category) 
and a variable for the level of education (coded 1 for university degree and 
0 for lower educational categories). Economic capital is operationalized via 
the household income variable, an additional household financial wealth 
variable and a homeownership dummy variable (1=home-owner; 0=no own-
er/renter). Because previous research reveals differences in homeownership 
rates and motives for owner-occupation (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008; 
Kurz and Blossfeld 2004), it can be hypothesized that households owning 
residential property tend to invest in financial assets to a lesser extent. 
Throughout the analyses, we use financial wealth including deposits and 
saving accounts, bonds, managed accounts, voluntary pension and life-
insurance assets as well as other financial assets difficult to classify. How-
ever, depending on the model we exclude either investments in mutual 
funds, life insurance and pension funds or shares and stocks from this cate-
gory, in order to avoid reverse causation bias. Income is measured as house-
hold gross income defined as earnings from employment, self-employment 
income, income from pensions and other regular social transfers as well as 
income from renting and financial investments. As in the case of financial 
wealth and due to the same reason, we exclude dividend and interest in-
come.15 The models also include a control variable for profession 
(1=managerial and professional occupations; 0=other occupations) as a 
measure for social status. 
                                                       
15 We choose to work with wealth and income indicators defined at the household level and 
not per capita figures or figures normalized by any equivalence scale. Theoretical argu-
ments to use equivalence scale in the case of consumption indicators are well documented 
(e.g. Atkinson et al. 1995), while wealth is usually considered at the household level. Con-
trols for the structure of the household are included in the empirical models. 
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 We include a set of different socio-demographic variables as controls in 
the models. These include marital status (1 signifies married and 0 signifies 
other), since previous empirical research has demonstrated that wealth port-
folios vary by family structure (Zagorsky 2005). We also add a variable on 
ethnicity coded as a dummy variable (0=native/white; 1=immigrant/non-
white). Prior sociological studies on wealth inequality point to systematic 
differences in patterns of wealth accumulation between racial and ethnic 
groups (Conley 1999; Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Semyonov and Lewin-
Epstein 2011). Also studies from the field of financial economics have 
shown that race matters when it comes to financial decisions (Yao et al. 
2005). We include a set of controls for age (three dummy variables, with 
under 35 years as the reference category) because age is an important pre-
dictor of savings behaviors within the “life-cycle” framework (Modigliani 
and Brumberg 1954; Ando and Modigliani 1963). From the life-cycle per-
spective, people start saving during early adulthood, reach peak levels of 
savings during middle age, and spend down their assets in retirement. The 
idea is that individuals simultaneously maximize and smooth out consump-
tion across the life course and that retirement savings out of current income 
is the chief driver of wealth accumulation.  
  The variable on household debt includes all kinds of outstanding liabili-
ties. On the one hand, debt causes constraints on household financial oppor-
tunities and thus may reduce engagement in financial investments. Howev-
er, on the other hand, debts have to be understood as integral part of con-
temporary processes of financialization, as already mentioned earlier 
(Montgomerie 2013; Langley 2008). Private indebtedness evolves as social 
norms interact with both cultural trends and institutional changes in house-
hold finance (Prasad 2012). This means that indebtedness – like forms of 
investment and saving – may be interpreted as a specific element of a “fi-
nance culture” (Fligstein and Goldstein 2015; Heiberger 2016) – a culture 
which entails actively engaging in one’s financial issues. 
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3.4.3. Findings 
Our comparative analysis of aggregate data allowed us to reconstruct paths 
in investment practices across countries and to identify national peculiarities 
and commonalities. When looking at portfolio composition, however, we 
should keep in mind that: (1) It is impossible to detect whether a change in 
asset shares in the last years is due to a change in participation or just to the 
amounts invested. (2) Aggregate data do not provide information whether 
national differences in participation and composition of household wealth 
attributes to wealth as such, to household socio-economic characteristics, or 
are due to other cross-country differences. (3) As a result, we cannot infer 
any indication about representative portfolios and representative investment 
practices from macro financial data directly. Hence, survey data has to in-
form us about how financialization and finance culture function on the mi-
cro-level. 
 
Descriptive analysis 
Before we turn to multivariate techniques of analysis, we take a look at de-
scriptive data. Table 10 documents large cross-country differences in partic-
ipation rates (the fraction of households that own a particular type of asset 
or have a particular type of liability). 
 Within financial assets, the highest participation rate is for bank deposits 
(including transaction accounts). In most countries, the second highest fi-
nancial asset participation rate is for retirement assets held in defined-
contribution pension plans and life insurance. Participation rates do vary 
considerably across countries, with high levels in Australia, the United 
Kingdom, and Canada, and quite low levels in Portugal, Italy, Austria and 
particularly Greece. Of course the main reason for this cross-country varia-
tion in private pension participation lies in the difference between DC and 
DB pension systems. Some countries rely primarily on defined-benefit pen-
sions, which are claims to future income, but are not well measured in the 
survey data and are not counted as financial assets in our analysis.  
 
   Deposits Bonds Mutual Funds 
Directly 
Owned 
Stocks 
Direct and 
Indirect 
Stockhold-
ings 
Retirement 
Assets  
and Life 
Insurance 
Main  
Residence 
Other 
Housing 
Assets 
Private 
Business Debts 
Mortgage 
Debt 
AUS 97.4 1.7 3.3 34.5 – 82.6 67.4 20.5 12.2 69.1 36.7 
AUT 99.4 3.5 9.9 5.3 12.9 17.6 47.7 13.4 9.4 35.8 16.8 
BEL 97.7 7.6 17.5 14.7 25.6 43.1 69.7 16.4 6.6 45.0 28.5 
CAN 93.6 7.4 11.6 10.0 – 70.5 62.5 18.4 17.1 71.1 33.8 
GER 99.0 5.2 16.9 10.6 23.7 46.3 44.2 17.8 9.4 47.4 18.1 
ESP 98.1 1.4 5.6 10.4 25.1 23.6 82.8 36.2 15.0 50.0 26.8 
FIN 100.0 0.8 27.4 22.2 33.9 23.7 69.2 29.8 13.8 59.8 32.8 
FRA 99.6 1.7 10.7 14.7 23.0 37.5 55.3 24.7 10.7 46.9 16.9 
GRC 73.4 0.5 1.3 2.7 4.7 3.8 72.4 37.9 9.8 36.7 13.9 
ITA 91.8 14.6 6.3 4.6 11.5 18.0 68.7 24.9 18.4 25.2 9.6 
NLD 94.2 5.9 17.8 10.5 19.3 50.0 57.1 6.1 4.8 65.4 43.9 
PRT 94.3 0.4 2.8 4.4 6.3 14.1 71.5 27.1 7.7 37.7 24.5 
UK 97.4 28.2 5.4 17.5 – 76.1 68.0 10.9 – 63.2 36.2 
USA 92.6 13.3 8.7 15.1 49.8 57.6 67.3 14.4 12.1 75.0 47.0 
Mean 94.8 6.5 10.3 12.6 21.4 40.3 64.5 21.3 11.3 52.0 27.5 
Data: HFCS 2010, SCF 2010, SFC 2012, WAS 2012, HILDA 2010; sample weights 
Table 10: Asset participation rates in 2010 
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There is also considerable variation across countries in the participation 
rates for directly held stocks and mutual funds. In spite of the well-known 
risk of active and direct stock-ownership, participation rates are substantial-
ly lower in mutual funds than in directly held stocks. The participation rates 
in bonds (fixed-income products outside retirement accounts) are overall 
relatively low, albeit with substantial cross-national variation. The United 
Kingdom, Italy and the United States show relatively high participation 
rates in these products, which include both public debt and long-term debt 
issued by banks. 
 To get an idea of households’ exposure to financial markets (their in-
vestment culture), we construct an inclusive equity participation rate that 
takes account of indirect holdings of equities in retirement accounts and mu-
tual funds as well as direct equity holdings (direct and indirect stockhold-
ings in Table 10). The analysis shows that the this participation rate is about 
one half in the United States, about one third in Finland, about one fourth in 
Belgium, France and Spain and no more than one fifth in other Continental 
European countries. 
 The homeownership rate (measured as the fraction of households owning 
their main residence, rather than the more common definition in the real es-
tate literature of the fraction of housing units that are owner-occupied) is 
above 50 percent everywhere except Germany and Austria, i.e. countries in 
which renting is prominently more common. The ownership of second 
homes is especially widespread in Southern Europe (Greece, Spain, Portugal 
and Italy) but also in Finland. In almost all countries about 10 percent of 
households own private businesses with particularly high levels in Canada 
and Italy.  
 On the liability side, data shows substantial cross-country heterogeneity. 
About 75 percent of households are indebted in the United States. This frac-
tion is only slightly lower in Canada (71 percent), Australia (69 percent), the 
Netherlands (65 percent) and the United Kingdom (63 percent). However, 
this figures are very different from Italy, where only one quarter of house-
holds has any debt, from Greece, Austria and Portugal, where about 35 per-
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cent of households are indebted, or even France, Spain, and Germany, 
where about half of all households have debts. Given that all countries in 
our data are developed industrialized societies with established market 
economies and many of them are even members of the same currency area, 
this cross-country variation may seem surprising. Of course, this phenome-
non has emerged as a major topic of debate in the social sciences (Prasad 
2012; Coletta et al. 2014; Kus 2013). We can also find great cross-country 
variation in the use of mortgage debt. For instance, only 10 percent of Ital-
ians and less than 20 percent Germans, Austrians and Greeks have a mort-
gage, whereas almost half of US-American households do. Note that this 
heterogeneity is not sufficiently explained by the homeownership rate, 
which indeed is low in Germany, but is close to the United States level in 
Italy. 
  AUT BEL GER ESP GRC ITA NLD PRT USA Mean 
Not willing to take 
any financial risk 62.7 73.0 63.7 84.3 77.3 49.5 71.8 92.2 47.4 71.5 
Take average  
financial risks 28.8 21.8 33.2 13.4 16.6 31.6 26.2 6.2 35.8 22.8 
Take above average 
financial risks 6.5 4.4 2.7 1.8 3.6 17.9 1.6 1.0 13.4 4.4 
Take substantial 
financial risks 2.0 0.8 0.4 0.5 2.5 1.0 0.4 0.6 3.5 1.3 
Data: HFCS 2010, SCF 2010; sample weights 
Table 11: Risk attitudes across countries 
Descriptive data also reveals wide cross-country variation in subjective atti-
tudes towards financial risk-taking (risk mentalities) as shown in Table 11. 
US-American households are more willing to take financial risks than 
Spain, Portuguese or German households, with Belgium, Italy, Austria and 
Greece somewhere in between. The fraction of people who say of them-
selves to take substantial risks when making financial investments is highest 
in the United States (4 percent) and lies above the average in Austria and 
Greece. However, Italy represents an interesting case since about 18 percent 
of households state to take above average risks when it comes to financial 
investments. These findings point at fundamental ambivalences in invest-
ment practices and cross-national perceptions of household finance. Note 
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that households’ direct exposure to financial markets is comparatively low 
in Greece, Austria and Italy, i.e. in countries which have above average lev-
els when it comes to subjective tastes for risks. The data reveals that this 
functions the other way round in Spain and particularly in the Netherlands. 
In the United States objective financial practices (high exposure to markets) 
and subjective perceptions of risk (risk-loving mentality) fit each other well. 
This is also the case for Portugal with low levels of direct participation in 
the ‘finance game’ and a corresponding high national risk-aversion.  
  AUT BEL GER ESP GRC NLD PRT USA 
Purchase own home 10.2 12.0 7.9 4.5 5.4 18.9 14.9 6.4 
Major purchases 34.9 15.9 36.1 23.4 7.1 66.7 2.8 15.8 
Set up private business 2.4 1.2 0.5 3.8 1.5 7.4 1.1 0.7 
Financial investment 3.1 2.1 1.4 11.1 2.4 20.1 1.6 1.1 
Unexpected events 66.7 54.1 42.8 52.7 71.6 88.7 54.5 55.3 
Paying off debts 9.3 5.0 3.0 7.5 13.3 25.3 8.3 2.5 
Old-age provision 37.0 35.6 35.9 27.6 34.8 70.8 40.8 40.9 
Travels/Holidays 34.9 23.6 28.7 39.9 21.0 74.2 6.3 9.7 
Education of children 22.9 22.9 19.5 31.2 22.5 52.2 26.1 13.0 
Bequests 7.7 14.2 0.8 9.2 3.6 23.0 9.3 9.8 
Note: Expressing multiple purposes was possible. Purposes in rows represent dummy variables. Data: HFCS 
2010, SCF 2010; sample weights 
Table 12: Investment reasons 
 As Table 12 shows, old age provision and provision for unexpected 
events (like unemployment or illness) represent important investment mo-
tives across all countries. In contrast, we can find striking cross-country dif-
ferences for the fractions of households who invest their money to cover 
major expenses, to pay off debts, to finance travels and to leave bequests. 
Not surprisingly, investing for purposes of future provision (unexpected 
events and retirement) is more widespread in the Netherlands and the United 
States, where welfare state arrangements are more ‘market-oriented’. How-
ever, also ‘family-based’ welfare states like Greece and Portugal show high 
levels when it comes to investing in order to reduce future uncertainty. 
Whereas investment for consumption purposes (travels, major expenses) is 
high in the Netherlands, corresponding figures are considerably lower for 
Portugal and the United States. Investment for one’s descendants (children’s 
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education and bequests) is relatively common in the Netherlands, Spain, 
Belgium and Portugal, whereas such intentions seem to be less important in 
Germany or Greece.  
Multivariate analysis 
We present the estimates for the effects of having direct investments in one 
of the three financial assets: mutual funds (investment funds), life insurance 
and pension funds (private pension assets) and publicly traded stocks 
(stocks) (Tables 13–15). The columns present predictions for whether or not 
a household has investment in that kind of assets for each of the four coun-
tries separately. We run models for countries separately and refrain from 
pooling the data because analysis of aggregate data and descriptive findings 
reveal large cross-country differences which cannot be attributed to individ-
ual, household-level characteristics. For instance, homeownership rates are 
particularly high in Southern Europe and low in Germany. And, the direct 
exposure to financial markets dynamics (equity participation rate) is larger 
in Anglo-Saxon countries than in Continental Europe. 
 The results of the logistic regressions indicate that investment decisions 
are strongly influenced by attitudes towards risk. This finding goes for each 
of the countries under analysis. Generally, the odds of having invested in 
one of the three assets are significantly higher among households with an 
above average taste for risk (level 3 and 4) than the odds for the households 
expressing a strong risk aversion (level 1). A distinct risk mentality plays a 
significant role when it comes to investments in investment funds and par-
ticularly when it comes to stocks, whereas risk attitude is only of signifi-
cance for the ownership of private pension assets in Germany and the Unit-
ed States. Even more, we find that households with a higher risk tolerance 
are more likely to own private pension assets in the United States, but in 
Germany risk-loving investors are less likely to have such assets. In Italy 
and the Netherlands risk mentalities do not seem to play a role for invest-
ments in private pension assets at all. 
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GER ITA NLD USA 
Takes average financial risks 1.370 *** 0.768 *** 1.816 *** 0.555 *** 
Takes above average financial risks 1.874 *** 0.419 ** 2.508 *** 0.736 *** 
Takes substantial financial risks 0.057 1.193 *** 2.159 ** 0.570 ** 
Save/Invest: own home 0.010 n.a. -0.022  0.510 ** 
Save/Invest: major expenses 0.345 ** n.a. -0.107  -0.017  
Save/Invest: own business -0.731 n.a. -0.086  -0.816  
Save/Invest: unexpected events 0.149 n.a. 0.225  0.150 * 
Save/Invest: old-age 0.254 ** n.a. 0.197  0.191 ** 
Save/Invest: travel/holidays -0.236 * n.a. 0.138  0.042  
Save/Invest: children’s education -0.200 n.a. -0.215  0.105  
Save/Invest: inheritance 0.230 n.a. -0.068  0.189  
Male 0.136 0.292 ** 0.275 -0.145 
University education 0.407 *** 0.311 * 0.330 * 0.614 *** 
Managerial/professional occupation 0.075 n.a. 0.022 0.130 *** 
Age 35–50 0.194 0.483 ** 0.655 0.049 
Age 51–65 -0.206 0.302 0.888 + 0.141  
Age >65 -0.219 0.161 0.912 ** 0.166  
Married 0.164 -0.062 -0.049 ** 0.056 
Number of persons in household -0.199 *** -0.156 ** -0.230 ** -0.059 + 
Immigrant -0.878 *** -0.934 ** n.a. -0.248 ** 
Household income 0.039 0.740 *** 0.235 ** 0.175 *** 
Household financial wealth 0.385 *** 0.343 *** 0.348 *** 0.394 *** 
Homeownership 0.286 ** 0.228 0.205 0.191 + 
Household debt -0.011 0.009 -0.014 -0.041 *** 
Constant -6.339 *** -14.228 *** -8.858 *** -7.681 *** 
Pseudo R²  .223 .185 .218 .345 
Observations 3347 7951 1224 6363 
Note: Logistic regression of the determinants of the log-odds of mutual fund investment, with robust standard er-
rors. Significance levels: *** p< 0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 (two-sided tests). Variable values for house-
hold financial wealth, household income and household debt are logged values. Household financial wealth ex-
cludes mutual fund investments and household income excludes interest and dividend income from financial in-
vestments. “n.a.” denotes categories for which data has not been collected. Data: HFCS 2010, SCF 2010; no sample 
weights. 
Table 13: Determinants of the log-odds of investment in mutual funds 
The regression models show that the functions and intentions attributed to-
wards investments exhibit significant effects on financial investment deci-
sion-making. In Germany, the likelihood of owning shares of investment 
funds is higher for households who invest and save for major expenses and 
old age, whereas people who invest their money in order to finance travels 
and holidays are less likely to own investment fund assets. In the Nether-
lands, investment motives have no significant effects on buying investment 
funds assets. 
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GER ITA NLD USA 
Takes average financial risks 0.103 *** 0.045  0.227  0.499 *** 
Takes above average financial risks -0.157 *** -0.081  0.705  0.658 *** 
Takes substantial financial risks -1.366 -0.301  -0.360  0.011 
Save/Invest: own home 0.124 n.a.  0.305  0.124 
Save/Invest: major expenses 0.164 + n.a.  -0.068  -0.168 
Save/Invest: own business 0.005 n.a.  0.223  -0.248 
Save/Invest: unexpected events 0.207 ** n.a.  -0.040  0.001 
Save/Invest: old-age 0.572 *** n.a.  0.332 ** 0.429 *** 
Save/Invest: travel/holidays 0.055 n.a.  -0.078 0.366 ** 
Save/Invest: children’s education -0.085 n.a.  -0.271 + 0.030 
Save/Invest: inheritance -0.294 n.a.  0.204 -0.068 
Male -0.010 0.242 ** 0.061 -0.101 
University education -0.045 *** 0.136 * 0.427 *** 0.106 
Managerial/professional occupation 0.320 n.a. -0.299 + 0.182 ** 
Age 35–50 0.002 0.436 ** 0.510 ** 0.286 ** 
Age 51–65 -0.492 -0.109 + 0.993 *** 0.269 ** 
Age >65 -2.241 -1.266 *** 0.355 -0.213 + 
Married 0.060 -0.026 0.292 + 0.394 *** 
Number of persons in household 0.240 *** 0.034 0.271 *** -0.092 *** 
Immigrant -0.710 *** -0.582 *** n.a. -0.147 + 
Household income 0.275 0.650 *** 0.004 0.183 ** 
Household financial wealth 0.128 *** 0.068 *** 0.066 ** 0.361 *** 
Homeownership -0.065 ** 0.284 ** 0.109 0.192 ** 
Household debt 0.027 0.045 *** -0.007 0.055 *** 
Constant -4.023 *** -9.242 *** -2.050 *** -5.684 *** 
Pseudo R²  .225 .158 .074 .368 
Observations 3347 7951 1124 6363 
Note: Logistic regression of the determinants of the log-odds of life insurance and pension fund investment, with 
robust standard errors. Significance levels: *** p< 0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 (two-sided tests). Variable 
values for household financial wealth, household income and household debt are logged values. Household finan-
cial wealth excludes investments in whole life insurance and pension funds and household income excludes interest 
and dividend income from financial investments. “n.a.” denotes categories for which data has not been collected. 
Data: HFCS 2010, SCF 2010; no sample weights. 
Table 14: Determinants of the log-odds of life insurance and pension funds investment 
In the United States, people who invest their money with the intention to 
buy a home, to be prepared for unexpected events and who invest for re-
tirement provision are more likely to own investment fund shares. Not sur-
prisingly, people who make financial investments for retirement provision 
are more likely to have life insurance assets and pension fund assets. This 
finding is consistent across all models. In Germany, investing and saving for 
the reason of financing travels and holidays has a significant negative effect 
on the probability of holding stocks. In the Netherlands people who invest in 
order to finance the education of their children are less likely to hold stocks. 
For the United States, the functions attributed to investments do not seem to 
contribute to the decision to buy stocks. 
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GER ITA NLD USA 
Takes average financial risks 1.401 *** 1.098 *** 1.937 *** 0.665 *** 
Takes above average financial risks 2.147 *** 1.249 *** 2.393 *** 0.892 *** 
Takes substantial financial risks 2.581 ** 2.470 *** 2.480 ** 0.912 *** 
Save/Invest: own home 0.174 n.a. 0.032  0.227  
Save/Invest: major expenses -0.176 n.a. -0.217  0.235  
Save/Invest: own business -0.075 n.a. 0.576  -0.039  
Save/Invest: unexpected events 0.095 n.a. 0.582  0.073  
Save/Invest: old-age -0.061 n.a. 0.354  0.128  
Save/Invest: travel/holidays -0.232 ** n.a. -0.054  0.013  
Save/Invest: children’s education -0.090 n.a. -0.440 ** 0.074  
Save/Invest: inheritance -0.789 n.a. -0.073  0.183  
Male 0.373 ** 0.493 *** 0.035 0.252 * 
University education 0.307 ** 0.213 0.110 0.661 *** 
Managerial/professional occupation -0.024 n.a. 0.395 + -0.014 
Age 35–50 0.535 ** 0.847 ** 0.168 -0.136 
Age 51–65 0.402 * 0.795 ** 0.421 -0.175  
Age >65 0.849 ** 0.611 + 0.745 + 0.040  
Married 0.054 0.184 0.226 0.092 
Number of persons in household -0.160 ** -0.226 ** 0.012 -0.053 + 
Immigrant -0.011 0.141 n.a. -0.255 ** 
Household income 0.410 *** 0.552 ** 0.032 0.068 
Household financial wealth 0.409 *** 0.557 *** 0.322 *** 0.370 *** 
Homeownership 0.249 + 0.218 0.304 0.367 ** 
Household debt 0.011 0.024 + -0.012 -0.005 
Constant -11.909 *** -15.759 *** -7.540 *** -7.507 *** 
Pseudo R²  .267 .244 .203 .307 
Observations 3347 7951 1124 6363 
Note: Logistic regression of the determinants of the log-odds of investment in publicly traded stocks, with robust 
standard errors. Significance levels: *** p< 0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 (two-sided tests). Variable values 
for household financial wealth, household income and household debt are logged values. Household financial 
wealth excludes investments in directly held publicly traded stocks and shares and household income excludes 
interest and dividend income from financial investments. “n.a.” denotes categories for which data has not been 
collected. Data: HFCS 2010, SCF 2010; no sample weights.
Table 15: Determinants of the log-odds of investment in stocks 
Gender plays a particularly significant role for investment decisions in the 
estimated models for Italy, while gender is only of marginal importance in 
the other countries. In Italy, males are significantly more likely to own in-
vestment fund assets, private pension plans and stocks, than females. 
Whereas, gender is of no importance in the Netherlands, males are more 
likely to own stocks in Germany and the United States. We find that univer-
sity education has a significant positive effect on the probability to have in-
vested in investment funds across all countries. It has a significant positive 
effect on private pension investments in Germany but a negative in the 
Netherlands and it is positively associated with stock-ownership in Germany 
and the United States. In general, these findings refer to social status mech-
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anisms but also to what is commonly called ‘financial literacy’ in media and 
public. Occupation shows no significant effect for the probability of owning 
stocks, pension funds or investment funds across all models, except for the 
United States. A professional or managerial occupation has a significant and 
positive effect on the probability of mutual fund investment and the owner-
ship of private pension assets. 
 From a ‘life-cycle’ perspective, age should be significantly associated 
with investment practices. This is, however, only partly true. The models 
show no age-effects for mutual fund investment, except for the Netherlands 
where seniors (older than 65 years) are more likely to own investment fund 
assets. Age has also no significant association with private pension invest-
ments in Germany, whereas in Italy the retired are less likely to own such 
assets and the people in their midlife (35–50 years) are more likely to have 
invested in private pensions than younger people. For the Netherlands and 
the United States coefficient behave as expected: people between 35 and 65 
years old are significantly more likely to have pension investments than the 
young (younger than 35 years) and the elderly (65 and older). While older 
people (seniors) are more likely to invest in stocks in Germany and Italy, we 
cannot find a significant relationship for the Netherlands and the United 
States.  
 To some extent these findings appear plausible since demographic 
change and the fiscal crisis of the welfare state have resulted in pension re-
forms which led to the emergence of multi-pillar pension systems and a 
‘double-payment problem’16 for younger generations in many countries 
(Myles and Pierson 2001; Dixon 2008). Our data reflect this phenomenon 
for the more ‘market-based’ economies (Netherlands, United States), 
whereas this effect is wholly absent in Germany and only partly observable 
for Italy. Besides, since direct stock-ownership is significantly more wide-
spread under seniors in Germany, investment in stocks seems to be rather a 
hobby activity for well-educated and affluent retirees, here.  
                                                       
16 This means: paying for current retirees while saving for one’s own retirement. 
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 Marital status only marginally affects financial practices. Being married 
increases the likelihood of having private pension assets in the United 
States, reduces the likelihood of holding investment fund shares in the 
Netherlands and exhibits no effect on stock-ownership. In contrast, ethnicity 
turns out to be a significant determinant of the probability to make financial 
investments. Being immigrant significantly reduces the probability to own 
investment fund and private pension assets across all countries. This finding 
is particularly pronounced in Germany and Italy. However, migrant status 
bears no meaningful effect when it comes to stock-ownership. We can find a 
highly significant negative association only for the United States model. 
 With Germany being an exception, household income increases the prob-
ability of investment fund ownership. Whereas higher income households 
are more likely to own private pension assets in Italy and the United States, 
we cannot find an equivalent significant association for Germany and the 
Netherlands. Household income shows a highly significant and positive as-
sociation with stock-ownership in the models for Germany and Italy, but 
seems to play no significant role in the Netherlands and the United States. 
 Generally, the probability of investment increases with household wealth. 
Financial wealth exerts substantial and significant positive effects on the 
likelihood of having investment in each of the three asset types across all 
models. This relationship is particularly apparent for the ownership invest-
ment fund assets and stock ownership. Also homeownership increases the 
probability to ownership of financial assets but not to the same extent as fi-
nancial wealth.  
 Home owners are significantly more likely to own investment fund assets 
and stocks in Germany and the United States while there is no significant 
effect for the case of Italy and the Netherlands. In Germany, the odds of 
have investments in pension funds or life insurance decrease for households 
which own housing property. These findings hint at different roles of home-
ownership within different countries. Homeownership not only indicates 
economic well-being or has a “symbolic meaning” (Doyle 1992), but it can 
function as private insurance (Conley and Gifford 2006), in particular for 
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old age retirement. Household debt increases the likelihood of having pri-
vate pension assets in Italy and the United States, decreases the likelihood of 
owning investment fund shares, and has no effect on whether or not being a 
stock-owner. Financial investing and taking on debts are partly two interre-
lated elements of a distinct ‘culture of finance’. However, we have to be 
aware of credit market access mechanisms. Research has shown that par-
ticularly the middle and upper classes are able to borrow money at ‘good’ 
conditions and are willing to get indebted (Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). In 
this way, debt seems to be another ‘stratification tool’ – just as financial 
market investment (Fourcade and Healy 2013; Langley 2008). 
3.4.4. Concluding Remarks 
Our findings show that financial investment is indeed highly contingent on 
social position (income, assets and education) and the social meaning at-
tributed towards investments. The findings also support that there is a strong 
relationship between subjective risk (risk mentality) and financial invest-
ment decisions as economic and sociological literatures suggests. From a 
sociological point of view, however, attitudes towards financial risk cannot 
be understood as an exogenous factor and are deeply constrained by socio-
economic characteristics which are a result of the internalization of econom-
ic dispositions. Indeed, factors ignored by the standard economic theory of 
portfolio choice and dismissed as ‘market imperfections’ exert substantial 
effects on financial decisions. The findings support sociological accounts 
which point at economic dispositions in playing a significant role for in-
vestment decisions in financial markets. In particularly, the social position 
in the income and wealth distribution exhibits a significant influence on in-
vestment strategies.  
 Our study makes use of different approaches in economic sociology to 
explain investment decisions and thus provides a micro-foundation of finan-
cial market participation in an era of financialization. The results indicate 
that research should treat “interests, preferences, and group identities as the 
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product of endogenous social processes” (DiMaggio 2002: 94) for a better 
understanding of economic action (see also Beckert 2013). 
 While economic research concentrates on psychological factors to ex-
plain financial market participation, economic sociology focuses on social 
context, cultural frames and socio-economic characteristics in affecting de-
cisions to invest or not to invest in different types of financial assets – de-
terminants which are handled as simple control variables supplementing a 
set of psychological main predictors in many investigations by economists. 
Our cross-sectional data analysis of investment practices demonstrates that 
the phenomenon of financialization is performed and carried by distinct so-
cial groups. As suggested by economic science, such ‘carriers’ are charac-
terized by a subjective-attitudinal willingness to take on greater risks. Our 
findings show the extent to which investment decisions are significantly in-
fluenced by risk preference, as standard economics suggests. Indeed, men-
tality and beliefs play a great role when it comes to financial investments. 
These, however, should not be handled as exogenous factors – like financial 
economics (Odean 1998; Campbell 2006; Merton 1971; Akerlof and Shiller 
2009) make us believe. Subjective perceptions of risk are always socially 
embedded. The results point out that financial investment is an economic 
practice that is situated in specific places in the social structure of society. 
People with a high social status who are able to draw on economic resources 
are more likely to make financial market investments as integral element of 
deliberate economic action. The diagnosis of a ‘democratization of finance’ 
and a ‘financial market inclusion’ are indeed more complex and highly am-
bivalent phenomena as often suggested (Erturk et al. 2007). Although we 
can observe rising participation rates in financial markets and increasing 
wealth in private pension products, our survey data analysis points at mech-
anisms of “social closure” (Weber [1922]1978) when it comes to financial 
investment. Such findings gain crucial importance in times of rising income 
and wealth inequality and growing importance of private savings for socio-
economic security – especially for retirement. Private pension and insurance 
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investors tend to be young, native, educated, indebted and, especially, high-
er-income earners and wealth owners. 
 However, we find variations in effect-sizes and statistical significances 
across countries, which clearly points out that investment practices cannot 
be isolated from country-level contexts (institutions, conventions, laws, his-
torically-grown habits). Behavioral finance typically takes on a perspective 
that centers on the individual in explaining investment practices while ig-
noring sociological factors (Abolafia 2010) and context variables (Froud et 
al. 2001). Approaches from behavioral finance ignore the effects of collec-
tive patterns of interpretation, socialization, social milieus, or reference 
groups on investment decisions. Such approaches also overlook the impact 
of institutional frameworks on investment decisions. Cultural patterns, pow-
er relations, political institutions and social structures are neglected. Our 
results point at significance of the institutional arrangement of a national 
social order for household financial decisions. It is therefore crucial to treat 
purely individualistic models of explanations with caution. As relations and 
practices of the accumulation, saving and investment of wealth have devel-
oped they have taken different institutional configurations across state-
societies (Zysman 1983; Allen and Gale 2000). Research demonstrates that 
financial market structures continue to be embedded in national, supra-
national or regional contexts (Amable 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001). In-
deed, our prior cross-country comparisons of wealth and investment practic-
es at the household level reveal not only cross-national differences in the 
social structure of financial investments, but also substantial differences in 
aggregate portfolios, participation rates and social meanings of assets across 
countries – a finding confirmed by economic research (Guiso et al. 2002, 
2003; Christelis et al. 2013; Siermiska and Doorley 2012). 
 Against this backdrop, future research has to engage deeper into the mu-
tually related dynamics of institutions and practices in the field of household 
finance. We will have to look at longitudinal survey data to examine the so-
cio-structural dynamics of market bubbles, political reforms and financial 
crises. Longitudinal data (preferably with panel structure) will enable to ex-
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plore the democratization of financial market participation and point out 
mechanisms which make people enter or exit markets. Further studies will 
also have to engage in exploring network-effects in household investment 
decisions. Social relations, either conceptualized as ‘network ties’ or as ‘so-
cial capital’ represent a sociological vantage point par excellence, but have 
remained largely under-investigated by sociological research.  
 More recently, studies find a significant effect of asset ownership on po-
litical attitudes and voting behavior (Ansell 2014; André und DeWilde 
2014). In the course of increasing wealth ratios and homeownership rates, 
research points at emerging liberal and market-oriented attitudes in large 
parts of the middle classes (Mau 2015). Therefore, financial practices and 
beliefs remain a rich research field of crucial societal and thus political rele-
vance. 
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4. Discussion – Uncertain Securities in an Uncertain World 
As we have documented throughout this study, the last decades experienced 
an increasing financial inclusion – an ever broader participation of ever 
more parts of society. At the same time, ever larger parts of growing private 
wealth became invested in risky types of assets and, even more pronounced, 
delegated to the hands of collective investors – so called institutional funds. 
 Accumulation of wealth and financial investment are important strategies 
of status maintenance. Cut down to the bone, wealth promises to provide 
certainty in an uncertain world. On the one hand, wealth ownership puts 
people in the position to face the insecurities and precariousness of “world 
risk society” (Beck 1999). On the other hand, however, wealth itself is not 
safe from the risks our contemporary world – life course risks, financial 
risks, the risk of personal failure. Wrong decisions, low interest rates, mar-
ket dynamics, complexity of financial products or wrong advice can quickly 
transform ones wealth into zero – or even into debts. The uncertainties and 
risks anchored in “liquid modernity” (Bauman 2000) can be curse and bless-
ing at the same time: the uncertain future represents the danger to lose one’s 
money, but also the opportunity to make profit and receive returns. Alt-
hough wealth ownership can function as a tool-kit to ‘colonize the future’, 
‘have-littles’ can immediately become ‘have-nots’. Additionally, ordinary 
investors and savers often lack information and overview. Thus, as a result 
of welfare state re-building, demographic change and great medial attrac-
tion, small investors often become ‘speculators against their will’ 
(Schimank 2011). Such a world can be described as a ‘society of investors’ 
where households experience an “endless, diffuse, yet ubiquitous exhorta-
tion to trade and invest: […] ‘Invest, or the future will be closed to you’” 
(Preda 2009: 4). 
 Over the past four decades financial markets have spread across geo-
graphic space and social structure. Stock markets have developed in many 
new countries, particular since 1980, changing how business is done. Nu-
merous countries privatized their industries, removed constraints on domes-
tic and foreign investment and guaranteed their central banks independence. 
160 
 
Some governments even employed US-trained economists to realize neolib-
eral orthodoxy and free-market ideologies. Ever more types of assets be-
came securitized – from student loans to lawsuit settlements. Many things 
not generally tagged as ‘assets’ experienced transformation into tradable 
financial products – such as predicted increases in property tax revenues in 
the future. It seems that today almost any kind of cash flow could be securit-
ized and transformed into a financial product. 
 As a result, we witness the introduction of dynamics and logics of finan-
cial markets into areas where they have been previously absent – with per-
vasive social consequences. The consequences include the transformation of 
the corporate sector, state finances, household financial practices, increasing 
inequality and emergence of new social movements (like #Occupy). In our 
empirical part, we demonstrated evidence on how financialization varies 
cross-nationally and how national institutions and private households inter-
act with the dynamics of financial markets. 
 This last section provides a broader discussion of the findings, its impli-
cations and the need for further research. We suggest that the impact of to-
day’s financial markets on the investment decisions of private households 
and the dynamics of private wealth is profound and pervasive. However, the 
‘rise of finance’ cannot be handled as an exogenous cultural ‘shock’ for pri-
vate households. The destinies of finance and private households are recip-
rocally related. People in capitalist societies do not solely ‘react’ to chang-
ing conditions. New ideological frames emerging out of processes of indi-
vidualization changed existing stances towards financial risk and made 
households engage in finance activities. From such a perspective, structures 
of financialization reflect the complexities, the unevenness and the ambiva-
lences of modern economic life. Financialization has to be regarded as an 
ongoing process that is always “partial, uneven and in the making” (Langley 
2004: 554). 
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Universalities of Private Wealth 
At first sight, as the financialization literature suggests, we can observe a 
universally increasing importance of assets tied to financial market dynam-
ics. The composition of private wealth became increasingly more risk-
orientated and private wealth is increasingly managed by organized inves-
tors with financial expertise. This evolution partly contrasts with the devel-
opment of private housing wealth which shows no clear pattern of universal 
global growth (Figure 10). Since financialization is closely interwoven with 
marketization and commodification, with individualization and self-
responsiblization within contexts of a “world risk society” (Beck 1999), 
households expand their holdings of risky assets (shares, mutual funds, pen-
sion funds) whose capital value can go up or down because risk-taking is 
perceived as a rational economic strategy. As a consequence, an old distinc-
tion between “bank-based” and “market-based” capitalistic organization 
(Zysman 1983; Hall and Soskice 2001; Amable 2003) seems to be outdated. 
Markets become increasingly important everywhere. It seems that it is im-
possible to speak of an ‘old’ divergence between the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and 
‘Continental European’ countries. Over the last three decades, investment 
and saving patterns across the Western world increasingly shifted from sav-
ing money in bank deposits to more risky, sophisticated and flexible forms 
such as directly held stocks or mutual funds – a phenomenon which is al-
ready well established (Bartiloro et al. 2012; De Bonis et al. 2013; Ynesta 
2008; Guiso et al. 2002). As the data reveal, US American households were 
certainly ahead of their European counterparts in pioneering these trends. 
 
Variations in Private Wealth 
Nevertheless, our findings show that it would be misleading to speak of a 
uniform global trend. Financialization of private wealth represents a multi-
faceted process. Structures of financialization are more complex since they 
take on different shape in different contexts (national, regional, temporal, 
social). Depending on context, financialization is associated with different 
social meanings.  
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 Not surprisingly, capitalistic development is indeed not that simple and 
steady. Even though we can find trends of convergence towards the US-
way, the “social embeddedness” (Granovetter 1985) of private wealth in 
distinct institutional, cultural and socio-structural contexts seems to limit 
such developments. A main finding refers to the variation in trajectories of 
private wealth dynamics and its manifestation in distinct national patterns 
and local logics. Although financialization is often conceptualized as a uni-
form global trend of convergence towards a US-American style, national 
differences in investment patterns and distinct national preferences for cer-
tain asset types continue to persist across financialized societies. Private 
wealth is subject to a “power of inertia” (Becker 1995). Thus, the findings 
rather provide support for ‘diversity within convergence’. Financialization 
cannot be viewed as that homogenizing. In reality, it seems to promote the 
capitalistic development of an uneven and polarized economy (Sewell 
2008). 
  
On the Evolution of Private Financial Wealth 
As the analyses of aggregate household sector data show, the current era of 
financialization is typically linked to a retreat from deposits and savings ac-
counts. Nevertheless, traditional bank savings still play an important role in 
Japan, Spain and Germany and even witnessed an unexpected comeback in 
Italy and the United Kingdom since the start of the 2000s. To some extent, 
financialization is a highly contradictory process which not only consists of 
increasing financial activities and the emergence of a financial risk culture. 
Financialization dynamics seem to produce ‘ricochet-effects’ as well as re-
sistance and a re-orientation towards ‘classical’ and ‘traditional’ frames of 
economic action. This seems to be especially true for economic ‘events’ 
(like financial crises) which deeply influence national trajectories of 
financialization as well as global trends in household financial practices. For 
instance, this shows up in the comeback of deposits after the burst of the 
Dot.com bubble in 2001 or the US Subprime Crisis in 2007. After 2001, pri-
vate wealth held in bank deposits was marked by stagnation. The decline of 
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bank saving seems to have found an end since 2001 – or 2007 at least. 
Throughout the last decades, also bonds and debt securities lost signifi-
cance. Bonds, however, still possess some importance in Italy. The last dec-
ades witnessed increasing wealth in stocks and shares, particularly in the 
United States, Canada, Finland and Sweden. However, private financial 
wealth in stocks and shares is extremely exposed to market volatility. In 
most of the countries, the boom in shares experienced its peak around the 
turn of the millennium during the Dot.com hype and then interest in shares 
declined.  
 These dynamics suggest the existence of shifting ‘channels of 
financialization’. While at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s 
financialization of private wealth was mainly driven by the boom in stocks 
and shares, the channel shifted. Currently, the financialization of private 
wealth functions mainly via private insurance and the delegation of financial 
wealth to the hands of institutional investors. 
 
Financialization and the ‘Insurance Society’ 
This last point is directly linked to the increasing significant role of private 
insurance wealth. Provision against future risks is increasingly organized via 
individualized market arrangements instead of collective arrangements via 
welfare institutions and the principle of solidarity. The “insurance society” 
(Ewald 1986) witnessed massive transformations over the last decades. Pro-
cesses of financialization and private insurance became more and more in-
terrelated throughout the last decades. Not surprisingly, we find a universal 
trend of rising private insurance wealth consisting of pensions fund assets 
and life insurance reserves. Private wealth is increasingly allocated to insti-
tutional investors like pension funds, mutual funds and life insurance com-
panies, who play a key role in the Netherlands, Australia, Denmark and the 
United Kingdom. Nevertheless, we can detect significant cross-national dis-
tinctions. Whereas pension fund investments are of major significance in 
Australia, the Netherlands and the United States, investment in life insur-
ance is particularly important in France. 
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 Since the re-arrangement of welfare states in Continental Europe repre-
sents an unfinished project which is expected to continue over the next dec-
ades, we have to relate the increasing private insurance investments in (still) 
generous welfare states to trust in institutions and status insecurity – or even 
status anxiety. A high level of private insurance wealth may indicate a low 
level of trust in the future stability of the current welfare state arrangements. 
This overlaps with current social diagnoses which hint at ‘fears of falling’ 
and status insecurities within the European middle classes (Mau 2015; Bude 
2014; Nachtwey 2016). It seems that people in Continental and Southern 
European societies want to be prepared for an upcoming era of market-
provided retirement provision. At the moment it seems that in generous 
Continental European welfare states, private pension provision is perhaps 
not so much a substitution to publicly provided old age security, but it may 
rather function as an option to raise one’s standard of living in old age for 
wealthier segments of society. Of course, this is ‘insurance’ too – however, 
insurance with the aim of social distinction through raising the level of con-
sumption rather than insuring one’s level of existence. It thus represents the 
‘bet’ on the chance of ‘having enough’, of being able to live a ‘good life’ in 
retirement. 
 However, what is ‘promised security’ and ‘financial prudence’ at first 
glance, turns out to be a risky financial enterprise. Also private wealth dele-
gated to institutional investors, who manage large pools of investment capi-
tal, is exposed to the dynamics and volatilities of global financial markets. 
 
Financialization, Risk and Stratification 
When we take a look at the social structure of financialized society, practic-
es of saving and investment turn out to be socially embedded. Household 
financialization is mainly determined by socio-economic characteristics – 
mainly income and wealth, whereas education is less important. The find-
ings also demonstrate a close association between financial investment prac-
tices and ‘cultures of financial risk’. We can find cross-nationally varying 
risk mentalities. When it comes to investment behavior, the ‘love for risk’ is 
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not as important in European societies as in the US case. In the United 
States, the ‘taste for risk’ and financial practices are intertwined at the clos-
est. Accordingly, a US ‘culture of finance’ seems to be characterized by a 
‘risk-reward frame’ so that we can speak of a ‘real’ culture of financial risk. 
Contrary, a European ‘culture of finance’ seems to be rather marked by the 
influence of social status and economic affluence. The United States and 
Continental Europe represent two distinct ‘worlds of financialization’. This 
manifests not so much in quantitative terms of levels of private wealth held 
in form of risky assets or levels of financial market participation. In both 
cases, Dutch or Finish households are partly as financialized as their US 
counterparts – partly even more. The difference between these ‘worlds’ 
seems to manifest in qualitative terms. The perception of financial risk and 
its meaning for investment decisions are substantially different. 
 In the course of the rise of finance, financial market volatility has in-
creased, making financial investment by ordinary investors riskier, just 
when the demise of traditional pension schemes makes them more depend-
ent on financial assets to fund old age retirement. The growing role of pen-
sion funds and life insurance reserves throughout the last decades is not 
solely to be explained by the (expected) erosion of public old age provision 
that has made households to seek supplementary pension income in finan-
cial markets. Processes of financial liberalization and deregulation resulted 
in an expansion of innovative financial products offered by financial firms 
and targeted to households. The liberalization of capital accounts, the stand-
ardization of financial practices and the gradual retreat by the national state 
from the financial sector might account for the synchronous growth of these 
‘new’ actors and products across the Anglo-Saxon and Western European 
world, making pension funds available for the wealthier strata of society, 
both in countries with more mature and emerging financial markets. The 
popularity of private pension insurance not only depends on institutional 
arrangements, as shown by the time-series analyses, but is also closely relat-
ed to the social stratification of society. The decision to invest in pension 
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funds is strongly influenced by a household’s position in the wealth distribu-
tion. 
 Thus, whereas household income and individual earnings relate to the 
current standard of living, household wealth reflects (1) past financial well-
being (to the extent that savings represents the excess of income over ex-
penditure) and (2) future financial well-being. Wealth represents the cumu-
lative effect of historical inequalities (in earnings, income, bequests). This 
means that wealth-ownership plays a major role in driving future inequali-
ties, through its transformable potential and the ability to invest not only in 
housing and business enterprise, but also in education and bequests or re-
tirement – features pointed out prominently by Piketty and Bourdieu – and 
already by Simmel. 
 
Global Economic Events – Crises and Crazes 
Globality, unevenness and ambivalence of private wealth dynamics in a 
financialized world are at the closest interrelated with the destinies of global 
financial market forces. Investment practices and the ups and downs of 
global financial markets go hand in hand. The evolution of private wealth 
and its composition moves in synchrony with financial crises and booms. 
 This hints at the inextricable linkage of everyday life and the conse-
quences of financialization. One the one hand, difference is marginalized 
because financial crises, market dynamics and increasing financial risk con-
cern everybody – albeit to different degrees. We might speak of a “sociali-
zing of risk” (Dodd 2011) in financialized society. One the other hand, 
however, financialization contributes to the polarization of society, in an era 
characterized by precariousness and vulnerability. We can find contours of a 
“world risk society” (Beck 1999) as well as a “winner-take-all society” 
(Frank and Cook 1995; Hacker and Pierson 2010). 
 In such a way, financial market dynamics lead to an intensification of 
potentials of uncertainty and inequality. When looking at the social groups 
primarily involved within practices of ‘high household finance’, we can 
witness ambivalent and reciprocal relationships. Virulent ‘cultures of fi-
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nance’ practiced within risk-loving, educated and well off fractions of socie-
ty reflect general processes of uncertainty, precarity and upward aspirations. 
This ‘culture of finance’ asks not only for the willingness to take on greater 
risks. Certain financial products are even regarded as supposedly risk-free 
and safe – totally misleading against the background of a ‘world risk socie-
ty’. The permanent search for security in an uncertain world brings about 
speculative practices of organized financial actors (institutional investors) 
on a global scale. People shift responsibility towards the hands of collec-
tives in times when demand for their individual autonomy and responsibility 
increases. Financialization reflects the ambivalences of individualization. 
We can witness a ‘risk-shift’ form state towards citizens and then a further 
‘responsibility-shift’ from citizens towards organized investors. This shift, 
however, is only a supposed shift. In the end, ordinary people lose their 
money and have to pay the price – or receive their dividends and make a 
quick buck. 
 Within this social transformation of private wealth and responsibility, 
orientations and beliefs underlying ‘cultures of finance’ contribute to the 
delegation of private household wealth to organized speculation by institu-
tional investors. Thus, in a non-directional way, people reinforce social 
trends of uncertainty and inequality – just “unanticipated consequences of 
purposive social action” (Merton 1936). 
 
Implications for Future Research 
The present study implies that future research has to dig deeper when it 
comes to dynamics of private wealth and ‘cultures of finance’. First, 
throughout our study the unevenness and ambivalence of capitalistic devel-
opment is explored in its distinct national context. But although the national 
society is (still) relevant from an institutionalist perspective and represents a 
distinct social reality, future research will have to move beyond national 
‘cultures of finance’. This kind of ‘methodological nationalism’ could be 
overcome in terms of supra and subnational levels (regions etc.) or in terms 
of a “world society” (Meyer 2009) perspective.  
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 Second, this study chose a quantitative approached to study household 
financialization. Future studies, however, will have to provide additional 
qualitative inquiries of financial actors. So far, only little research has made 
inquiries into household financialization making use of qualitative methods 
(see Schimank and Stopper 2012; Legnaro et al. 2005; Chan 2013; Harring-
ton 2008 for exceptions). Quantitative methods by itself are not enough for 
the task of exploring ‘cultures of finance’ because underlying realities can 
be veiled by solo-use of quantitative datasets. From such a perspective, 
analysis of qualitative data promises to elucidate both (evolving) situations 
and (evolving) subjectivities by exploring locally-historically situated sub-
jectivities. Narrative accounts, for instance, would allow understanding how 
peoples’ practices and perceptions have emerged over a longer period of 
time, how attitudes towards financial risk are constructed and emerge in 
everyday life, as well as how evolving situations are internalized and how 
coping mechanisms are developed.  
 Third, we chiefly concentrated on financial wealth and only touched is-
sues of housing wealth. Thus in the future, research will have to take a clos-
er look at the interrelationship of dynamics of financialization and housing 
wealth. The existing sociological studies on housing offer a perfect starting 
point. How do financial movements affect house prices? Do financial dy-
namics and events drive households to invest in financial assets more likely 
than in housing assets – or vice versa? Are financial assets and housing as-
sets complementary or substitutive?  
 Fourth, our study has also mainly focused on wealth and assets and has 
insofar only partly referred to debt. However, an important facet of 
financialization in general and household financialization in particular is the 
increasing significance of credit and debt (Fligstein and Goldstein 2015; 
Kus 2013; Langley 2008; Crouch 2009). Issues of debt are inseparable re-
lated to the study of wealth. In order to adequately interpret findings deriv-
ing from the investigation of wealth, an examination of private debt is abso-
lutely necessary. Future research will have to concentrate on the ‘asset-debt-
nexus’. 
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 Fifth, we would also like to encourage research on the financially ‘ex-
cluded’ and ‘finance negators’. Although financial exclusion has proved to 
be a popular topic of sociological research, little research has engaged in 
taking a look at households or communities who try to refuse to take part in 
the dynamics of global finance. By analyzing the ‘outsiders’ of global fi-
nance, research will also be able to investigate into the ‘universals’ of global 
finance. 
 Sixth, typically, financialization is viewed as a phenomenon diffusing 
from the US context into other contexts (Dore 2002; Salento 2014; Dixon 
and Sorsa 2009; Fiss and Zajac 2004; Vitols 2004). By undertaking careful 
case studies, the household-level diffusion of US-style finance in Continen-
tal and Southern Europe, Far Eastern societies and Russia should by ex-
plored and understood. How diffusion happens locally? Which social forces 
are of major significance? Is diffusion a top-down process, a bottom-up pro-
cess or a mix of both? 
 Seventh, analyzing financial culture contact, for instance by exploring 
practices and mentalities of immigrants, could provide further insights into 
the dynamics, boundaries and workings of ‘cultures of finance’. This task 
would reach further sophistication by comparing immigrants with the global 
financial players which in some kind represent also ‘migrants’ in a ‘world 
finance society’. 
 An eighth point is dedicated to data issues. Our findings demonstrate the 
‘social life’ of private wealth portfolios. Analysis of longitudinal micro-
level data – preferably panel data – may shed additional light on the dynam-
ic character of the social structure of private wealth and the development of 
‘cultures of finance’. In order to take on a panoramic view and to back up 
financialization research by a historical perspective, we need more historical 
data reaching further back than 1970. Economic historians have engaged in 
collecting historical aggregate data on private finances to find out if we can 
really speak of a ‘this time different phenomenon’ with regard to contempo-
rary phenomena of financialization (see Jordá et al. 2013, 2014; 
Waldenström 2016) or inequality (see Saez and Zucman 2016; Roine and 
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Waldenström 2015). Data issues, however, do not touch the temporal di-
mension alone. There is need for adequate homogenized datasets which 
cover both various components of household wealth and financial attitudes 
as well. Ideally, attitudes towards financial activities would be surveyed on 
a cross-national scale, more subtle as so far and on a regular basis to be able 
to construct time series. 
 Ninth, up to now, the increasing role of finance in society has resulted in 
massive socio-economic changes. Currently, an abrupt end of present forms 
of financialization is hard to believe. Nevertheless: ‘time will tell…’. So, the 
study of financialization will not only have to deal with historical accounts 
and present-day social diagnosis, but as well with future perspectives. By 
structuring current decisions towards investment and saving, structures and 
outcomes of financialization have great impact on private future wealth. 
This gains additional significance due to the powerful social institution of 
inheritance. 
 Last but not least, we should mention that the data analysis was conduct-
ed with data from official sources – aggregate macro-data and household-
level survey data. Consequently, ‘informal’ investments within family-
networks, informal networks, peer-groups or criminal and illegal enterprises 
are definitively excluded from analysis. Here, future research on issues of 
financialization will find a methodologically challenging but interesting 
field of investigation. 
 
Conclusion 
The study demonstrates that the ‘rise of finance’ and processes of 
financialization have profound consequences for dynamics of private wealth 
– for its accumulation and meaning, for its composition and distribution. 
Financialization can be described as a multi-dimensional phenomenon 
whose different levels are inextricably interrelated. The findings confirm 
that financialization involves the penetration of finance into ever more areas 
of social life. 
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 However, the study also points at the limits of financialization – at least 
for the household level. These limits of financialization partly originate 
from local and social translation, editing and hybridization that mitigate the 
process. Processes of diffusion imply reception and reception calls for local 
appropriation, contextual decoding and “indigenization” (Scott 2003). As 
they flow, ideas and normative categories are edited, translated and hybrid-
ized or even rejected (Campbell 2004; Westney 1987; Djelic 2006). Where-
as financial logics have advanced in the Western World, in several places 
national welfare schemes have not experienced fundamental dismantlement 
(Deacon 2005). US-style financial practices and ideas are often not well-
suited for traditional environments, for instance the religion based financial 
environments of the Islamic world. Limits of financialization are also evi-
dent in forms of “decoupling” (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer and Scott 
1983). Sometimes financial discourses and ideologies differ from their im-
plementation and practicing in reality. Another limit can be located within 
the phenomena produced by the ‘rise of finance’ itself. Crisis, vulnerability 
and dissatisfaction can give reason for the rise of ‘new’ frames how to or-
ganize economic life. As we have seen, financial crisis are destructive for 
wealth on a global level and produce a number of ‘losers’. After crisis 
events, people tend to withdraw from risky investment in financial markets 
and search for safety within ‘old’, ‘traditional’ forms of saving or turn to 
collective funds to minimize risk. Furthermore, individuals (citizens) and 
collectives (states, funds) are only willing and able to absorb global finan-
cial crises to certain limits – especially in times of increasing frequency of 
crises. As Bordo et al. (2001) show, the era from 1973 to 2000 was marked 
by a frequency of financial crises that was double that of the Bretton Woods 
and gold standard eras and close to that of the 1920s and 1930s. As they put 
it, “[h]istory confirms that there is something different and disturbing about 
our age” (Bordo et al. 2001: 72). 
 In analyzing trajectories and patterns of private wealth in an era of 
financialization, this study contributes to a comprehensive uncovering of 
socio-economic processes and structures which are essential for understand-
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ing contemporary financialized capitalism. The investigation into social dy-
namics of private wealth supports the general understanding of economic 
practices, social actors and institutions in our society. Sociologists just start-
ed to comprehend the nature of change and the ‘power of inertia’, so that a 
lot of work remains to be done. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 26: Share of the FIRE sector (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate) as a percentage of 
GDP, 1970–2010 
 
 Country Abv. Time span Source 
1 Australia AUS 1976–2012 Australian Bureau of Statistics 
2 Canada CAN 1970–2012 Statistics Canada 
3 Denmark DNK 1973–2012 Danish National Bank; World Wealth and 
Income Database (WID) 
4 Finland FIN 1975–2012 Bank of Finland 
5 France FRA 1970–2012 INSEE; Banque de France 
6 Germany GER 1970–2012 Deutsche Bundesbank;  
Deutsche Bundesbank 1994 
7 Italy ITA 1970–2012 Banca d’Italia; Bonci and Coletta 2008; 
Istat; Pagliano and Rossi 1992 
8 Japan JPN 1970–2012 Economic and Social Research Institute 
of Japan’s Cabinet Office; Bank of Japan 
9 Netherlands NLD 1980–2012 Statistics Netherlands;  
De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) 
10 Portugal PRT 1980–2012 Banco de Portugal; Cardoso et al. 2008 
11 Spain ESP 1980–2012 Banca de España 
12 Sweden SWE 1970–2012 Sveriges Riksbank; Statistics Sweden; 
Swedish National Wealth Database 
(SNWD) (Waldenström 2015, 2016) 
13 United 
Kingdom 
UK 1970–2012 Office for National Statistics (ONS); 
Sbano 2008 
14 United States USA 1970–2012 Federal Reserve Board (FRB);  
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
Table 16: Sources for aggregate data on private wealth, its components and private debt 
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Figure 27: The share of financial wealth and housing wealth in private gross wealth (Data 
for 2010) 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Development of private housing wealth in thirteen countries, 1970–2012 
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Figure 29: Development of private debt in eleven countries, 1970–2012 
 
 
 
Figure 30: The composition of private financial wealth (Australia), 1989–2012 
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Figure 31: The composition of private financial wealth (Denmark), 1973–2012 
 
 
 
Figure 32: The composition of private financial wealth (Finland), 1970–2012 
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Figure 33: The composition of private financial wealth (France), 1970–2012 
 
 
 
Figure 34: The composition of private financial wealth (Netherlands), 1990–2012 
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Figure 35: The composition of private financial wealth (Portugal), 1980–2012 
 
 
 
Figure 36: The composition of private financial wealth (Spain), 1980–2012 
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Figure 37: The composition of private financial wealth (United Kingdom), 1970–2012 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38: Top 10 shares in wealth and income (Data for 2010) 
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Private Net Wealth/GDP (%) 507 291.084 107.009 106.173 638.520 
Private Debt/GDP (%) 530 56.298 25.790 5.596 147.654 
Private Housing Wealth/GDP (%) 513 177.848 70.964 85.865 562.210 
Private Insurance Wealth/GDP (%) 517 46.558 36.372 0.000 171.426 
Social Transfers/GDP (%) 559 13.114 4.048 3.110 23.660 
Pension Generosity (Pension 
Replacement Rate) 484 0.583 0.186 0.143 1.119 
Unemployment Generosity 
(Unemployment Replacement Rate) 530 0.569 0.215 0.000 0.973 
Sick Pay Generosity (Sick Pay 
Replacement Rate) 524 0.578 0.271 0.000 0.969 
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP 
(%) 533 54.800 42.952 0.195 268.110 
Dependency Ratio (Proportion of 
population older than 65 of total) 559 21.351 4.587 10.244 38.407 
Life Expectancy 559 76.602 3.166 66.400 83.200 
Saving Rate 523 9.810 6.272 -6.000 25.400 
Income Inequality (Top 1) 510 8.258 2.749 3.490 19.340 
Equity Prices 559 459.310 1093.987 1.200 8010.890 
Property Prices 540 107.918 78.089 4.991 388.612 
Inflation (CPI) 559 5.483 5.112 -1.350 31.020 
GDP Growth 559 2.531 2.433 -8.540 11.200 
GDP per capita 559 4.197 0.312 3.297 4.711 
Financial Crisis 559 0.038 0.190 0.000 1.000 
Table 17: Summary statistics 
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Variable Description Source 
Private Net Wealth Household financial assets 
plus household housing 
assets minus household 
liabilities to GDP 
See Table 16 
Private Debt Household liabilities to GDP See Table 16 
Private Housing Wealth Household housing assets to 
GDP 
See Table 16 
Private Insurance Wealth Household insurance assets 
to GDP 
See Table 16 
Welfare State Size Social Transfers as a 
percentage of GDP 
OECD Historical Statistics; 
Comparative Political Dataset 
I 1960–2012 (Armingeon et 
al. 2014) 
Pension Generosity  Pension Replacement Rate Comparative Welfare 
Entitlements Data Set 
(Scruggs et al. 2014) 
Unemployment Generosity  Unemployment Replacement 
Rate 
Comparative Welfare 
Entitlements Data Set 
(Scruggs et al. 2014) 
Sick Pay Generosity Sick Pay Replacement Rate Comparative Welfare 
Entitlements Data Set 
(Scruggs et al. 2014) 
Stock Market Size Stock Market Capitalization 
as a percentage of GDP 
World Bank (Financial 
Development and Structure 
Dataset (Beck et al. 2000; 
Čihák et al. 2012); Rajan and 
Zingales 2003; Bozio 2002 
Dependency Ratio  Proportion of population 
older than 65 years (the 
elderly) as a percentage of the 
total population 
OECD  
Life Expectancy Life expectancy at birth OECD 
Saving Rate Household gross saving to 
GDP 
OECD; National Statistical 
Offices 
Income Inequality Income share of the highest 
one percent in the income 
distribution 
Wealth and Income Database 
(WID) 
Equity Prices Stock prices (nominal index 
1990=100) 
OECD; Jordà-Schularick-
Taylor (JST) Dataset  
Property Prices House prices (nominal index 
1990=100) 
Knoll et al. 2014; OECD; 
BIS 
Inflation Consumer price index (CPI) OECD 
GDP Growth Real economic growth OECD 
GDP per capita gross domestic 
product divided by midyear 
population 
OECD; Penn World Tables 
Financial Crisis Systemic financial crisis (0-1-
dummy) 
Jordà-Schularick-Taylor 
(JST) Dataset; Laeven and 
Valencia 2012 
Table 18: Data sources and description of the variables 
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